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Abstract
This thesis is a collection of essays on contract theory and behavioral economics. Chapter 1
proposes a model of choice under risk based on imperfect memory and self-deception. The
model assumes that people have preferences over their own attributes and can, to some extent,
manipulate their memories. It leads to a non-expected utility representation and provides
a unified explanation for several empirical regularities: non-linear probability weights, small-
stakes risk aversion, regret and the competence hypothesis. It also leads to endowment and sunk
cost effects. The model implies that behavior will converge to the one predicted by expected
utility theory after a choice has been made a sufficiently large number of times.
Chapter 2 develops a model of competition with non-exclusive contracts in a market where
consumers are time-inconsistent. Non-exclusivity creates a stark asymmetry between immediate-
costs goods and immediate-rewards goods. In the former, non-exclusivity does not affect the
equilibrium and, when consumers are sophisticated, the efficient allocation is achieved. When
consumers are partially naive, the optimal sales tax may be either positive or negative and
depends on parameters that are hard to estimate. In the case of immediate-rewards goods,
however, the equilibrium features marginal-cost pricing and is always Pareto inefficient. More-
over, the optimal tax does not depend on the consumers' degree of naivete and is a function of
parameters that are easy to assess.
Chapter 3 is based on a joint work with Aloisio Araujo and Humberto Moreira. It considers
a job-market signaling model where signals convey two pieces of information. The model is
employed to study countersignalling (signals nonmonotonic in ability) and the GED exam.
A result of the model is that countersignalling is more likely to occur in jobs that require a
combination of skills that differs from the combination used in the schooling process. The
model also produces testable implications consistent with evidence on the GED: (i) it signals
both high cognitive and low noncognitive skills and (ii) it does not affect wages.
Chapter 4, which is also based on joint work with Aloisio Araujo and Humberto Moreira,
characterizes incentive-compatibility in models where types are multidimensional and the single-
crossing condition may not hold. This characterization is used to obtain the optimal contracts
in multidimensional screening as well as the equilibria in multidimensional signaling models.
Then, I determine the implications of signaling and screening models when the single-crossing
condition is violated. I show that the unique robust prediction of signaling is the monotonicity
of transfers in (costly) actions. Any function from the space of types to the space of actions and
an increasing transfer schedule can be rationalized as an equilibrium profile of many signaling
models. Apart from the monotonicity of transfers in actions, I obtain an additional necessary
and sufficient condition in the case of screening. In one-dimensional models, this condition
states that the principal's profit as a function of the agent's type must grow at a higher rate
under asymmetric information than under symmetric information.
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Chapter 1
Imperfect Memory and Choice
under Risk
1.1 Introduction
Choices with uncertain outcomes are an important part of a person's life. The outcomes often
depend on the person's own attributes (e.g., skill, knowledge, or competence) and, therefore,
affect the individual's self-views. Choices that turn out to be wrong typically lead to self-doubt,
while choices that turn out to be right enhance the person's self-image. Hence, a person who
cares about self-image has an incentive to manipulate recollections and beliefs. Indeed, there
is sizeable psychological evidence that people value a positive self-image and manipulate their
memories (see Section 1.1.1).
This chapter analyzes how the concern for self-image affects an individual's behavior under
risk when memory is imperfect. The model is based on two basic premises: First, individuals
have preferences over their own attributes; Second, they can (to some extent) affect what
they will remember. Both assumptions are largely supported by evidence from the psychology
literature. Apart from these two assumptions, individuals are assumed to behave as in standard
economic models. Their preferences satisfy the axioms of expected utility theory. Furthermore,
individuals follow Bayes' rule and, therefore, are aware of their memory imperfection. The model
ties the concept of self-deception together with several deviations from standard expected utility
theory, such as ambiguity aversion, non-linear probability weights, risk aversion over lotteries
with small stakes, regret aversion and the competence hypothesis. It also leads to endowment
and sunk cost effects.
In its simplest version, the model consists of a two-period decision problem. In the first
period, an individual observes the realization of a signal oa {H, L}, which is informative
about her attributes. Then, she chooses the probability of remembering the realization of
the signal by engaging in memory manipulation. In the second period, the individual applies
Bayes' rule to her recollection of the signal. Because Bayes' rule implies that, on average, the
individual's interpretation of her recollections are correct, self-deception does not change her
(ex-ante) expected self-views. Hence, from an ex-ante point of view, memory manipulation
is wasteful and, therefore, the agent would prefer not to observe the realization of the signal.
Nevertheless, after observing the signal, the individual has an incentive to manipulate her
memory in order to improve her self-image.
The model leads directly to preferences for avoiding information: people prefer not to ac-
quire certain information if the expected benefit from making an informed decision is lower
than the costs of self-deception. Because individuals anticipate these costs, they may prefer to
make uninformed decisions if the objective value of information is sufficiently low. This result
contrasts with Blackwell's celebrated theorem, which states that additional information can
never be harmful. It is consistent, however, with the large psychology literature that connects
self-deception and information avoidance. For example, people may avoid health exams, espe-
cially if the value of information is not high enough (e.g. the disease is not easily treatable)
and if being diagnosed with the disease significantly affects the person's self-image. Individuals
may also engage in "self-handicapping" strategies, such as under-preparing for an examination
or getting too little sleep before physical exercise, in order to reduce the informational content
of the signal. They may also display a "fear of competition" since outcomes from competitors
are often informative about the person's own attributes.
When outcomes a E {H, L} consist of monetary payments, the individual's expected utility
can be represented by
w (q) UH + [1 - w (q)] UL,
where us is the decision-maker's utility in the state where s occurs and q is the probability of
state s = H. The probability weight w (q) is lower than the actual probability q when outcomes
lead to memory manipulation. Hence, these preferences provide a self-deception explanation
for non-expected utility and ambiguity aversion.
As in other models that admit non-expected utility representations, the decision-maker
may reject gambles with small but positive expected value. The agent may also exhibit a gap
between the maximum willingness to pay for a good and the minimum compensation demanded
for the same good (endowment effect). However, unlike other non-expected utility models, the
departure from linear weights in my model is directly related to the decision-maker's self-
perceived attributes. This departure is consistent with experimental evidence suggesting that
deviations from expected utility theory are associated with the lotteries' being correlated with
the decision-maker's skill or knowledge (c.f., Heath and Tversky, 1991, Josephs et al., 1992,
Fox and Tversky, 1995, Goodie, 2003, and Goodie and Young, 2007).1 In particular, the model
provides a formalization of the (informal) theory of regret aversion based on self-perception
proposed by Josephs et al. (1992). According to this theory, individuals with low self-image
are more likely to make choices that minimize the possibility of regret. While different patterns
may also be consistent with the model, it is able to predict the behavior described by Heath
and Tversky (1991), according to which individuals prefer a knowledge-based lottery instead of
a knowledge-independent lottery with the same expected probability of winning if and only if the
individual believes that the probability of a positive outcome is high (competence hypothesis).2
The model also allows the decision maker to reject small gambles without imposing unrealistic
degrees of risk aversion over large gambles.
Two applications illustrate the theory. Successful trading usually requires certain skills or
knowledge. At the very least, the agent must form expectations about how much each good
is worth. In more complex markets, future prices of the goods must also be estimated. Thus,
the outcome of the trade is informative about the person's skills or knowledge. Since decision-
makers avoid information correlated with skills or knowledge, they will accept a trade only if the
expected benefit from the trade exceeds a certain positive threshold. Therefore, self-deception
leads to an endowment effect.
The second application considers the influence of sunk decisions on behavior. In several
'See Subsection 1.4.2 for a more detailed discussion.
2 The model is also consistent with behavior that Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) have shown to be inconsistent with
the Psychological Expected Utility model of Caplin and Leahy (2001).
contexts, revising one's decision usually involves admitting that a wrong decision was made
and, therefore, it is often informative to the person about her own skills or knowledge. My
model provides a self-deception explanation for the influence of sunk decisions on behavior that
is consistent with arguments from the literature in psychology.
In a repeated setting in which the person observes a sequence of signals and engages in
memory manipulation after each signal is realized, the attitude towards risk converges to the
one implied by expected utility theory. This result is consistent with the arguments that people
do not exhibit ambiguity aversion over events that have been observed several times and that
experts are subject to much less bias than beginners (e.g. List, 2003, List and Haigh, 2005).
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 1.1.1 briefly reviews the psychological
evidence on the memory and the related literature in economics. Section 1.2 introduces and
discusses the general framework. In Section 1.3, I describe the implications for information
acquisition. Section 1.4 considers lotteries over money and provides a representation result. In
Section 1.5, I analyze a repeated version of the model. Section 1.6 presents the two applications
of the model. Section 1.7 summarizes the main results and discusses possible extensions. The
appendix relaxes some assumptions from the model and presents the proofs of the propositions
in the text.3
1.1.1 Related Literature
An Overview of the Psychology Literature
Ego-involvement, or its absence, makes a critical difference in human behavior.
When a person reacts in a neutral, impersonal, routine atmosphere, his behavior is
one thing. But when he is behaving personally, perhaps excitedly, seriously com-
mitted to a task, he behaves quite differently. In the first condition his ego is not
engaged; in the second, it is. (Gordon W. Allport, 1943, pp. 459).
Psychologists have largely documented a human tendency to deny or misrepresent reality
to oneself (i.e., engage in self-deception). In general, people consider themselves to be "smart,"
3Appendix A relaxes the additive separability assumption made in Section 1.4; Appendix B considers naive
decision-makers, who are unaware of their memory imperfection; Appendix C considers models with any finite
number of possible states, and Appendix D presents the proofs.
"knowledgeable," and "nice." Information conflicting with this image is usually ignored or
denied. Greenwald (1980, pp. 605), for example, argued that "[o]ne of the best established
recent findings in social psychology is that people perceive themselves readily as the origin of
good effects and reluctantly as the origin of ill effects." Similarly, Gollwitzer, Earle, and Stephan
(1982, pp. 702), claimed that the "asymmetrical attributions after success and failure" is a
"firmly established finding."
People are also more likely to remember successes than failures (Korner, 1950). After
choosing between two different options, they tend to recall the positive aspects of the chosen
option and the negative aspects of the forgone option (Mather, Shafir, and Johnson, 2003).
Relatedly, individuals overestimate their achievements and readily find evidence that they pos-
sess attributes which they believe to be correlated with success in personal or professional life
(Kunda and Sanitioso, 1989; Quattrone and Tversky, 1984). Success is usually attributed to
one's own ability and effort, whereas failure tends to be attributed to bad luck or other external
variables (Gollwitzer, Earle, and Stephan, 1982, Zuckerman, 1979). 4 In group settings, where
each individual's contribution cannot be unequivocally determined, people tend to attribute to
themselves a larger share of the group's outcome after a success and a smaller share after a
failure (Johnston, 1967).
Self-assessments and the memory are intrinsically connected. In his Essay Concerning Hu-
man Understanding, Locke (1690) identified the self with memory. Mill (1829, Vol. 2, pp. 174)
argued that "[t]he phenomenon of Self and that of Memory are merely two sides of the same
fact." Modern cognitive psychologists define the self as the "mental representation of oneself,
including all that one knows about oneself' (Kihlstrom et al., 2002). Therefore, a model of
self-views should devote considerable attention to memory.
In psychology, the memory is typically viewed as imperfect and manipulable. Rapaport
(1961), for example, conceived "memory not as an ability to revive accurately impressions once
obtained but as the integration of impressions into the whole personality and their revival
according to the needs of the whole personahty." Allport (1943) believed that self-deception was
a mechanism of ego defense and the maintenance of self-esteem. Hilgard (1949, pp. 374) argued
4 Van den Steen (2004) presents a model of rational agents with differing priors that generates these biases.
Harbaugh (2008) provides a career concerns explanation for prospect theory.
that "the need for self-deception arises because of a more fundamental need to maintain or to
restore self-esteem. Anything belittling the self is to be avoided." Festinger (1957) suggested
that individuals have a tendency to seek consistency among their cognitions (i.e., beliefs and
opinions). He labeled the discomfort felt when one is presented with evidence that conflicts with
one's beliefs and the resulting effort to distort those beliefs or opinions cognitive dissonance.
In a review of the recent literature in social psychology, Sedikides, Green, and Pinter (2004,
pp. 165) describe people as "striving for a positive self-definition or the avoidance of a negative
self-definition (...) at the expense of accuracy and truthfulness." According to them, "[m]emory
serves the function of shielding a positive self-definition from negativity."
There are several reasons why people may want to believe in things that are not true. First,
there may be a hedonic value of positive self-views so that people simply like to think that
they have these attributes.5 Second, as argued by Compte and Postlewaite (2004), a person
may benefit from having overconfident beliefs in situations where emotions affect performance.
Third, manipulating one's own beliefs may facilitate the deception of others. Thus, holding an
optimistic view of oneself may help convincing others of one's own value.6 Fourth, there may
be a motivational value of belief manipulation. As Benabou and Tirole (2002) and Weinberg
(2006) argued, confidence in one's ability may help the person set more ambitious goals and
persist in adverse situations.
This essay abstracts from the exact reason why people may value a positive self-image. The
model developed here is based on the two basic ideas discussed above. First, individuals have
preferences over their attributes. Second, they can affect what they will remember. The essay
focuses on how memory manipulations affect the person's attitudes towards risk.
As the opening quote from Allport demonstrates, psychologists have long realized that self-
deception may change a person's behavior. Festinger (1957, pp. 3), for example, argued that
"[w]hen dissonance is present, in addition to trying to reduce it, the person will actively avoid
situations and information which would likely increase the dissonance." More recently, Josephs
et al. (1992, pp. 27) argued that "[r]isky decisions are potentially threatening to self-esteem
5For example, in Schelling's (1985) theory of the mind as a consuming organ, self-views have a hedonic value.
"As argued by Trivers (2000, pp. 115), "[b]eing unconscious of ongoing deception may more deeply hide
the deception. Conscious deceivers will often be under the stress that accompanies attempted deception." This
argument is modelled formally by Byrne and Kurland (2001) in an evolutionary game.
because the chosen alternative will occasionally yield a less desirable outcome than would some
other alternative. When a less desirable outcome does occur, it can sometimes lead people to
doubt their judgement and ability, especially when the decision is an important one."
This chapter shows that incorporating self-deception in a standard model of choice can lead
to a unified theory of choice under risk that is consistent with economic phenomena such as
ambiguity aversion, risk aversion over lotteries with small stakes, regret, and the competence
hypothesis. It also leads to endowment and sunk cost effects.
An Overview of the Literature on Imperfect Memory
The economic literature on imperfect memory can be divided in two strands. The first assumes
that decision makers are naive and act as if they have not forgotten anything (Mullainathan,
2002). The other strand assumes that decision makers are sophisticated, so that they draw
Bayesian inferences given that they might have forgotten things. This essay follows the latter
approach and considers the case of rational decision makers subject to imperfect recall.7 As
suggested by Piccione and Rubinstein (1997), the resulting game of imperfect recall is solved by
the principle of "multiself consistency," whereby decisions made in different stages are viewed
as being made by different incarnations of the decision maker.
Models of limited memory are a special case of imperfect memory. They were originally
proposed by Robbins (1956) in the mathematical statistics literature. He suggested a decision
rule for choosing between two lotteries with unknown distributions that was conditional on a
finite number of outcomes (finite memory). In a series of papers, Cover and Hellman charac-
terized optimal solutions to some finite memory problems.8  More recently, economists have
independently studied optimal decision making subject to limited memory. Dow (1991) con-
sidered the behavior of a consumer looking for the lowest price. Wilson (2003) studied how
limited memory leads to certain biases in belief formation. Hirshleifer and Welch (2002) consid-
ered informational cascades generated by players who observe actions but not the information
leading to such actions.
In a sequence of papers, Benabou and Tirole have used imperfect memory frameworks to
7Appendix B considers the case of naive decision makers.
8 See Hellman and Cover (1973) for a review of the main results in this literature.
study questions from the psychology literature. Based on the assumption that agents recalled
actions but not their motivations, they have proposed theories of personal rules and internal
commitments (Benabou and Tirole, 2004), prosocial behavior (Benabou and Tirole, 2006b), and
identity and taboos (Benabou and Tirole, 2006c). Using a model of self-deception, Benabou and
Tirole (2002, 2006a) analyzed the provision of self-motivation and the formation of collective
beliefs and ideologies.
The model of memory presented here is general enough to allow for an agnostic view of
the behavior of the memory system. It encompasses both Benabou and Tirole's self-deception
framework and a static version of the limited memory framework as special cases. This essay is
also connected to the economic literature on cognitive dissonance (Akerlof and Dickens, 1982,
Rabin, 1994). This literature assumes that agents derive utility from their beliefs and that they
can, at some cost, choose their beliefs. Separately, Lowenstein (1987), Caplin and Leahy (2001
and 2004), and KOszegi (2006) have studied models with anticipatory emotions.9
1.2 General Framework
The Decision Problem
The model examines a decision maker (DM) who has preferences over her attributes 0. At-
tributes 0 may be interpreted as skills, knowledge, or competence as well as a parameter of
anticipatory utility. Let O be a non-empty subset of R representing the possible values of 0 and
let F (.) denote the agent's prior distribution of 0.10
The DM acts in 3 periods (t = 0, 1, 2). In period 0, she chooses an action a from a non-
empty, compact subset of a finite dimensional Euclidean space A. For example, a can be an
investment decision or a decision of whether to undertake some medical examination. The set
9 Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) proposed a theory of "optimal expectations," according to which individuals
choose their beliefs balancing the gains from anticipating a higher future utility with the losses from suboptimal
decision-making. Similarly, Hvide (2002) proposed the notion of "pragmatic beliefs," which are the beliefs that
maximize the individual's utility. Bernheim and Thomadsen (2005) showed that memory imperfections and
anticipatory emotions may lead to a resolution of Newcomb's Paradox and sustain cooperation in the Prisoners
Dilemma.
108 can be continuous or discrete, as long as it contains at least two elements (otherwise, 0 cannot be random).
Note that we have not assumed that the agent has a correct prior distribution over 0. Therefore, agents are allowed
to hold optimistic or pessimistic beliefs about their attributes.
A can also be a singleton, in which case the agent makes no choice in period 0.11
In period t = 1, an outcome oa, which can be either high (H) or low (L), is observed. The
outcome a may be a purely informative signal, entering the agent's preferences only indirectly
through her beliefs about her attributes 0. It may also affect the agent's preferences directly.
For example, a medical exam consists of a purely informative signal, whereas the outcomes
of an investment affect an individual not only through their informational content but also
through the different monetary payments associated with them. I denote by qa E (0, 1) the
probability of observing a high outcome given action a E A. A high outcome is assumed to be
more favorable than a low outcome in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance:
F (OIga = H) < F (ia, = L) for all 0 E O, (1.1)
with strict inequality for some value of 0, and for all a E A.
Following Rabin (1994), Benabou and Tirole (2002, 2006a), and Benabou (2008), I assume
that the individual can, at a cost, influence her recollections. The DM remembers the outcome
s E {H, L} with probability
775 + ms,
where the parameter r,, E [0, 1] is the agent's "natural" rate of remembering outcome s. This
rate determines the probability that the DM recollects the outcome if she does not employ
any manipulation effort. However, the DM is also able to depart from the natural rate of
forgetting the outcome by exerting effort m, E [-rs, 1 - rs ] in period t = 1. Engaging in
memory manipulation m. leads to a cost of I, (ms) > 0, s E {H, L} . The agent's recollection
of the outcome o-a is denoted by 6a E {H, L, 01, where we write &a = 0 if the outcome has
been forgotten.
In period t = 2, the DM takes an action b in a non-empty, compact subset of a finite
dimensional Euclidean space B. For example, b can be a decision of whether to continue with
some previous investment or whether to undertake some medical treatment. B can also be a
singleton, in which case the DM does not act after observing the outcome. Figure 1-1 presents
the informational structure.
"In some applications, the set A may also include the possibility of not observing a signal.
l-q
L H
lL+IL iqU /+111
L H
Figure 1-1: Informational Structure
Preferences satisfy the standard axioms of expected utility theory. Therefore, there exists
utility function u : x A x B x {H, L} -+ R representing the DM's preferences. Furthermore,
u (0, a, b, a) is strictly increasing in 0 for all (a, b, a) E A x B x {H, L}.
When u (0, a, b, H) = u (0, a, b, L) for all (0, a, b) E E x A x B, we refer to outcomes as signals
since they do not affect the agent's utility directly. In this case, we say that the model has
purely informative signals. When signals are purely informative and A and B are singletons,
we say that signals have a purely hedonic value. In models where signals have a purely hedonic
value, the DM does not need to take any decision and the only reason for memory manipulation
is the improvement of the individual's self-views.
We refer to the case where u (0, a, b, H) > u (0, a, b, L) for all (0, a, b) E E x A x B as a
model of monetary outcomes. In this case, outcomes are interpreted as monetary payments and
a high outcome raises the agent's utility both directly and through beliefs about 0.12
The cost of memory manipulation 's can be related to psychic costs (stress from repression
of negative information or effort to focus on positive information), time (searching for reassuring
information or excuses, lingering over positive feedback), or real resources (avoiding certain cues
and interactions or eliminating evidence). They can also be interpreted as the shadow costs
12Although the case described above, where the outcome with a higher monetary payment provides more
favorable news about the DM's attributes, is the most intuitive, this is not necessary for our results. Alternatively,
one could assume that the outcome with a higher monetary payment is bad news about the DM's attributes.
Prob of Remembering
O+M)n1
Figure 1-2: Cost of Memory
of memory in a limited information framework. Remembering an outcome with probability
above its natural rate q, requires an individual to focus on it and on information correlated
with it. In turn, this restricts the amount of attention available to other information (which
has shadow cost C,). Similarly, forgetting an outcome with probability above the natural rate
1 - 7, requires an individual to focus on confronting evidence which again restricts the amount
of attention available to other potentially useful information. 13
Assumption 1 The cost of memory manipulation 4I, (ms) is strictly decreasing in ms < 0,
strictly increasing in m, > 0, convex, twice-continuously differentiable, and such that
s (0) = 0, sE {H, L} .
Figure 1-2 depicts the costs of memory manipulation implied by Assumption 1. I further
assume that the agent forgets a high outcome with some positive probability if she does not
exert any effort: 14
Assumption 2 77H < 1.
'"For example, Steele's (1988) self-affirmation theory argues that people cope with negative outcomes in one
domain by focusing in other, unrelated domains.
14If 77H = 1, then the model becomes trivial. Since the agent always recalls high outcomes, she will perfectly
infer that a = L was observed if she recollects & = 0. Therefore, she will never engage in memory manipulation.
The model can also be seen as a conflict between a "hot" or "impulsive" self and a "cold" self.
The hot self (self 1) wants to minimize current losses from negative information and maximize
the current gains from positive information. 15 The cold self (self 2) wants to circumvent the
manipulations made by the hot self in order to make a correct inference. The hot self exerts
efforts mL and mH in order to manipulate the beliefs of the cold self. Then, the cold self applies
Bayes' rule in order to filter these manipulations and make a correct decision b. 16
As the following examples show, the general framework encompasses other models of im-
perfect memory.
Example 1 (The Forgetfulness Model of Benabou and Tirole, 2002) Take 7L = 1, H =
0 and 4 'H (mH) = +oo for all mH > 0 so that high outcomes are always forgotten (i.e.,
17H + mH = 0). Figure 1-3 presents the informational structure in this case. This is the memory
framework from Benabou and Tirole (2002). It can be interpreted as a model of bad news or
no news. If the agent receives bad news, she can exert an effort mE E [-1, 0] in order to forget
them.
If the state 0 is reinterpreted as the recollection of a high outcome, then the model from
Example 1 becomes one where the agent is able to convince herself that a low outcome was a
high outcome. 17 Hence, memory manipulation would allow the DM to believe that she observed
an outcome u = H. This reinterpretation is compatible with neurological evidence from Prelec
(2008), who showed that subjects experience heavy brain activity only when they try to convince
themselves that a bad outcome was actually a good one. In the other states (both when they
acknowledge a mistake or when they believe to have been correct), no such activity is detected.
Hence, Example 1 can be interpreted as the agent incurring psychological costs when she tries
1 This interpretation assumes that the hot self is rational in the sense of taking into account the benefits
and costs of memory manipulation. Several papers in social psychology have documented that individuals tend
to be more realistic and impartial when making important decisions (c.f., Taylor and Gollwitzer, 1995, and
references therein). Therefore, self-deception seems to decrease when the cost of a mistake increases. Prelec
(2008) presented experimental evidence where self-deception responds positively to its expected benefits.
Similarly to this interpretation, Bodner and Prelec (2002) present a signaling model between an agent's pri-
vately informed gut and the agent's uninformed mind.
'
6 The model can be interpreted as a formalization of the neurophysiological argument put forth by Trivers
(2000). According to this interpretation, self 1 would be the person's unconscious process of information manip-
ulation. In the context of intertemporal choice, several papers have proposed dual self models (c.f. Thaler and
Shefrin, 1981, Fudenberg and Levine, 2006, and Brocas and Carrillo, 2008).
17In this model, the agent would never choose to believe that a high outcome was actually low.
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Figure 1-3: Forgetfulness Model
to convince herself that a bad outcome was actually a good one.
Example 2 (The Limited Memory Model) Take ?qL = =H = so that the DM forgets
any outcome if she does not employ memory efforts. Then, the framework becomes a model of
limited memory. In this model, the DM must allocate a limited amount of memory in order to
store information. By spending a memory cost b, (ms), she remembers an outcome s E {H, L}
with probabzlity ms. A higher effort ms can be interpreted as having greater memory resources
used to store the information18
The following examples present applications of the general framework to specific environ-
ments:
Entrepreneurship Example An employed individual is considering quitting her job and
starting a new company. Building a successful company requires certain entrepreneurial skills
which are unknown to the individual. Therefore, a success provides favorable news about the
individual's skills. If she decides not to quit her job, the individual obtains a wage w E R and
does not learn any information about her skills.
IsDow (1991) conszders a consumer who searches sequentially for the lowest pmce, but who only remembers
each prce as belongzng to a finzte number of categories. Wzlson (2003) considers a decision-maker who must act
after a large number of periods but whose memory is restricted to a finite number of states.
1-q
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Figure 1-4: Limited Memory Model
In this essay, this situation is modeled as follows. Let the individual's career choice be
denoted by a = E if she becomes an entrepreneur and by a = W if she remains a worker and
let 0 denote the individual's entrepreneurial skills. The outcome from starting a company is
denoted by a, which is equal to H in the case of success and L in the case of failure. After the
outcome a is observed, the entrepreneur may engage in memory manipulation. In this model,
there is no ex-post choice (B is a singleton). The agent's decision tree is presented in Figure
1-5.
Appendix C considers a more general model. In that model, an outcome is a vector a = (s, r)
consisting of a binary variable reflecting whether or not the company was successful, s E {S, F},
and an external variable r e R which affects the outcomes but is independent of the agent's
attributes (e.g., general market conditions, economy-wide shocks). The entrepreneur always
remembers whether the company succeeded or failed but may forget the prevailing external
conditions r.
Succeeding under adverse conditions provides good news about the individual's skills. Sim-
ilarly, failing under favorable conditions is bad news about her skills. In this model, that the
agent will manipulate her memory in order to forget positive external shocks and remember
negative shocks. This result is consistent with the psychological literature described in Section
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Figure 1-5: Entrepreneurship Example
1.1.1, which shows that success is usually attributed to one's own attributes whereas failure
tends to be attributed to bad luck or other external variables.
In Section 1.4, I will show that self-deception will prevent some individuals from becoming
entrepreneurs even when the expected monetary payoffs from starting a new company are higher
than the payoff from remaining on the previous job.
Used Car Example An individual is considering whether to purchase a used car or to
use public transportation. A used car may be defective. Moreover, detecting whether the car
is defective requires certain skills. Therefore, purchasing a defective car conveys unfavorable
information about the buyer's skills and requires the car to be fixed. If she decides to use public
transportation, no information is learned.
This situation is modeled as follows. Let a = C denote the choice of purchasing a used
car and let a = PT denote the choice of using public transportation. Denote by a = H
the case where the car is non-defective and a = L the case where it is defective. After the
consumer learns that the car was defective, she may manipulate her memory in order to forget
that it needed to be fixed. Similarly, if the car was non-defective, she may exert some effort
IIsl I car
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Figure 1-6: Used Car Example
to remember that the car did not need to be fixed. Assuming the memory system from the
forgetfulness model of Example 1, we obtain the decision tree depicted in Figure 1-6.
Section 1.4 will show that if the expected monetary benefit from buying the used car is
positive but lower than the expected self-deception costs, the individual will prefer not to
purchase it.
1.2.1 Modeling as a Multiself Game
This essay follows Piccione and Rubinstein (1997) in modeling a decision problem with imperfect
memory as a game between different selves. The decision maker is treated as a collection of
selves, each of them unable to control the behavior of future selves. As will be described in
Subsection 1.2.2, the decision made by an agent with imperfect recall corresponds to the perfect
Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of this game between selves. 19
The extensive form of the multiself game is presented in Figure 1-7. There are two players:
self 1 and self 2. Both selves have the same utility functions but different information sets. In
"
1 For the games considered here, the set of sequential equilibria coincides with the set of PBE.
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Figure 1-7: Extensive Form
period 0, self 1 chooses an action a E A. Then, nature plays a high outcome with probability qa
and a low outcome with probability 1- qa. In period 1, conditional on the outcome s E {H, L},
self 1 decides the amount of memory manipulation m,. Then, given the outcome s and the
manipulation effort ms, nature plays & = s with probability rq, + m and & = 0 with probability
1 - , - m . In period 2, self 2 observes the recollection & and takes an action b E B. Then,
both selves get payoff E [u (0, a, b, a) I&] - 'CI, (ms).
Because the DM has preferences over 0, she has an interim incentive to manipulate her
beliefs by exerting effort m,. However, the set of possible beliefs that an agent can hold is
restricted by the assumption that recollections are interpreted according to Bayes' rule. Thus,
the agent makes correct inferences about her attributes 0 given her recollections &.
t=0
Equivalently, we can conceptualize an "inferential self' who tries to make a correct inference
about the agent's attributes given the recollections. This inferential self chooses the agent's
expected utility so as to minimize a quadratic loss function:
u& (a, b, a) = arg min [if - u (0,a,b, a)] 2 dF(01 ).
The solution to this program is u& (a, b, a) = f u (0, a, b, a) dF (018) , which is the Bayes estima-
tor of u (0, a, b, a) given the recollection &. Thus, by minimizing a quadratic loss function, the
inferential self constrains the decision-maker to be a Bayesian given her memory imperfection.
Remark 1 Denote the expected value of 0 conditional on the observed outcome a by 0a, and
the expected attributes conditional on the recollection &a by O&a, O&a is "less variable" than
0a in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance.20 Therefore, because 0,, is the Bayes
estimate of 0 given the outcome ia, forgetfulness implies that the decision-maker updates ob-
served outcomes ca less than implied by Bayes' rule. This result is conszstent with experimental
evidence from Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2006).
1.2.2 Solution Concept
As described in the previous subsection, the decision made by an agent with imperfect recall is
modeled as the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of the multiself game. Let p (.I&) denote
the DM's posterior beliefs about 0 given & and let E, [.I&] denote the expectation operator
with respect to t (.1). Given a profile of memory manipulation manipulation (mL, mH), let
Ea& [.ImL, mH] denote the expectation with respect to the distribution of &a.
Definition 1 A PBE of the game is a strategy profile (a*, b*, m* (a), m (a)) and posterior
beliefs d (.Ia) such that:
E&a [E. [u (a, b (&a) , ca) Ia] m7 (a),m (a)]
1. a* E argmax E [E  [  a ( a O  ) la]  L (a  n*H (a
aeA H H 1L1aAE-r H (m (a)) - (1 - q) 'PL (rn; (a))
(q., + ms) E,, [u (a, b (a) ,, 0, s) '( = m2. m (a) E arg max
m + (1 - - ms) E, [u (ab (a) , , s) a = Z - s (ms)
20 See Appendzx D for the proof.
sE {H, L};
3. b* (&) E arg max {E, [u (a, b, , a) 1a = &;
bEB
4. P (0O&a = &) is obtamied by Bayes' rule ifPr (6a = &I m (a*) , m*H (a*)) > 0, V& e {L, H, 0}.
Conditions 1 - 3 are the standard sequential rationality conditions. Condition 1 states that
self 1 chooses an ex-ante action a that maximizes the agent's expected utility in period 0 given
the behavior of self 2. Condition 2 states that, conditional on each outcome s E {H, L}, self
1 chooses the amount of manipulation that maximizes the her expected payoff. Condition 3
states that self 2 takes an action that maximizes her utility given the beliefs she holds about
the manipulation employed by self 1.
Condition 4 is the standard consistency condition, requiring that beliefs of self 2 satisfy
Bayes' rule given the strategy of self 1. For every recollection & that is reached with positive
probability, it implies that / (0)a) = F (016') . Because of Bayesian updating, Condition 3
becomes
b* (&) E arg max u (a, b, 0, ) dF ( = 8),
for any recollection & that is reached with positive probability. The following proposition
establishes the existence of a PBE:
Proposition 1 (Existence) There exists a PBE.
Define the expected utilities given 0a = H and a = L by
uH (a, b, a) J- (a, b, , a) dF(Ola = H), and (1.2)
uL (a, b, a) f u(a, b,O, ra) dF (Oloa = L).
Given the recollection of a high signal, &a = H, self 2 infers that a high signal was observed
in period 1. Hence, Bayesian updating implies that the expected utility of self 1 conditional on
&a = H is uH (a, ba (H) , H). Similarly, the expected utility of self 1 conditional on &a = L is
uL (a, b (L) , L) .
Let m* (a) and m* (a) denote the amount of memory manipulation that self 2 believes was
employed in period 1. Note that the PBE concept implies that mL (a) and m* (a) are taken as
given by self 1 when choosing the amount of memory manipulation to exert. If the DM forgets
which signal was observed in period 1 (i.e., she recollects &a = 0), then there is a probability
(1 - -q) (1 - 'L - m (a)) that 9a = L was observed and a probability qa (1 - rH - m" (a))
that a = H was observed. Thus, the expected utility given &a = 0 is
U0 (a, ba (O), Uaa) (m*L, m*H) UH (a, ba (O), Ua) (1.3)
+ [1 - a ((M
, 
m*H)] U L (a, ba (0), 0a) ,
where a (M, a(H1-r)li-mH) is the conditional probability of 9a = Hwhere a (rnL, rnH) = rqa(lrH-mH)+(lqa)(lrlL_mL)
implied by Bayes' rule.
Conditions 2 and 3 from Definition 1 state that, after observing signal a = s e {H, L} ,
self 1 chooses ms to maximize
(I, + ms) us (a, ba (s) , s) + (1 - l, - m) u 0 (a, ba (0) , s) - Os (ms).
Using equation (1.3), the expected utility after a low signal can be written as
UL (a, ba (0) , L) + (77L + mL) [UL (a, ba (L) , L) - UL (a, ba (0) , L)] (1.4)
+ (1 - 'iL - mL) a (m* (a) , m*H (a)) [UH (a, ba (0) , L) - uL (a, ba (0) , L)] - '~L (mL)
Note that self 1 takes three factors into account when choosing the amount of effort to
forget bad news. First, forgetting a low signal leads to a higher utility through a more favorable
inference about 0 since uH (a, ba (0) , L) > UL (a, b, (0) , L) (self-deception factor). Second, it
leads to a sub-optimal choice of b since UL (a, ba (L) , L) > UL (a, ba (0) , L) (decision-making
factor). Third, self-deception leads to a memory cost of V)L (mL) (memory cost factor).
Analogously, conditional on a high signal, self 1 chooses mH to maximize:
S [1 - c (m* (a) mH (a))]
('qH + mH) (1.5)
+UH (a, ba (H) , H) - UH (a, ba (0) , H)
+uO (a, ba (0), H) - 4)H (mH) .
This equation displays the three factors that determine the amount of effort to remember good
news. First, remembering a high signal leads to a higher utility through a more favorable
inference about 0 since UH (a, ba (0) , H) > UL (a, ba (0) , H) . It also leads to better decision-
making since uH (a, ba (H), H) > uH (a, ba (0), H). However, it leads to a memory cost of
H (mH) .
The improvement in decision-making leads the DM to engage in an effort to remember a
high signal. The effect from self-image also leads the DM to exert an effort to remember the
high signal. Because small amounts of memory manipulation have second-order costs, the DM
always remembers a high signal with probability above her natural rate H :
Proposition 2 (Remembering Good News) Suppose that V), is strictly convex, s E {H, L} .
Then, in any PBE, m* (a) > 0 Va E A.
The DM's ex-ante expected utility (in period 0) is
Ea, [E, [u (0, a, ba* (-) , a) 1&]] - q H (mH (a*)) - (1 - q) 4bL (m* (a*)) . (1.6)
As in other decision problems with imperfect recall, the timing of decisions has important
implications for the solution. If the agent could commit to a strategy at an ex-ante stage, she
would generally choose a different amount of memory manipulation.
Consider, for example, the model of purely hedonic signals. In this case, equations (1.4) and
(1.5) imply that the DM faces a trade-off between self-deception and memory costs. Manipulat-
ing one's memory into forgetting a low signal directly increases the individual's expected payoff
by raising the probability that the signal is forgotten. Similarly, exerting effort to remember
a high signal directly raises her expected payoff by decreasing the probability that the signal
is forgotten. However, these manipulations also decrease the DM's expected payoff indirectly
by reducing the relative probability of a high signal when the signal is forgotten. Bayesian
updating implies that the indirect effects exactly cancel the direct effects out. Because the DM
is not fooled on average, she adjusts the expected attributes given & = 0 to take into account
the relative frequency that each signal is forgotten. Therefore, from an ex-ante perspective,
memory manipulation only leads to memory costs and the DM would prefer not to engage in
memory manipulation at all (mH = mL = 0). However, the multiself approach implies that self
1 does not take into account the indirect effects from memory manipulation and, therefore,
chooses to engage in memory manipulation. 2 1 Hence, unlike in decision problems with perfect
recall where ex-ante optimal strategies are always time-consistent, the ex-ante optimal strategy
is time-inconsistent. 2 2
In cases where outcomes affect ex-post actions b (i.e., information has positive value), it
is ex-ante optimal to choose some positive amount of memory manipulation. 23 In these cases,
the optimal strategy from an ex-ante perspective would always have a probability to remember
(weakly) above the natural rate 1s, s E {L, H}.
Recall that self 1 takes three factors into account when choosing the amount of memory
manipulation: (i) self-deception, (ii) decision-making, and (iii) memory costs. As discussed
previously, Bayesian updating implies that the self-deception effect vanishes from the DM's
ex-ante utility. Since only factors (ii) and (iii) would be taken into account, the DM would
choose to remember good news and to forget bad news less frequently if she could commit to a
strategy in period 0. Let the ex-ante expected utility be denoted by
U(mH,ML,a,{b(&)}&E{H,L,0} = E&[E,[u (0,ab(),a) &]]
-qV)H (mH) - (1-- ) OL (mL).
Proposition 3 establishes this claim formally:
Proposition 3 (Excessive Manipulation) Let (7nH (a) ,L (a), {ba ()&E{H,L,0}) be a
maximizer of U given action a and suppose U is a concave function of mH and mL. 24 Then, in
any PBE with manipulations m* (a) and m* (a),
m* (a) _ rH (a) and M*r (a) <_ mL (a)
21 Note that the DM would never choose to undo the memory manipulation in period t = 2 and find out the
true outcome a if she had a chance to do so.
2 2 See Piccione and Rubinstein (1997) for a discussion of decision problems with imperfect recall. In the
present model, because all nodes are reached with positive probability, the two equilibrium concepts proposed
there (multiself consistency and modified multiself consistency) coincide.
2 3 More precisely, let b( )(mL,,mH denote the action that maximizes the DM's utility given recollection &
and conditional on manipulation efforts mL and mH. Then, b(H),mL=mH= o 5 b(0)lmL=mH=o implies that
the manipulation effort mH that maximizes the ex-ante expected utility is strictly positive. Analogously, if
b (L)lm]=m1=0 b (0)lmL=mH=O then mL that maximizes the ex-ante expected utility is strictly positive.
24 It is straightforward to show that U is always a concave functzon of mH and mL when B is a singleton.
for all a E A, with at least one of the inequalities beng strict.
1.2.3 Equilibrium when Information has Purely Hedonic Value
In order to illustrate the impact of self-deception on choice, this subsection considers the simple
case where signals are purely informative and the DM does not take any action (i.e., informa-
tion has purely hedonic value). In this case, the only reason for memory manipulation is the
improvement of the DM's self-views. Since remembering a low signal decreases self 1's expected
utility, she would never choose manipulate her memory in order to remember a low signal (i.e.,
m < 0). Analogously, she would never manipulate her memory so as to forget a high signal
(i.e., m*H > 0).
Since, in the purely hedonic case considered in this subsection, A and B are singletons and
the outcome of the signal does not enter the agent's utility directly, I omit the terms a, b, and
oa from the DM's von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. Let Au = uH - UL denote the
payoff gain by observing a high signal instead of a low signal.
Proposition 4 (Forgetting Bad News) Suppose that 4, is strictly convex, s E {H, L} .
Then in any PBE, m H > 0 m*. Furthermore,
Au < b'H (1 - rH) = 0 < m*H < 1 - rH and m* < 0.
If the marginal cost of remembering good news is lower than its marginal benefit for all
mH E [-rH, 1 - rH), i.e. VI' (1 - H) < Au, then the DM always remembers high signals. In
this case, there is no point in trying to forget a low signal since the agent perfectly infers that
a low signal was observed when she recollects & = 0.
If the marginal cost of remembering good news is higher than its marginal benefit for some
mH E [-rH,1 1- rH), then the DM forgets high signals with positive probability. In this case,
because the cost of a small amount of memory manipulation is of second-order, bad news are
remembered with probability below the natural rate 77L, i.e., mj < 0.
Next, I characterize the PBE in the forgetfulness model of Benabou and Tirole (Example
1) and in the limited memory model (Example 2) when signals have purely hedonic value.
The forgetfulness model of Benabou and Tirole (2002)
Consider the forgetfulness model of Example 1 and suppose that ?/L is strictly convex. Given
a low signal, self 1 solves
max (l+ mL) UL-mL{a(m*,O)UH+[1 -a(m*L,O)]UL} - L(mL). (1.7)
mLE[-1,0]
Applying Kuhn-Tucker's theorem and substituting the equilibrium condition mL - m L , we
obtain
qAu 
-V' (m) , (1.8)q - (1- q) LL
in any interior equilibrium.
Let m* be implicitly defined by equation (1.8). From the implicit function theorem, such
m~ E R exists and is unique. The following proposition characterizes the PBE and presents
some comparative statics results:
Proposition 5 (Characterization) In the forgetfulness model when signals have a purely
hedonic value, there exists an essentially unique PBE.2 5 The equilibrium manipulation effort is
/L1 (  qAu i ____
= q-(lq)m) if Au < -1 and
-1 if Au > -VL({-1 q
Furthermore, the absolute value of belief manipulation Im*I is:
1. zncreasing in the benefit of manipulation Au (for uL fixed),
2. decreasing in the marginal cost of manipulation, and
3. increasing in q, the probability of not observing a signal.
The comparative statics above follows from simple cost-benefit comparisons. When the
marginal benefit of self-deception is higher or the marginal cost is lower, the agent chooses
25 The PBE is essentzally unique in the sense that all PBE feature the same choices of actions a and b, the
same manipulatzon efforts mL and mH, and the same beliefs for all recollectons that are reached with positive
probability. Equzhbria may diverge only wzth respect to beliefs at recollections that are not reached wzth positive
probabilty.
to engage in more self-deception. This result is consistent with the experimental evidence
presented by Prelec (2008), which suggests that self-deception is increasing in the benefits of
manipulation.
Also, recall that in this model, no news is good news. Therefore, when the probability of not
observing a signal q is higher, it becomes more credible that the individual has not manipulated
her beliefs into forgetting a low signal. Hence, an increase in q increases the marginal benefit
of self-deception, and this in turn leads to an increase in the amount of memory manipulation
Im* I
The limited memory model
Consider the limited memory model of Example 2. Given a high signal, self 1 solves
max mHUH + (1 - H) {a (0, m*H) UH + [1 - a (0, m*H) uL} -- H (H)
mH c[-1,1]
Proceeding as in Proposition 5, it follows that the set of PBE efforts are characterized by
(1- q)AuI
1 - q + q (1 - rnq) = a ! ,
if Au _ 4" (1) [1+ q (1- LH )] , and
m = 1 if Au > iP(1).
Since both sides of equation (1.9) are increasing in m*, there may be multiple interior
equilibria. It may also simultaneously feature interior equilibria and a corner equilibrium. 2 6 A
person that believes she often forgets good signals is not hurt much by not recalling a good
signal. Therefore, she will not manipulate her memory enough and, in equilibrium, she will
often forget good signals. On the other hand, a person that usually remembers good signals is
severely hurt by recollecting & = 0. Therefore, she will have more incentive to remember good
signals. As I show in the next section, these equilibria are welfare ranked (from an ex-ante
26For example, if 0' (1) < Au < 0' (1) [1 + H (1 - m)] , there exist both an equilibrium with m* = 1
and an interior equilibrium with m* implicitly defined by equation (1.9).
perspective): The equilibrium with the lowest amount of memory manipulation is preferred.
The individual may be caught in a self-trap where she exerts more manipulation effort because
self 1 believes that she will have engaged in more memory manipulation. 27
1.3 Purely Informative Signals and Information Acquisition
Suppose the decision-maker can choose whether or not to observe an informative signal. When
would she prefer to observe it? This section is concerned with the implications of memory
manipulation for the acquisition of information. I show that the DM will only observe a signal if
the benefit of making an informed decision exceeds the cost of memory manipulation. Subsection
1.3.1 discusses a theory of regret aversion based on self-deception. Then, Subsection 1.3.2 shows
that the model is consistent with intuitive behavior that Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) have shown
to be incompatible with Caplin and Leahy's (2001) Psychological Expected Utility model.
The standard theory of information acquisition under expected utility states that it is op-
timal to observe a signal when the value of information (defined as the expected payoff gain
by observing the signal) is greater than the cost of information. Similarly, I will show that
the DM prefers to observe a signal if the (objective) value of information is greater than the
expected cost of self-deception. In particular, when information has purely hedonic value, the
DM always prefers not to observe any signal.
The objective value of information is defined as the expected payoff from observing the
signal:
V = E& [E, [u (a, ba (&a) , ) ]] - max u (a, b, 0) dF (0) > 0, (1.10)
where maXaEA,bGB fu (a, b, 0) dF (0) is the expected payoff if the DM could not observe &a.
Thus, equation (1.6) implies that the ex-ante expected utility from observing the signal U (E)
is equal to
aEA,bBx u (a, b, ) dF (0) + V -qH (mH (a*)) - (1 - q)L (m (a*)) (1.11)
2 7 The existence of multiple equilibria is interesting since there seems to be a large heterogeneity in the amount
of self-deception accross different people (c.f., Prelec, 2008). However, since the results presented here hold in all
PBE, they would also be obtained if one applied a selection criterion.
It follows that the DM would prefer to observe the signal if the objective value of information V
is greater than the expected cost of memory manipulation q4'H (mH (a*))+(1 - q) bL (m L (a*)).
Proposition 6 (Information Acquisition) Fix a PBE. Let U (E) denote the expected utility
of observing the signal in this PBE and let E [u] denote the expected utility of not observing the
signal. Then, U (E) - E [u] = V - qH (m*H (a*))- (1-q) VL (m L (a*)) < V.
When information has a purely hedonic value, the objective value of information is V = 0. In
equilibrium, when the a signal is forgotten (& = 0), the DM knows that there is a probability
a (m, m*) that there was a high signal and 1 - a (mi, m*H) that there was a low signal.
Bayesian updating implies that on average, the only effects of engaging in self-deception are
the manipulation costs 'L (mi) and 'H (MH) Of course, there is still an interim incentive
to manipulate beliefs after she observes the signal. The inability to commit not to engage in
self-deception leads to a loss in (ex-ante) expected utility:
Corollary 1 When information has purely hedonic value, the DM is strictly better off by not
observing the signal: E [u] > U (E) . Furthermore, in order to observe the signal, the individual
requires a "participation premium" of q4bH (mH) + (1 - q) x ?/L (m*).
Proposition 6 and Corollary 1 show that memory manipulation leads to the avoidance of
information when individuals have preferences over their own attributes (i.e., they have "ego
utility").
The most standard model of ego utility one could formulate consists of a basic application of
expected utility theory. Let the space of possible attributes O be a non-empty subset of R and
let F (.) denote the agent's prior distribution of 0. The DM has preferences that are represented
by a strictly increasing von Neuinann-Morgenstern utility function u : O -+ IR.
In this basic model, if the individual does not observe a signal that is informative about 0, her
utility is f u (0) dF (0) . If she observes a signal a, the utility conditional on a is f u (0) dF (oa) .
Hence, the expected utility of observing the signal is Lf .f u (0) dF (Ola) dG (a), where G is the
distribution of signals a. By the law of iterated expectations, we have
J u (0) dF (0) = u (0) dF (cr) dG (a),
so that an individual with perfect memory and who behaves as an expected utility maximizer is
always indifferent between observing the signal or not when signals do not affect actions. In
other words, in this standard model of ego utility, the fact that an individual has preferences
over her expected attributes does not influence her decision of whether to acquire information.
In particular, as in Blackwell's theorem, more information cannot hurt the individual.
Note that the result above holds regardless of the shape of the utility function u. In order to
affect the decision of whether to acquire information, the utility function must be a non-linear
function of probabilities. Several models of information acquisition have, thus, assumed that
utility functions are non-linear in probabilities. 28 Our model also leads to a utility function that
is non-linear in probabilities. However, the non-linearity arises endogenously through memory
manipulation. Therefore, the present model can be seen as providing a cognitive foundation for
a model of information acquisition.
Proposition 6 shows that the DM will prefer not to collect some information if its objec-
tive value V is lower than the expected costs from memory manipulation qH (m*H (a*)) +
(1 - q) 'L (m* (a*)). In particular, she will always prefer not to observe information that is
informative about her attributes 0 but does not affect her actions b. For example, people will
prefer not to know the outcome of a medical exam if the value of information is not sufficiently
high (e.g. if a detected disease is not treatable) and if the exam has a potentially large impact
on the person's self-image. Dawson et al. (2006) present experimental evidence supporting this
result.2 9
An immediate consequence of avoiding information correlated with one's skills is the possible
desirability of "self-handicapping" strategies such as under-preparing for an examination or get-
ting too little sleep before a physical exercise (Berglas and Baumeister, 1993). Self-handicapping
strategies reduce the informational content of the signal. and therefore, the model predicts that
a person may engage in such strategies if the expected costs are not too high.
In several environments, competition allows for more precise information about one's abil-
28For example, Philipson and Posner (1995) and Caplin and Eliaz (2003) analyze the case of testing for
sexually transmitted diseases, K6szegi (2003) considers a model of patient decision-making, Kbszegi (2006)
studies information acquisition and financial decisions, and Caplin and Leahy (2004) study strategic information
transmission. With the exception of Philipson and Posner (1995), who do not provide a justification for the
assumption of a utility function that is non-linear in probabilities, all these papers depart from the standard
expected utility model by adopting the Psychological Expected Utility model.
29Dunning (2005) obtained the same result in the domain of academic ability.
ities. Thus, individuals may display a "fear of competition" and prefer environments where
outcomes are not directly comparable to the outcomes from other people. More generally, the
model predicts that in environments where information is correlated with one's attributes, in-
dividuals typically face a trade-off between the objective value of information and the costs of
self-deception. Coarser information structures reduce the objective value of information but
cause lower self-deception costs.
1.3.1 Regret Aversion
In this subsection, I study how the agent's utility from the lottery changes as a function of
her prior distribution about her attributes. This allows us to show that the model developed
in this essay provides a formalization for the (informal) theory of regret aversion based on
self-evaluation proposed by Josephs et al. (1992).
The Theory of Regret Aversion based on Self-Perceptions The theory of choice
based on regret aversion was simultaneously proposed by Bell (1982) and Loomes and Sugden
(1982). According to this theory, agents base their decisions not only on expected payoffs but
also on the payoffs that they would have obtained if they had made other decisions. Because
agents anticipate feeling regret or delight over their choice, they take this into account when
making a decision.
Josephs et al. (1992) argued that the feeling of regret arises from an individual's self-
evaluation that follows an outcome. 30 They suggested that people with worse self-perceptions
are more severely harmed by negative outcomes than those with better self-perceptions. There-
fore, individuals with low self-image would be more likely to make choices that minimize the
possibzlity of regret.
According to this theory of regret aversion based on self-perception, the premium required
to observe a signal ara that is informative about the DM's attributes should be decreasing in the
favorableness of the agent's prior distribution (see Figure 1-8). Denote by U (Ea) the expected
utility of observing signal ora and, as in Proposition 6, let E [u] denote the expected utility from
not observing the signal. Then, the theory predicts that E [u] - U (Ea) should be decreasing in
30See also Larrick (1993) for a similar discussion.
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Figure 1-8: Regret Aversion based on Self-Perceptions
the favorableness of the agent's prior distribution over her attributes.
The Model Since the theory presented by Josephs et al. (1992) considers only choices
where no ex-post actions are taken, assume that B is a singleton. Moreover, since the ex-ante
decision consists of selecting a gamble, we interpret ex-ante actions a E A as a choice between
different possible lotteries and assume that these actions do not affect the DM's utility function.
The only way in which ex-ante actions a E A affect the agent's utility is through the different
distributions associated with each lottery. For simplicity, I consider either the forgetfulness
model of Example 1 or the limited memory model of Example 2.
In order to determine how the agent's attitude toward information is affected by her prior,
let , be a parameter that indexes her prior distribution. A higher parameter r, leads to a more
favorable prior in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance:
f ' > -==> F (0; ') < F (0; ) , (1.12)
for all 0 E O, with strict inequality for some 8.
Denote the gain from observing a high signal instead of a low signal by
AU (K, a) = J (0)dF (O'a = H; ) - u (0) dF (Olca = L; ) ).
The assumption that individuals with worse self-perceptions are more severely harmed by neg-
ative outcomes than those with better self-perceptions states can be stated as:31
Assumption 3. Au (r, a) is decreasing in K for all a E A.
Recall that U (Ea) and E [u] were defined as the expected utility of observing signal and the
expected utility from not observing the signal, respectively. Then, the prediction of the theory
of regret aversion based on self-perceptions can be stated as follows:
Conjecture 1 (Josephs et al., 1992) E [u] - U (Ea) is positive and decreasing in r, for all
aE A.
Next, I show that under Assumption 3, the model implies that Conjecture 1 is true. Since
there are no ex-post actions in this model, the only benefit from memory manipulation is the
change in the DM's self-perceptions Au. Therefore, the amount of memory manipulation is
increasing in the self-image gain from observing a high signal Au. Because, under Assumption
3, Au (r, a) is decreasing in ;, we obtain:
Proposition 7 (Regret Aversion) Suppose Assumption 3 holds and consider either the for-
getfulness model of Example 1 or the limited memory model of Example 2. For any a E A, the
premium requred to observe the signal 9a is decreasing (in the sense of strong set order) in the
the decision-maker's prior over her attributes indexed by parameter r,.
Therefore, the model provides a formalization of the theory of regret aversion based on
self-perception proposed by Josephs et al. (1992).
31Although this assumption is intuitive for intermediate values of n, it is probably not a good assumption for
extreme values of K. An individual who is certain to have a very high parameter 0 is likely to be severely hurt
by a negative outcome. Similarly, a positive outcome may have a large effect on the self-perceptions of someone
who previously believed to have an extremely low 0.
1.3.2 Prior-Dependent Attitude Towards Information
Proposition 6 showed that the DM will seek information if its objective value is greater than
the expected costs of self-deception. This result contrasts with Blackwell's theorem, which
states that more information cannot be harmful. Alternatively, Caplin and Leahy (2001) have
proposed the Psychological Expected Utility (PEU) model which generalizes the expected utility
model to allow for different attitudes towards information.
Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) have criticized the PEU model by showing that it is inconsistent
with certain situations where a DM's preference for information varies with her prior distribu-
tion. In one example, they describe a patient who prefers more accurate medical tests when she
is relatively certain of being healthy, yet she avoids these tests when she is relatively certain of
being ill. In another example, they describe a manager that asks for their employees' opinion
only when he is sufficiently certain that the new information will not cause her to change her
views much. They proved that such behaviors are inconsistent with the PEU model. As a result,
Eliaz and Spiegler have suggested that one should drop the Bayesian updating assumption.
As the following example shows, the model presented in this essay is consistent with these
two examples described by Eliaz and Spiegler. Therefore, unlike the PEU model, the self-
deception model leads to prior-dependent attitudes toward information while retaining Bayesian
updating.32
Example 3 An individual must choose whether or not to take some medical exam. Let a = E
denote the choice of taking the exam and a = NE denote the choice of not taking it. The
exam is informative about the individual's health 0 and has outcome a = H if the individual is
healthy and o- = L if she is not. If the individual takes the exam, she can undertake medical
treatment B = {T, NT} , where b = T and b = NT denote the cases where she does and does
not undertake the treatment.
The individual's payoff from being healthy is 25. If she takes the medical exam, the individual
has a cost of 5. Thus, her payoff conditional on a high signal is 25 if b = T and 20 if b = NT.
The agent's expected payoff conditional on a low signal is -y (q) . Undertaking the treatment can
3 2 Epstein (2007) presents a model of anticipatory utility. In the special case of rank-dependent expected utility,
they show that their model is also able to accommodate the behavior from Eliaz and Spiegler's examples.
reduce the effects from the disease, which increases her expected payoff to -y (q) + 1. In order
to be consistent with Assumption 3, assume that y- (q) is increasing so that Au is decreasing in
the DM's prior distribution over her skills (indexed by the probability of observing a high signal
q). Let -y () = 10 and -y (1) = 20. If the DM does not take the exam, she obtains an expected
payoff of 25q + - (q) (1 - q) .
For simplicity, let the memory system be given by the forgetfulness model of Example 1 and
suppose that memory manipulation is binary: mL E {(-, 0} with V/L (- ) = 3. The decision
problem is depicted in Figure 1-9.
It is straightforward to show that the agent chooses mE = 0 when q is close to 1. In this
case, since the objective value of information is positive and the cost of self-deception is zero, the
DM always chooses to take the exam. When q = , however, the DM engages in self-deception
(mL = -). It can be shown that the expected cost from memory manipulation is greater than
the objective value of information so that the DM prefers not to take the exam. Thus, unlike
Eliaz and Spiegler's result on the PEU model, the DM may prefer to take the exam when she
is relatively certain of being healthy (q 1) but prefer not to take the exam for intermediate
values of q.
1.4 Lotteries Over Money
We propose that the consequences of each bet include, besides monetary payoffs,
the credit or blame associated with the outcome. Psychic payoffs of satisfaction
or embarrassment can result from self-evaluation or from an evaluation by others.
(Heath and Tversky, 1991, pp. 7-8)
In Section 1.3, outcomes a c {H, L} consisted of purely informative signals, which affected
the DM's utility only through her beliefs about her own attributes 0. This section considers
outcomes that affect the DM's utility not only by providing information about 0 but also
directly through monetary payments. I show that the model leads to a theory of ambiguity
aversion based on self-deception. The DM may reject gambles with small but positive expected
value. Moreover, the model is consistent with the competence hypothesis proposed by Heath
and Tversky (1991).
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Figure 1-9: Decision Problem in Example 3
In order to focus on the implications of the model for the DM's preferences over monetary
lotteries, I take A and B to be singletons so that the agent does not take any actions. Therefore,
as in the model of Subsection 1.2.3, information has purely hedonic value. However, in the case
of monetary lotteries, outcomes also have a direct effect on the DM's payoff through monetary
payments.
As described in Section 1.2, the outcome o E {L, H} is interpreted as a monetary payment.
For notational simplicity, I omit a and b from the DM's von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function. Therefore, in this section, the DM's utility function is denoted by u (0, x) , where x E IR
denotes the amount of money that she has. If H > L, a high outcome not only provides favorable
information about the agent's attributes 0 but also leads to a higher monetary payment. This
is the natural assumption since, in most cases, the outcome associated with higher monetary
payments is also associated with better attributes. If L > H, a high outcome provides favorable
information about 0 but provides a lower payment. The results in this essay hold for any L
and H.
For simplicity, I assume that the utility function is additively separable between character-
istics and money:
u (0, x) = v (0) + 7 (x),
for a strictly increasing function v : E -+ IR and a function T : R -- IR. Appendix A analyzes
the general case. Let v, denote the expected payoff from attributes conditional on recollection
rE {H,L,0}.
Under, additive separability, monetary payments can be factored out of self l's memory
manipulation choice. Given an outcome r = s E {H, L}, she maximizes:
(q, + mS) vs + (1 - - m,) v® + T (s) - , (ms).
Therefore, self 1 chooses the same amount of memory manipulation as in the purely hedonic
signals model analyzed in Subsection 1.2.3. Proposition 4 then implies that the DM will never
choose to remember a low outcome or forget a high outcome:
Corollary 2 Suppose that 'b, is strictly convex, s E {H, L} . Then, in any PBE, m*H > 0 > m*L .
Furthermore,
VH - VL < V(1 - H) ==> 0 < m*H < 1 - rH, rML* < 0.
From equation (1.6), the DM's ex-ante expected utility is:
U (E) = q [vH + 7 (H) - VH (mH)] + (I - q) [vL + (L) - L (mL)] . (1.13)
It consists of the sum of the expected payoff from attributes, the expected monetary payoffs,
and the expected cost of memory manipulation. Denote by U' the utility of a lottery with the
same distribution over monetary outcomes as the one above but whose monetary outcomes are
uninformative about 0. Then, the DM's ex-ante expected utility can be written as
U (E) = U' - qIH (m*) -(1- q) L (m*). (1.14)
Because the DM takes no actions after observing the outcome (i.e., B is a singleton), information
has no objective value. Therefore, the model implies that the uninformative lottery is strictly
preferred.
Remark 2 Consider the entrepreneurship model described in Subsection 1.2. The DM will
choose to become an entrepreneur if the expected monetary payoffs are greater than the expected
costs of self-deception:
qT (H) + (1 - q) (L) > qH (m'H ) + (1 - q) PL (m).
Baron (1999) presents evidence that individuals who become entrepreneurs find it easier to
admit past mistakes to themselves. In a static environment, our model may easily lead to this
result. Suppose, for example, that individuals have heterogeneous concerns for self-image or that
homogeneous individuals play different equilibria of the game. Then those with a lower concern
for self image or those who play equilibria with lower amounts of self-deception are precisely the
ones who benefit the most from becoming entrepreneurs. Alternatively, Section 1.5 will establish
that the expected cost of self-deception converges to zero as experience grows. Therefore, it could
be the case that entrepreneurs were not different from other individuals ex-ante, but, as they
have gained experience, their cost of admitting past mistakes decreased.
Remark 3 Consider the used car model described in Subsection 1.2. The individual will pur-
chase the car if the expected payoff gain from the purchase is greater than the expected costs of
forgetting a bad outcome.
Remark 4 Under the additive separability assumption, it is immediate to extend Proposition
7 to the case of monetary lotteries. Let , index the DM's prior distribution as defined in
equatzon (1.12). As in Assumptzon 3, assume that Av (r) zs decreasing min r and consider either
the forgetfulness model of Example 1 or the limited memory model of Example 2. Then, the
premzum U' - U (E) is positive and decreasing (in the sense of strong set order) in K.
1.4.1 Probability Weights
In this subsection, I will consider a non-expected utility representation, where the decision-
maker's expected utility from observing the signal is expressed as a weighted average of the
utility in each state of the world o E {L, H} . The representation consists of a weighting
function w : [0, 1] -4 R such that the utility from participating in the lottery is
U (E) = w (q) x uH + [1- -w(q)] X UL,
where u f u (0, s) dF (1acr = s), s E {H, L}. Clearly, the decision maker is an expected
utility maximizer if w (q) = q. Although the model does not feature ambiguity in the sense of
an imprecise distribution of probabilities, I will follow the literature on decision-making under
ambiguity and say that an agent is ambiguity averse if w (q) < q.3 3
Proposition 8 shows that the ex-ante preferences of the DM can be represented by a non-
expected utility and that the DM always displays ambiguity aversion when the outcomes from
the lottery are informative about her attributes: 34
Proposition 8 (Representation) The DM's expected utility from the monetary lottery can
be represented by
U (E) = w (q) UH + [1- w (q)] uL, (1.15)
where
w (q) = q- (m ) + (1- q) L (m(1.16)
u H - u L
Furthermore, w (0) = 0, w (1) = 1, and w (q) < q for all q E (0, 1).
Remark 5 Note that the representation from equation (1.15) is not separable between probabil-
ities and the utility us . Since the departure from linear probability weights is caused by memory
manipulation, individuals who engage in more memory manipulation have lower probability
weights w (q) . Furthermore, because the amount of memory manipulation is increasing in the
marginal utility from attributes, it follows that the deviation from linear weighting is itself a
function of us.
3 3 If we identify "unambiguous" lotteries as those whose outcomes are uninformative about the DM's attributes
and follow the approach in Epstein (1999), it follows that the DM is ambiguity averse if and only if w (q) < q.
3 4 Note that the model of monetary lotteries becomes a model of purely hedonic signals (Subsection 1.2.3) when
7 (H) = 7 (L) . Thus, when information has purely hedonic value, the DM's expected utility from observing the
signal can be represented by
U (E) = w (q) H + [1 - w (q)] UL,
where w (q) =q- q -H, (m)+(1-q)L(-(t ) . Furthermore: w(0) = 0, w (1) = 1, and w (q) < q for all q E (0, 1).UH --UL
1.4.2 Discussion
The model presented here implies that ambiguity aversion is a consequence of the lottery out-
comes being informative about the DM's attributes. Several experimental papers have related
ambiguity aversion with the lotteries' being influenced by an individual's skill or knowledge.3 5
First, some experiments have contradicted the idea that ambiguity aversion is related to the
imprecision of the probability distribution of the events as is usually argued. Budescu, Wein-
berg, and Wallsten (1988), for example, compared decisions based on numerically, graphically
(the shaded area in a circle), and verbally expressed probabilities. Numerical descriptions of a
probability are less vague than graphic descriptions which, in turn, are less vague than verbal
descriptions. Thus, if agents had a preference for more precise distributions, they should rank
events whose probabilities have a numerical description first, graphic descriptions second, and
verbal descriptions last. However, unlike ambiguity aversion would predict, subjects were in-
different between these lotteries. Indeed, the authors could not reject that the agents behaved
according to subjective expected utility theory and weighted events linearly.3 6
Heath and Tversky argued that people's preferences over ambiguous events arise from the
anticipation of feeling knowledgeable or competent.3 7 Their interpretation of the Ellsberg para-
dox is as follows:
People do not like to bet on the unknown box, we suggest, because there is infor-
mation, namely the proportion of red and green balls in the box, that is knowable
in principle but unknown to them. The presence of such data makes people feel less
knowledgeable and less competent and reduces the attractiveness of the correspond-
ing bet. (Heath and Tversky, 1991, pp. 8)
Fox and Tversky (1995, pp. 585) proposed that ambiguity is caused by comparative ig-
norance. They have argued that "ambiguity aversion is produced by a comparison with less
ambiguous events or with more knowledgeable individuals." As in Heath and Tversky's (1991)
competence hypothesis, this "comparative ignorance hypothesis" states that ambiguity aver-
35See Goodie and Young (2007) for a detailed discussion of this literature.
36See also Budescu et al. (2002).
3 7 Subsection 1.4.4 defines Heath and Tversky's "competence hypothesis" more precisely and also briefly reviews
the empirical evidence related to it.
sion is driven by the feeling of incompetence. Similarly, Goodie (2003) proposed the perceived
control hypothesis, according to which ambiguity aversion is generated by an agent's belief that
the distribution of outcomes is influenced by attributes such as knowledge or skill.38
As will be shown in Section 1.5, it is straightforward to embed the model in a dynamic
setting where the DM updates beliefs according to Bayes' rule. Therefore, the model provides
a tractable framework where individuals display ambiguity aversion and still follow Bayes' rule.
Under the self-perception reinterpretation of ambiguity aversion, the difficulties in characteriz-
ing an updating rule under ambiguity do not arise.39
1.4.3 Small-Stakes Risk Aversion
This subsection considers lotteries with small monetary stakes. It is shown that memory manip-
ulation leads the DM to exhibit "zeroth-order" risk aversion, which has important implications.
Standard expected utility maximizers exhibit second-order risk aversion. An individual with
second-order risk aversion always accepts small gambles with positive expected value. Then,
if the agent has reasonable levels of risk aversion with respect to lotteries with small stakes,
she must display unrealistically high levels of risk aversion with respect to lotteries with large
stakes (Samuelson, 1963; Rabin, 2000).
Segal and Spivak (1990) show that an individual with first-order risk aversion rejects small
gambles as long as the positive expected value is sufficiently small. Therefore, several nonex-
pected utility models that feature first-order risk aversion have been proposed. However, Safra
and Segal (2008) show that the inability to simultaneously explain an agent's risk aversion over
lotteries with small stakes and lotteries with large stakes can be generalized to non-expected
utility models. 40 In this subsection, I show that the model allows us to reconcile risk aver-
sion with respect to small lotteries with sensible levels of risk aversion with respect to large
lotteries.41
3 8 There is a large experimental literature on the effect of perceived control on risk-taking (c.f., Chau and
Phillips, 1995, or Horswill and McKenna, 1999).
39 See, for example, Hanany and Kilbanoff (2007).
40The crucial assumption in Segal and Spivak (1990) is that decision-makers have a unique preference relation
over final-wealth distributions. Hence, their framework does not include gain-losses models such as Prospect
Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).
41Fudenberg and Levine (2007) present a dual-self model of dynamic consumption where the agent's exercise
of self-control may also lead to risk aversion over lotteries with small stakes.
Consider the lottery described previously. The certainty equivalent of the lottery is defined
by the monetary amount CE E R that makes the agent indifferent between participating in the
lottery or receiving CE for sure:
u (0, CE) dF (0) = quH (H) + (1- q) U(L) -qH (m -(1- q) H (m). (1.17)
The risk premium associated with a lottery is defined as the difference between the expected
payment and the certainty equivalent: 7r = qH + (1 - q) L - CE.
Let s E {H, L} be a binary random variable such that E [s] = qH + (1 - q) L = 0. Consider
a lottery that pays x = es, where e > 0. A decision maker has risk preferences of second order
if lim,,o+ 7r (e) /e = 0. She is first-order risk averse if lim,,o, ir (e) /e > 0 is finite. She is
zeroth-order risk averse if lim,,o+ 7r (e) /6 = +0o.
Note that the monetary lottery converges to a model of purely hedonic signals as e ap-
proaches zero. Then, as shown in Corollary 1, the DM demands a strictly positive participation
premium in order to observe the signal. Hence, the certainty equivalent of the lottery converges
to CE(0) < 0 and
lim 7 () lim CE (e)lim = - lim = +oo.
e--0+ --. +
Thus, the individual exhibits zeroth-order risk aversion. This result is established formally in
the following proposition:
Proposition 9 (Zeroth-Order Risk Aversion) In any PBE, the DM exhibits zeroth-order
risk aversion.
Since outcomes are informative about the DM's attributes, the DM engages in memory
manipulation. Therefore, even when the monetary payoffs converge to zero, she still demands
a strictly positive risk premium. Hence, the individual displays zeroth-order risk aversion and
displays risk aversion for lotteries with small stakes. However, as shown in Corollary 1, when
the expected monetary stakes are larger than the DM's participation premium, she will accept
to participate in the lottery. Thus, as the following example shows, the DM may be risk averse
over lotteries with small stakes without displaying an unreasonable degree of risk aversion over
lotteries with large stakes:
Example 4 (Safra and Segal, 2008) Suppose an agent rejects a lottery that pays either
-100 or 105 with equal probability at all wealth levels below 300,000. Safra and Segal show
that all standard non-expected utility models imply that thzs agent cannot accept a lottery that
pays -5, 000 or 10, 000, 000 with equal probability for some wealth level below 300, 000. The
model is this essay, however, is consistent with this behavior. Indeed, I will show that the DM
may even accept the second lottery for all wealth levels below 300, 000.
Suppose both lotteries have the same informational content about the DM's attributes 0. For
simplicity, take the forgetfulness model of Example 1 with binary manipulation efforts mL E
{-, 0} and let 7 (x) = x for all x E IR. Suppose that (vH - VL) > L (-2) so that self I
engages in memory manipulation: m* = -m. Then, the DM rejects the first lottery and accepts
the second lottery for all wealth levels below 300, 000 if
1 1 1 (1) 1 1(VL + W - 100) + (vH + W + 105)- -2 - <-VL + H+W, and
S22 2 2 2
1 1 1
2 (vL + W - 5000) + (VH + W + 1000000) - 2  > VL + -vH + W
for all W < 300, 000. These conditions are satisfied if
5< L (-) < min -(vH - VL);995,000 . (1.18)
Therefore, when inequality (1.18) is satisfied, the DM accepts the first lottery and rejects the
second lottery for all wealth levels below 300, 000.
1.4.4 The Competence Hypothesis
Consider two lotteries with the same distribution over monetary outcomes. In the first lottery,
outcomes are informative about the decision-maker's skills or knowledge whereas in the second
they are not. If the information about one's skills or knowledge is not useful (i.e., the objective
value of information from the first lottery is zero) and the individual is an expected utility
maximizer, she should be indifferent between these lotteries. Since one's attributes are ambigu-
ous, an ambiguity averse individual should prefer the lottery whose outcomes are uninformative
about her skills or knowledge.
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Figure 1-10: Experimental Evidence on the Competence Hypothesis
Heath and Tversky (1991) have studied this choice in a series of experiments. They have
shown that people prefer the skill- or knowledge-dependent lottery in contexts where they feel
knowledgeable or competent but prefer the skill- or knowledge-independent lottery in ones where
they consider themselves ignorant or uninformed. In one experiment, for example, subjects were
asked to answer several questions. Subjects also revealed (in an incentive-compatible way) their
expected probability of answering the questions correctly. Afterwards, they chose between
betting on their answers or participating in a lottery with the same expected probability of
winning. The proportion of people who chose to bet on their answers is presented in Figure
1-10.
If decision-makers are expected utility maximizers and the value of information is zero, they
should be indifferent between these two lotteries. Since Prospect Theory does not distinguish
between sources of uncertainty in the specification of probability weighting function, it also
predicts that people should be indifferent between these two lotteries. Therefore, in both
cases, the proportion of individuals who bet on the knowledge-based lottery should be roughly
constant at 50% when the value of information is zero. If the value of information is positive,
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Figure 1-11: Simulated Results on the Competence Hypothesis
individuals who behave according to either Expected Utility Theory or Prospect theory should
prefer the knowledge-based lottery. Hence, in this case, the proportion of individuals who bet
on the knowledge-based lottery should be constant at 100%.
Heath and Tversky found a remarkably different pattern. The proportion of people who
preferred to bet on the knowledge-based lottery instead of a knowledge-independent lottery
with the same expected probability of winning was increasing in the judged probability.42 In
situations where the expected probability of winning was small, people preferred to bet on the
knowledge-independent lottery. On the other hand, when the expected probability of winning
was large, individuals preferred to bet on the knowledge-based lottery. This result was labeled
the Competence Hypothesis.
The following examples show that our model is consistent with the Competence Hypothesis:
Example 5 Consider the forgetfulness model of Example 1. For simplicity, let memory ma-
nipulation be a binary variable mLe {- , 0}, with OL (- ) = 1 and 4 L (0) = 0. Suppose that
4 2 A number of other experiments have confirmed the predictions of the competence hypothesis (c.f., Keppe
and Weber, 1995; Taylor, 1995; Kilka and Weber, 2000; Chow and Sarin, 2001; Fox and Weber, 2002; Kuehberger
and Perner, 2003; Di Mauro, 2008).
the DM does not face any ex-ante choice. However, in order to have a positive objective value
of information, suppose that she chooses between a low bL and a high bH action ex-post.
Let v, (b) denote the expected payoff from attributes conditional on outcome s E {H, L} and
take the following payoffs:
vH (bH) = 6, vH (bL) = 5, vL (bL) = 1, vL (bH) = 0, 7 (H) = 1, T (L) = 0.
In Appendix D, I show that the DM prefers the attribute-dependent lottery if q > 1 and prefers
the attribute-independent lottery if q < .
Example 6 Take the same parameters from the previous example but suppose that memory
manipulation is a binary variable mLe {-E i, 0}, where the parameter f is distributed according
to a c.d.f. #4 on [, 1]. Suppose that q > 4 so that the objective value of information is positive.43
In Appendix D, I show that the proportion of people who prefer the attribute-dependent lottery
is:
c1 7 7S'19
3 1 - 2qj ifqE ( 7 11
4 1 - q 19 2
if q (1, 1] .
Therefore, consistent with the Competence Hypothesis, this proportion in increasing in q. Figure
1-11 depicts the case where fi is uniformly distributed.
1.5 Practice makes perfect: The Repeated Model
The previous sections considered a decision-maker who observes an outcome once and makes
inferences about her attributes based on her recollection of this outcome. In several situations,
however, individuals participate in this process repeatedly. A professional investor, for example,
is constantly deciding which investment to undertake and receives feedback about the success
4
"If q < 1, then b(^) = bL for all &. Therefore, since actions are not a function of recollectzons, the ob3ective
value of information is zero.
or failure of these investments very frequently. It is often argued that the biases in decision-
making that we observe in experimental settings would be severely attenuated as individuals
gain experience. This section presents a repeated version of the general model described in
Section 1.2 and shows that this is indeed the case in this model. More precisely, I show that the
behavior of the DM converges to the one predicted by expected utility theory as the number of
observed signals grows.
Consider a repeated version of the general model described in Section 1.2. For simplicity, I
assume that A is a singleton so the DM only chooses actions after observing the signal.44 In
each period n E {1, 2,3, ...,N}, an independent draw of the signal an E {H, L} is made. Each
signal an is observed with probabilities Pr (a = HIO) and Pr (a = LiO), where 0 is the agent's
'true' attributes. The parameter 0 is not known. Instead, the DM has a prior F (0) about its
distribution. Hence, the prior over the distribution of a signal a, is
Pr (n = s)= JPr (a = s0) dF (0) s E {H, L},
where the conditional probability Pr (a = H10) is strictly increasing in 0.
After observing an, E {H, L}, the DM engages in memory manipulation mL and mH. She
recollects a signal &n, E {H, L, 0} . A history at time n is a sequence of recollected signals and
actions:
h n - 1 = ((I, ... , 6n-1), (bl,..., bn-1)) E H
n - ,
where H"- 1 - {0, L, H}"- 1 x Bn - 1 is the set of possible histories. Note that, in this model,
the DM can only manipulate the recollection of a signal in the time that the signal occurred.
After the recollection has been registered into the agent's memory, she can no longer distort
it. 45
As in the static game, the agent's choice is modeled through a different self acting each time
information is forgotten. Thus, in each period, a stage-1 self chooses memory manipulations
44 See Remark 6.
45This assumption captures the psychological finding that most information loss occurs soon after it is obtained.
Nevertheless, it is clearly an extreme assumption. In general, forgetting rates seem to follow a power law
(Anderson, 1995). Therefore, a large fraction of the information is lost right after learning, and over time, the
rate of forgetting slows down.
(mH,n, mL,n) : H n - ' -nH, 1 - H1 X [-L, 1 - nL] to maximize the discounted sum of
payoffs from all future stage-games. The discount rate is 6 E [0, 1). Then, a stage-2 self applies
Bayes' rule and chooses an action bn: {0, L, H} x H n- 1 * B. For notational clarity, I omit
the arguments from the profiles of actions and manipulations. 46
Definition 2 A PBE of the game is a strategy profile (b*, m*H, m') and posterior beliefs t (.1.)
such that:
1. m n maximizes
(, + ms) (E, [u (0, b*, s) I (s, b (s) ; hn-1)] + 6V (s, b (s) ; hn-1)
+- (1 - - m ) {(E [u (0, b*, s) 1 (0, b (0); h"- 1 )] + SV (0, b (0); hn- 1 ) } - s (ms)
with respect to ms, s E {H, L} .
2. b* E arg maxbEB (E[ [u (0, b, s) i, hn - 1] + 6V (, b; hn-1) } , for s E {H, L} and § E {H, L, } .
3. y (.1h) is obtained by Bayes' rule if Pr (hm,n, m*H,n) > 0, for all h Hn U {0, L, H}
H n - ,
4. The continuation payoff V satisfies, for all ( , b; hn - l ) E H ,
N u (0, b*, uz) - Pr (oz = H) 4 H H"1
V (, b; h"-1) = E, L m, (, b, h" )
z=n+1- Pr (az = L) O mLH ,z
I am interested in the PBE of the game when N is large for a fixed 6 E [0, 1). Let n (h n )
denote the Bayes estimator of 0 given history h"'
On (h n ) - OdF (1h) .
Note that F (OIhn) is a function of mH and mL.
46Thus, we write b* instead of b* ( ,, h-l 1), and m*,, instead of m,,, (a, hn- 1).
I assume that rqH > 0 and that there exists some m > -r/L with 4 'L (m) > sup {u (b, 0, a)}-
info {u (b, 0, o)} for all b, a. 47 This assumption ensures that the DM never forgets a signal an E
{H, L} with probability 1.48 The first issue is whether the Bayes estimator of 0 is consistent.
In other words, does the DM eventually learn her true attributes after observing a sufficiently
large number of signals?
If memory manipulation were constant, the answer would be immediate because in this
case, the recollections would be i.i.d., and hence Doob's Consistency theorem would imply that
O, (h") converges to 0. This is formally stated in the following lemma:
Lemma 1 Suppose mH,n (h n - 1) = H and mL,n (h n - l ) =- fL for all h n - l , n and let N -- oo.
Then On -- 0 for almost all histories.
When memory manipulation is endogenous, however, it is not immediate that the DM
eventually learns her true type. Although observed signals an are i.i.d., memory manipulation
leads to non-independent and non-identically distributed recollections &n. However, because
the agent knows the equilibrium strategies, she knows the probability of each signal conditional
on the recollection. Therefore, intuitively, the agent correctly updates the recollections and
eventually learns her true type regardless of how much manipulation effort she exerts.
The following result will be used in order to show that this intuition is correct:
Lemma 2 For any fixed history hn , F (OIhn; mH , mL) is increasing in mH and decreasing in
mL.
The lemma above implies that, conditional on reaching each history, the agent always prefers
that she had forgotten high signals and remembered low signals. Because the agent is ultimately
concerned about an, F (0jlh; mH, ML) is not a function of m H and mL in all histories that do
not contain any &n = 0. However, whenever the agent recollects &n = 0, she is always better
off when she forgets high signals and remembers low signals (since it reduces the probability
4 7 This is satisfied, for example, if limm,L--L 0 (mL) = +00.
48Either one of these conditions are needed to ensure identification. If 77H = 0 and mL (h) = 71L, then
mH (h n ) = 0 for all h" would imply that &^n = 0. In this case, the Bayesian posterior would be equal to the
prior and, therefore, there is no hope for the Bayes estimator to be consistent. This assumption is not satisfied
in the model of Example 1.2.3 (r7H > 0 is violated). However, it is straightforward to adjust the arguments from
this section to establish the same results for that model.
of arriving at 7, = 0 after a low signal 7, = L). Hence, (OIh'; - 7 H , 1 - ?L) first-order
stochastically dominates (01hn; mH, mL) for all mH, mL. 4 9
A straightforward implication of Lemma 2 is that:
E [O1hn; 1 - 7 H, m] < E [Olhn; mH, mL] < E [Olhn; -rH, 1 - L], (1.19)
for all mH and mL > rn and all histories hn . But because Lemma 1 implies that both extremes
in the inequality (1.19) converge to 0, it thus follows that the term in the middle converges and
has limit 0. This result is formally stated in the following proposition: 50
Proposition 10 (Consistency) Let N - oo. Then, On -+ 0 for almost all histories.
Proposition 10 shows that, regardless of the memory manipulation employed by the DM, she
eventually learns her true attributes 0. Thus, the benefit of memory manipulation converges to
zero, and therefore, memory manipulation converges to zero as the number of observed signals
increases:
Proposition 11 (No Manipulation in the Long Run) Let N -+ oo. Then, mH,n - 0 and
mL,n - 0 for almost all histories.
Suppose signals are purely informative. As in Section 1.3, omit the signal a from the agent's
utility function. Define the optimal action b° (0) E B as the one that maximizes the agent's
utility when her attributes 0 are known: b0 (0) E arg maxbEB u (b, 0) . Proposition 11 implies
that b, -* bo for almost all histories. Therefore, in the limit, the DM chooses the same actions
as an expected utility maximizer who knows 0.
Consider the case of monetary lotteries, and as in Section 1.4, omit the actions from the
utility function. The DM's ex-ante utility from observing an additional signal converges to
4 9 The first-order dominance (FOSD) is for fixed h'. Since the probability of each history is itself a function of
mL and mH, it does not follow that there is unconditional FOSD.
50Note that the probability of occurence of a history Pr (h' ) is a function of the sequence of memory manipu-
lations mH and mL. Because r7 H > 0 and V)L (rh) > sup0 {u(b,O,a)} - info {u(b,O,a)} for some f > -rqL, the
sets of histories with zero measuse is the same for all relevant manipulation efforts: mH (h n ) c [-77H, 1 - rH]
and mL (h") E [-7 L , m ] . Therefore, we omit any explicit reference to mL and mH when considering almost sure
convergence of On (h").
qu (H, 0) + (1 - q) u (L, 0), which is the same utility of an expected utility maximizer when the
attributes 0 are known.
Therefore, when signals are observed frequently enough, agents will not engage in self-
deception and their behavior will converge to the behavior of standard expected utility maxi-
mizers. This is consistent with the usual intuition that people do not exhibit ambiguity aversion
over frequently observed events or that experts are subject to much less biases (e.g. List, 2003,
List and Haigh, 2003).51
Remark 6 In the preceding analysis, we have assumed that A is a singleton so that the DM
does not take actions that affect the distribution of the signals oa. This assumption simplifies the
notation and the proofs. It is not important for our results as long as the first-order stochastic
dominance assumption (equation 1.1) is retained. Thus, as long as all signals a E A are
informative about 0, the DM eventually learns her true attributes and does not engage in memory
manipulation.
If the agent has the choice of not observing any signal (see, for example, Subsections 1.6.1
and 1.6.2), then she may choose never to obtain any information about 0. In that case, her
expected attributes would not converge.
1.6 Applications
This section presents two applications of the model. The first application provides a self-
deception model of the endowment effect. The second application provides a self-deception
rationale for people taking sunk investments into consideration when making decisions.
1.6.1 The Endowment Effect
An individual that satisfies the axioms of expected utility theory does not display a difference
between the maximum willingness to pay for a good and the minimum compensation demanded
to sell the same good (willingness to accept) when income effects are small. However, several
s5 List (2003) also showed that experienced traders of sports paraphernalia show smaller endowment effects for
everyday goods used in lab studies than novice traders. This result is also consistent with the model above if
the ability to trade sports paraphernalia is correlated with the ability to trade other goods.
empirical works have documented a discrepancy between these values. An individual tends to
value one good more when the good becomes part of that person's endowment. Thaler (1980)
labeled this phenomenon an "endowment effect."
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990) argued that the endowment effect was caused by
loss aversion. 52 This subsection proposes an alternative explanation for the endowment effect.
The main idea is that, in most markets, trading requires certain skills or knowledge. At the
very least, the parties must form an expectation of how much each good is worth. In more
complex markets, they must also estimate the future prices of the goods (which determine
the opportunity cost of trading). Therefore, as in the used car example (Subsection 1.2) the
outcome from the trade reveals information about how skillful the person is.
As we have seen previously, an individual that cares about her self-image and is subject to
imperfect memory will engage in an activity that reveals information about her skills only if
the objective value of information is greater than the expected memory cost. Therefore, she
may prefer not to trade if the price is only slightly above the expected value of the good.
The model is a special case of the general framework described in Section 1.2. Let a E
{T, NT} denote the DM's choice of whether or not to trade an object. Let r denote the gain
from trade (in monetary terms), which is unknown by the agent. Trading leads to an outcome
a E {H, L} , which affects the DM's utility both directly through the gain from trade 7i, and
indirectly because it is informative about the DM's skills 0. After observing the outcome a,
the DM engages in memory manipulation mL (T) and mH (T). As in Section 1.4, let the DM's
preferences over skills 0 and money x be represented by v (0) + T (x) and, with no loss of
generality, normalize the monetary payoff from not trading to zero (T (0) = 0).
Equation (1.13) implies that the DM will prefer to trade if the expected gain from trade is
greater than the expected memory cost:
q- (TrH) + (1 - q) T (7rL) > qV)H (m* (T)) + (1 - q) ¢L (m* (T)).
Therefore, we have the following result:
52"According to loss aversion, losses are weighed substantially more than gains. Then, the cost of losing a good
is much higher than the benefit of winning a good.
Proposition 12 (Endowment Effect) There exist ti >_ 72 > 0 such that:
1. the DM agrees to trade in any PBE if E [7 (r)] > -i,
2. the DM refuses to trade zn any PBE if E [T (7r)] < 72,
3. there exist PBE where the DM agrees to trade and PBE where the DM refuses to trade if
1 > E [T (7)] > T2.
In particular, a risk neutral individual will demand a strictly positive premium in order to
trade. A risk averse individual will demand an even greater premium.
A standard explanation based on ambiguity aversion would argue that the object initially
owned by the DM has a less ambiguous distribution than the other object. Therefore, an
ambiguity averse agent would not agree to trade if the expected gain from trade is not sufficiently
high. Recall from Subsection 1.4.1 that the self-deception model relates the degree of ambiguity
aversion with the DM's attributes. Thus, in the present model, the endowment effect is due
to the self-evaluation that follows trade. Since the outcome of the trade is informative about
the agent's skills or knowledge and therefore leads to costly self-deception, the DM may require
some strictly positive premium in order to trade.
1.6.2 Sunk Cost Effects
The consequences of any single decision (...) can have implications about the
utility of previous choices as well as determine future events or outcomes. This
means that sunk costs may not be sunk psychologically but may enter into future
decisions. (Staw, 1981, pp. 578)
Standard decision theory shows that only incremental costs and benefits should influence
decisions. Historical costs, which have already been sunk, should be irrelevant. However,
evidence suggests that people often take sunk costs into account when making decisions.53
Genesove and Mayer (2001), for example, studied the Boston housing market. They have
5"Sunk costs effects are also called "irrational escalation of commitment", the "entrapment effect", or "too
much invested to quit".
shown that when expected prices fall below a the original purchase price, sellers set an asking
price that exceeds the asking price of other sellers by between 25 and 35 percent of the difference.
In a field experiment, Arkes and Blumer (1985) randomly selected sixty people to buy season
tickets to the Ohio University Theater and divided them in three groups of twenty. Patrons in
the first group paid the full price ($15). Those in the second group received a $2 discount, and
people in the last group received a $7 discount. Patrons in the first group attended significantly
more than those in the discount groups.
This subsection shows that the self-deception model leads to sunk-cost effects. Psychologists
have long argued that self-deception may be an important cause of why sunk costs affect
choice. For example, Staw (1976) has shown that being personally responsible for an inefficient
investment is an important factor in choosing to persist on it. Brockner et al. (1986) have
documented that persisting on an inefficient allocation of resources is increased when subjects
are told that outcomes reflected their "perceptual abilities and mathematical reasoning." 54
Whether previous investments succeed or fail has important effects on the decision maker's
self-views. Then, as the opening quote suggests, a past choice may be associated with not simply
sunk monetary costs but also real psychological costs. Abandoning a project usually involves
admitting that a wrong decision was made. Therefore, an individual revising her position in
the project reveals information about her skills or knowledge. As shown in Section 1.3, the DM
will prefer to avoid such information if the cost of making an uninformed decision is not high
enough. But, in this case, some projects with negative expected value will not be terminated.
The model is a special case of the general framework described in Section 1.2. As in Section
1.4, I assume the DM's utility function is additively separable over attributes 0 and money x.
For simplicity, I also assume that the DM is risk neutral so that u (0, x) = v (0) + x.
The timing of the model is presented in Figure 1-12. First, the DM chooses whether to invest
in a project that costs K > 0 and gives a random monetary payoff of ir. Let ao E {I, NI} denote
the investment choice, where ao = I if the DM undertakes the investment and ao = NI if she
does not. After the sunk investment was made, the DM can reevaluate the value of the project
at zero cost. Let al = E denote the case where DM reevaluates the project and al = NE
otherwise. Reevaluating the project leads to a (purely informative) signal a E {H, L} . A high
54See Brockner (1992) for a review of the literature.
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Figure 1-12: Timing of the model
signal is good news, both about the profitability of the project r and about the DM's skills 0.
After observing the signal a, the DM may engage in memory manipulation mL and mH
which leads to a recollection & E {H, L, 0} . Then, she chooses whether or not to abort the
project. I write b = A if the project is aborted and b = C if it is continued. If the project is
aborted, the DM obtains a monetary payoff of 0. If it is not aborted, the DM has an expected
monetary payoff conditional on signal s E {H, L} of 7rs.
I assume that the project is ex-ante efficient E [7r] > 0.55 As was shown in Proposition 6, the
agent will prefer to observe the signal a if the objective value of information, V = - (1 - q) 7rL >
0, is greater than the expected manipulation costs, q4'H (mH) + (1 - q) ~/L (mi) > 0. Hence,
if the loss from not aborting after a low signal are "not too large," the DM will prefer not to
reevaluate the project:
Proposition 13 (Sunk Cost Effect) There exist t1 < -2 < 0 such that:
1. the DM reevaluates the project in any PBE if 7rL < 1,
2. the DM does not reevaluate the project in any PBE if 7rL r2 , and
2. there exist PBE where the DM reevaluates the project and the DM doesn't reevaluate the
project zf 1l < 7L < t2.
Since reevaluating one's previous decision is informative about the person's skills or knowl-
edge, it leads to self-deception. Therefore, the DM will prefer not to reevaluate her initial choice
if the monetary loss 7rL from continuing an inefficient project is lower than the expected cost
of memory manipulation. Note that the key feature of the model is not the psychological cost
55If the project is ex-ante inefficient, E [7r] < 0, the problem would be trivial since the DM would never invest.
from failure itself. The individual will eventually find out whether the project is successful or
not. However, by not reevaluating a project, the individual avoids the psychological cost from
self-deception.5 6
1.7 Conclusion
This chapter proposed a model of choice under risk based on imperfect memory and self-
deception. The model provides a unified explanation for a number of biases in decision-making.
It also leads to non-expected utility representation that is consistent with recent experimental
evidence relating ambiguity aversion to an individual's skills or knowledge.
The model can be enriched in several directions by incorporating strategic components.
Principal-agent relationships seem like a natural application of the theory. Since the outcome
of the relationship is typically informative about the agent's skill or knowledge, principals may
prefer to offer contracts that do not completely reveal the outcome to the agent. Therefore,
firms may prefer not to condition wages on economy-wide shocks. Similarly, CEOs may be
"rewarded for luck."
Another interesting direction is in the field of incomplete contracts. Contracts may be
incomplete due to the contracting parties' preferences for avoiding information correlated with
their skills or knowledge.5 7 However, because parties understand the consequences of contract
forms and post-contractual decisions, the allocation of rights may matter for the outcomes.
Therefore, the general framework proposed here may provide a behavioral model for a theory
of ownership based on incomplete contracts.
The model can also be embedded in a general equilibrium model. Since self-deception leads
to endowment effects, the model may provide an explanation for the low volume of trades of
uncertain assets occurring in equilibrium. 58
Finally, the model can lead to interesting predictions when 0 is interpreted as a parameter of
56The argument above is related to agency explanations. For example, as argued by Li (2007), in environments
with adverse selection, agents may prefer not to change their opinions if this publicly conceals bad news about
their abilities. It is unclear, however, whether agency concerns would play an important role in contexts where
the decisions are not publicly observed.
57Mukerji (1998) showed that ambiguity aversion may lead to incomplete contracts Tirole (2008) considered
a model where thinking about contingencies is costly. In his model, contracts may be "too complete."
" See Billot et al. (2000) for a model based on ambiguity aversion.
anticipatory utility. Because anticipatory utility typically leads to a first-order gain from mem-
ory manipulation but only second-order costs through suboptimal decision-making, individuals
will forget negative news and remember positive news with probability above their natural
rates. For example, a model of portfolio allocation where signals a are informative about the
profitability of a risky asset may provide an explanation for why most investors hold extremely
underdiversified portfolios and overinvest in stocks issued by the their employing firm.
Appendix A Non-Separable Preferences
In Section 1.4, the DM's preferences were assumed to be additively separable between at-
tributes and money. In this section, I consider general utility functions. It turns out that a main
feature in this general model is the degree of complementarity between attributes and money.
As will be discussed later, since a DM is not as affected by monetary outcomes when she is
uninformed about her attributes when attributes and money are complementary, complemen-
tarity can be interpreted as providing "psychological insurance." Therefore, the DM may prefer
a lottery whose outcomes are informative about her attributes if the complementarity effect is
greater than the costs of self-deception. Moreover, the resulting probability weighting function
may have an "inverted S-shape" as in Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Prelec (1998).
Let u, (s) - f u (0, s) dF (0la) denote the expected utility from a monetary amount equal
to s conditional on outcome a. As in Corollary 2, it can be shown that, in any PBE, m* > 0 >
* 59
Define the degree of complementarity between 0 and money by
X (H, L) - uH (H) + uL (L) - uL (H) - uH (L). (1.20)
Note that x (H, L) > 0 if u has increasing differences and X (H, L) < 0 if u has decreasing
differences. The additively separable case presented in the text corresponds to the case where
X (H, L) = 0. The ex-ante expected utility from the lottery is
U (E) =q (7H + n*H) uH (H) + (1 - q) (7L + mL) UL (L)
+q (1 - 71, - mr*H) u (H) + (1 - q) (1 - qL - mr*) uo (L) - MC,
where MC = qbH (M ) + (1 - q) 'H (m*) is the expected memory cost. Then, long but tedious
5 9 As in Corollary 2, it can also be shown that
UH (H) -UL (L) > H1- H- 7) m=--H, m = 0, and
uH (H) - uL (L) < = OH (1 -qH) 0< n<mH <1- H, mr < 0.
algebraic manipulations yield
U (E) = quH (H) + (1 - q) uL (L) + zx(H, L) - MC. (1.21)
where z = q(l-q) (1- -mL) (- q m.,) > 0 and MC = q/) H H(mv) + (1 - q) 4OH (mL).
The utility of a monetary lottery can be decomposed in three terms: First, the expected
utility quH (H) + (1 - q) UL (L) of the lottery when memory is perfect. Second, the expected
manipulation costs MC. These two effects are precisely the same as in the additively separable
case (see equation 1.13). The third effect, which is not present when the utility is additively
separable, is the degree of complementarity between attributes and money. When signals are
forgotten, there is probability a (m*H, m*) that a high signal was observed and the comple-
mentary probability that a low signal was observed. Thus, forgetting a signal can be seen
as providing "psychological insurance" to the agent. This raises her expected utility if 0 and
money are complementary (X > 0) and decreases her expected utility if they are substitutes
(X < 0).
Proceeding as in Subsection 1.4.1, it follows that the DM's expected utility can be repre-
sented by
U (E) = w (q) x uH (H) + [1- w (q)] X uL (L),
where w (q) = q + zX(H,L)-MC Moreover, it is straightforward to show that w (0) = 0, anduH(H)-uL(L)"
w (1) = 1. Therefore, when attributes and money are complementary, the DM may exhibit
ambiguity loving behavior. In particular, the following example shows that the model may lead
to an inverted S-shaped probability weighting function:
Example 7 (Inverted S-shaped Probability Weighting Function) Consider the limited
memory model of Example 2 and suppose that the manipulation effort is a binary variable:
mH E {0, 3}, where ,H () = -. Let X (H, L) = uH (H) - uH (L) = 1. Then, self 1 chooses
to engage in memory manipulation if q E (0, }2) . It is straightforward to show that, for values
of q such that the DM engages in memory manipulatzon, the probability weighting function has
an inverted S-shape:
> iq E (0, 1)
As in Section 1.4, denote by U' the utility of a lottery with the same distribution over
monetary outcomes as the one above but whose monetary outcomes are uninformative about
0. Rearranging equation (1.21), we obtain
U (E) = U' + yX (H, L) - MC, (1.22)
[ (1-77LmL)(1-7H-m*H
where y = q (1 - q) 1 + H( > 0. Consider the choice between the
lottery E and another lottery with the same distribution over monetary outcomes but whose
monetary outcomes are uninformative about 0. Equation (1.22) implies that the DM will prefer
lottery E if the degree of complementarity is high enough or if the expected memory cost is low
enough: yX (H, L) > MC. Therefore, when attributes and money are complementary, the DM
may prefer the attribute-dependent lottery.
However, when the monetary lottery is "small" (i.e., when the lottery pays x = es for e
low), the complementarity effect vanishes. Since the memory cost converges to a strictly positive
number as e converges to zero, it follows that the certainty equivalent of the lottery converges
to CE (0) < 0. Therefore,
ir (E) CE (E)lim = -)lim = +oo
-- 0+ 6 E-+O+
and, for any degree of complementarity between attributes and money, the DM always exhibits
zeroth-order risk aversion. This is formally stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 14 In any PBE, the DM exhibits zeroth-order risk aversion.
It is interesting to contrast the general model with the a model from the following example
where the DM does not face memory costs:
Example 8 (Exogenous Memory Model) Take s b (ms) = +oo for all m, 0. Thus, the
agent cannot engage in endogenous memory manipulation. Let rl, < 1 so that the agent forgets
outcome with (exogenous) probabilities 1 - r, > 0. If qH > 17L, memory is selective in the sense
that good news is more likely to be remembered than bad news.
When memory manipulation is endogenous (and differentiable at m, = 0), the effect from
memory manipulation always dominates the complementarity effects and the DM displays
zeroth-order risk aversion. When memory manipulation is exogenous, the order of risk aver-
sion is determined by the degree of complementarity between attributes and money. Note that
for small e, attributes and money are complementary if u'H (0) < u' (0) and substitutes if
uH (0) > u t (0).
Proposition 15 In the exogenous memory model: (i) the DM is first-order risk averse if
U' (0) > u'H (0); (ii) the DM is first-order risk seeking if u'L (0) < u' (0); and (iii) the DM has
second-order risk preferences if u' (0) = u' (0).
Therefore, the DM may display risk preferences of first order when there are no manipulation
costs. Unlike when memory manipulation is endogenous, the DM may be first-order risk seeking
or have risk preferences of second order.
Appendix B Non-Bayesian Framework
Throughout the chapter, I have maintained the assumption that the DM understands that
she engages in memory manipulation and, thus, interprets her recollections according to Bayes'
rule. Therefore, in the model presented in the text, individuals are sophisticated. In this
section, I consider the case of naive individuals. As in Mullainathan (2002), naive individuals
are unaware of their imperfect memory and interpret recollections as if they were the true
outcomes. Two interesting features arise under naivet6. First, unlike the model of sophisticated
individuals, the equilibrium is unique. Second, decision makers may prefer to observe a signal
even if it has no objective value. As a consequence, they may display ambiguity seeking behavior
even under additive separability between attributes and money. Moreover, the individual may
exhibit zeroth-order risk seeking behavior.
Consider a naive decision maker (NDM), who is unaware of her memory manipulation efforts.
Therefore, she applies Bayes' rule as if her recollections were generated by the memory system
when she does not engage in memory manipulation, i.e. mL = mH = 0. When & E {H, L}, she
correctly infers that outcome a = & has been observed in period 1. However, when an outcome
is forgotten, she attributes weight
q(1 - rH)
p = q (1 -qH) (1.23)q(1 -qH) + (1 -q) (1 - 'L)
to a high outcome and (1 - p) to a low outcome. I refer to such updating rule as naive Bayes'
rule. The following definition proposes an adaptation of the PBE concept to naive decision
makers:
Definition 3 A Perfect Naively Bayesian Equilibrium (PNBE) of the game is a strategy profile
(a*, b*, m H (a), m E (a)) and posterior beliefs P (. &a) such that:
E&. [E, [u (a, b* (&a) , 9, 0a) 1a] m (a) , m* (a)]
1. a* E arg max ;aEA - q H (m*H (a)) - (1 - q) /L (rnL (a))
{ (s + m.) E, [u (a, b* (&a) , , s) I-&a = s] }
ms" + (1 - q - ms) EL [u (a, b (8i) , , s) &a = 0] - Os (m s )
sE {H, L};
3. b* (&) E argmax{E, [u(a,b,0,a) I&a = &]};
bEB
4. / ( 1&a = &) is obtained by naive Bayes' rule if Pr (&a = &ImL = mH = 0) > 0, V6 E
{L, H, 0}.
Conditions 1 - 3 are the same as in the PBE concept. Condition 4 modifies the standard
Bayesian condition by requiring agents to follow the naive Bayes rule instead.
An interesting special case of this naive framework is obtained when we take the forgetfulness
memory system of Example 1. Recall that if the state 0 is interpreted as a recollection of a
high outcome, then the model from Example 1 becomes one where the agent is able to convince
herself that a low outcome was a high outcome by engaging in memory manipulation. Suppose
an individual recollects a high outcome (i.e., & = 0). If this individual is sophisticated, she then
corrects for her memory imperfection and attributes some (Bayesian) weight to the possibility
that she has observed a low outcome but managed to convince herself that the outcome was
high instead. On the other hand, a naive individual believes her recollection is correct and
attributes full weight to a high outcome (p = 1).
B1 Equilibrium Uniqueness
This subsection establishes that a PNBE exists and, under mild conditions, is unique. The
naive updating rule implies that the NDM's expected utility given & = 0 is
u, (a, b, a) = puH (a, b, a) + (1 - p) uL (a, b, a) . (1.24)
Upon observing an outcome s E {H, L}, self 1 maximizes:
(s + ms) us (a, ba (s) , s) + (1 - r7, - ms) u (a, ba (0), ) , s) - (ms) . (1.25)
The key feature of the naive updating rule is that it is not a function of the amount of memory
manipulation employed by self 1. This greatly simplifies the computation of the PNBE of the
model since, unlike in the sophisticated case, there is no feedback between self 2's expectation
of the manipulation exerted by self 1 and self l's manipulation choice. Then, the equilibrium
amount of manipulation is determined by the maximum of expression (1.25).
Proposition 16 There exists a PNBE. Furthermore, if 1s, is strictly convex and ba () is a
(single-valued) function where s E {H, L} and E {H, L, 0}, the PNBE is essentially unique.60
Proof. Existence follows the same argument as Proposition 1. Note that Condition 3
from Definition 3 implies that ba (s) is not a function of self l's memory manipulation. Strict
convexity of s, implies that expression (1.25) is strictly concave in m,. Then, the equilibrium
amounts of memory manipulation m* and m* are unique. Condition 4 implies that beliefs
must also coincide in all recollections such that Pr (6a = &I m = m* = 0) > 0. *
Corollary 3 The PNBE is essentially unique 'when either: (i) u (a, ., 0, Ua) : B -- > R is a
strictly concave function, or (ii) B is a singleton (i.e., the individual does not take ex-post
actions).
60 The PNBE is essentzally unique in the sense that, all PNBE feature the same choices of actzons a and b,
manipulation efforts mL and mH, and beliefs gzven recollections that are believed to be reached wzth posiztve
probability (i.e., (&a = & mL = mH = 0) > 0). Equilibria may diverge only with respect to beliefs at recollections
that are not believed to be reached with positive probability. Obviously, one can ensure uniqueness of beliefs in
all recollections by assuming that the NDM believes that all recollections are reached wzth positive probabilzty:
0 < min {TlH, IL} < 1.
Remark 7 Suppose that B is finite and fix the natural rates of remembering an outcome TIL and
7 H.- Since the set of utility functions u : OxAx B xR -- R such that arg max {E, [u (a, b, 0, Ora) Ia = ]}bEB
contains more than one element is nowhere dense, it follows that the PNBE is essentzally unique
for generic utility functions when the set of ex-post actions B is finite.
The generic uniqueness of the PNBE contrasts with the multiplicity of the PBE discussed
in Subsubsection 1.2.3. Multiplicity arises from the fact that self 1 affects self 2's equilibrium
inference when the individual is sophisticated. In the naive case, because there is not effect
from memory manipulation on self 2's inference, uniqueness is obtained.
B2 Ambiguity-Seeking Behavior
For simplicity, consider the forgetfulness memory system of Example 1 and, as in the Sec-
tion 1.4, assume that the utility is additively separable between attributes and money. Then,
the equilibrium amount of memory manipulation is m = min 11 (Au); 1 . The ex-ante
expected utility of the NDM is
U (E) = (1 - q) (1 + m [ - (1 - q) mj] o -- (1 - q) L (mr)
= (1--q)(1+m*L)UL+[q 
-(1- q)m*]UH-(1-q)L(m*),
where the second inequality uses the fact that uO = UH. The NDM prefers to observe the signal
E if and only if the expected improvement in self-image m* I Au is greater than the cost of
memory manipulation OL (m) *.61 Thus, naive individuals may prefer to observe signals even if
the objective value of information (which in this case is zero) is lower than the expected costs
of manipulation.
Remark 8 Proceeding as in Proposztion 8, it follows that the NDM's expected utility from the
monetary lottery can be represented by
U (E) = w (q) UH + [1- w (q)] UL,
61As in Subsection 1.3.1, the NDM's surplus from observing a signal is decreasing in the favorableness of her
prior distribution over her attributes under Assumption 3. However, unlike Conjecture 1, this surplus may be
positive when the individual is naive.
where w (q) = q -(1- q) m* + , w (0) =0, and w (1) = 1. Thus, the NDM is ambi-
guity averse if ImLl Au < L (m ) and ambiguity seeking if the reverse inequality is satisfied.
Hence, a naive individual may be ambtguity seeking even when the utility function is additively
separable between attributes and money.
B3 Zeroth-Order Risk Seeking Behavior
This subsection shows that the NDM may be zeroth-order risk seeking. As in Subsection
1.4.3, consider a lottery that pays x = s, s E {H, L}, where qH + (1 - q) L = 0. Let m (e)
denote the equilibrium amount of memory manipulation as a function of e. The certainty
equivalent of this lottery is:
u(O, CE ())dF(O) = (1 - q)(1+m())uL(L)
+ [q - (1 - q) m (e)] UH (H) - (1 - q) OL (m (e)) - qC ('H  (E)),
Recall that u, (s) f u (0, s) dF (O a) us (u) = va + T (s), where the last equality follows from
additive separability. Then, taking the limit as e -- 0+, we obtain:
T (CE (0)) = -m* (1 - q) Av - (1 - q) OL (miL) - qH (m').
Hence, CE (0) > 0 if ImL (0)l (vH - vL) > VL (m* (0)) + qCH (m* (0)) and the NDM is
zeroth-order risk seeking. In the opposite case, the NDM is zeroth-order risk averse. Thus, we
have established the following result:
Proposition 17 The NDM is:
* zeroth-order risk averse if Im* (0)1 (vH - VL) < PL (m* (0)) + 1-qH (m (0)), and
* zeroth-order risk seeking if Im* (0) (vH - VL) > 4 L (m*L (0)) + 1CH (m* (0)).
Appendix C Finite Number of Realizations
In the main text, we assume that each outcome oa may be either high or low. It is straightfor-
ward to generalize this framework to allow for any finite number of possible outcomes. Suppose
that, given action a C A, an outcome Ua E {1, 2,...,Sa} is realized, Sa 2. Outcomes are
ordered by first-order stochastic dominance:
F (0a -= s) < F (0la = s+1)
for all 0 E O, s E {1, 2, ..., Sa} and a E A, with strict inequality for some value of 0.
An outcome s E {1, 2,..., Sa} is remembered with probability Uls,a + m, where rs,a E [0, 1].
Self 1 exerts memory manipulation m, E [-ns,a, 1 - 7s,a], which costs sb, (ms) > 0. Then, self
2 observes a recollection of the outcome ca, which is denoted by &a E {1, 2, ..., Sa, 0} and takes
an action b E B.
Preferences are represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u : E x A x
B x R --+ R which is strictly increasing in 0. When u (0, a, b, x) = u (0, a, b, y) for all x, y E IR,
the model has purely informative signals. If signals are purely informative and A and B are
singletons, we say that they have a purely hedonic value. When u (0, a, b, x) =A u (0, a, b, y) for
some x, y E R we say that the model has monetary signals.
It is straightforward to generalize the results in the text to this framework. For the rep-
resentation result of Proposition 8, however, one should note that probability weights are no
longer unique when Sa > 2.
Entrepreneurship Example The performance s E {S, F} of an entrepreneur is affected by
two independent variables: her attributes 0 and the external conditions r E {1, 2, 3, ..., R}. At-
tributes and external conditions are substitutes for the entrepreneur's performance. Therefore,
given her performance s E {S, F}, more favorable external conditions r provide bad news about
the agent's attributes (in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance). The individual always
recollects her performance s, but may manipulate her memory in order to change the rate at
which she remembers the external conditions r.
This situation is modeled as follows. Let a E {S, F} x {1, ..., R} denote the outcome of the
(= (S,)...(s,ri)... (Sr) (F.r1-1.(Fri Ik(FfrR)
"=(S,0) M=(F,0)
Figure 1-13: Entrepreneur Example
project. Outcomes are ordered by first-order stochastic dominance:
(S, 1) >-FOSD (S, 2) >FOSD -... FOSD (S, R) tFOSD (F, 1) tFOSD ... >FOSD (F, R),
where we write x >-FOSD Y if x first-order stochastically dominates y. Given an outcome (s, r),
self 1 chooses the probability at which the external conditions r are forgotten by exerting
manipulation effort ms,r. Then, self 2 applies Bayes' rule to the recollections (s, f), where
P {r, 0}. The agent's payoff net of manipulation costs given a recollection (s, ) is
E [v (0, s) Is, ] + (s),
where s E {S, F} and i E {1, 2, ... , R, 0}. Figure 1-13 presents the agent's decision tree.
It is straightforward to extend the results from the general framework to this environment.
In particular, expected manipulation costs are always strictly positive. Therefore, the agent will
require the expected monetary payoffs from starting a new company to be strictly higher than
the payoff from the previous job in order to become an entrepreneur. Moreover, if all outcomes
have the same natural rate of recollection (i.e., rs,r = q for all s, r), then m,,1 > ms,2 - >
m ,R with at least one strict inequality, s E {S, F} . Hence, the agent will remember negative
external conditions more frequently than positive ones.
Appendix D Proofs
D1 Proofs of Propositions and Lemmas
Proof of Proposition 1: Define mnL (mL,mH) and mnH (mL, mH) as the set of maxima of (1.4)
and (1.5), respectively (these are the best-response correspondences of self 1). Since (1.4) and (1.5)
are continuous and concave functions defined over a compact set, rnL (mL, mH) and r7nH (mL, mH) are
non-empty, convex, and compact sets. Define the transformation T : [-rL, 1 - rL ] X [-H
, 
1 - 77H] -
[-rL, 1 - rqL] x [-qH, 1 - 7HI] by
T (mLm H) ( 'hL (mL, mH) ,rnH (mL, mH))
Then, Kakutani's theorem establishes that there exists a fixed-point of T which is a PBE. *
Proof of Proposition 2: The proof will use the following result:
Claim Al. UH (a, ba (0) , L) > UL (a, ba (L) , L).
Proof of the claim. By revealed preference, uO (a, ba (0), L) > uo (a, ba (L), L). From the definition
of u 0 ,
aUH (a, b(0) , L) + (1 - a) uL (a, b (0) , L) auuH (a, b (L) , L) + (1 - a) uL (a, b (L) , L) ,
where I omit the efforts mH and mE from a (mH, mL) for notational clarity. Rearranging, gives
a [UH (a, ba (0), L) - UH (a, ba (L) , L)] (1 - a) [UL (a, ba (L) , L) - UL (a, ba (0) , L)] .
Then, revealed preference implies that
1-a
UH (a, ba (0), L) - UH (a, ba (L) , L) > [UL (a, b, (L) , L) - UL (a, ba (0), L)] > 0.
Thus, uH (a, ba (0) , L) > uH (a, ba (L) , L) . But, first-order stochastic dominance implies that uH (a, b, (L) , L) >
UL (a, ba (L) , L). Therefore, we have that UH (a, ba (0), L) > UL (a, ba (L) , L). M
Proof of Proposition 2: Because ?7H < 1, the set of strictly positive efforts given a high signal
(0, 1 - 'H] is nonempty. Since (1.5) is strictly concave, it suffices to show that its derivative evaluated
at mH = 0 is strictly positive:
UH (a, b (H) , H)- uL (a, b (0) , H)- a (m* (a) , m* (a)) [UH (a, b (0) , H) - uL (a, b (0) , H)] > 0, (1.26)
for all m* (a), m* (a), where I have used the fact that 0' (0) = 0.
Note that, by revealed preference, UH (a, b (H) , H) UH (a, b (0) , H) . Hence,
UH (a, b (H)) - UL (a, b (0))
UH (a, b(0)) - uL (a, b (0))
Rearranging, we obtain:
UH (a, b (H) , H) - UL (a, b (0), H) - a (m* (a) , m* (a)) [UH (a, b (0), H) - UL (a, b (0), H)]
> UH (a,b(H) ,H) - UL (a,b(o) ,H) - [UH (a,b(o) ,H) - UL (a,b() ,H)] > 0.
This shows that the expression on the left-hand side of (1.26) is non-negative. Suppose it is equal
to zero. Then, by the previous inequality, it must be the case that a (m* (a),m H (a)) = 1. But
a (m* (a), m* (a)) = 1 implies that m n = 1 - 7L which, from the Kuhn-Tucker condition of the
maximization of (1.4), requires that
UL (a, ba (L) , L) - UH (a, ba (0), L) >2 OL (1 - 7L) 0.
But, from Claim Al, UL (a, ba (L) , L) - UH (a, ba (0), L) < 0, which contradicts the inequality above.
Hence, m 1H (a) > 0 for all a G A.
Proof of Proposition 3: Define the function W, as the expected utility of self 1 conditional on a = s :
(1 - , - ms) [a (mL, mH) UH (a, ba (0), H) + [1 - a (mL, mH)] UL (a, ba (0), L)]
Ws (mL, mH, a, {ba}) ba (, ) - (
+ (rs + ms) us (a, be (s),s) - Cs (ms)
For notational clarity, I omit the term a from m* (a). In any PBE, m* solves:
S(1 -U - m,) [a (m*, m*)uH (a, b, (0) , H) + [1 - a (m , m)] uL (a, b (0) , L)]
max
m, + (, + ms) us (a, ba (s) ,s) - 40, (ms)
Therefore, the envelope theorem implies that
OW, 80 (mn, m*)
O~mL mL=L= (1- s - mi*) [UH (a, ba (0) , H) - UL (a, ba (0), L)]O) (1.27)
8m L m=* , Oms
mH =mH
The DM's ex-ante utility is equal to
U (mH,mL,a, {ba}) = qWH (mL,imH,a, {ba}) + (1 - q) WL (mL,imH,a, {ba})
Thus,
OU (mH, mL, a, {ba}) OWH (mH (a) ,m* (a),a) OWL (m*H (a) ,m* (a) ,a)
mimH=M q  +(1 -q) O
mL=mL
Since a(mH,m) < < a(mH,mL) with at least one inequality being strict, equation (1.27) yieldsS mH - 9 &mL
OU (mH, ML,a, {ba}) Ou (mH, mL,a, {ba})
Om H  <m< L
Then, the result follows from the concavity of U. *
Proof of Proposition 4: From Proposition 2, it follows that m*H (a) > 0. First, we establish that
m* (a) < 0. By the strict concavity of equation (1.4), it suffices to show that its derivative evaluated at
mL = 0 is weakly negative:
-a (m (a), m* (a)) Au - 0' (0) < 0,
0
which is true because a (m* (a), m* (a)) > 0 and Au > 0.
Let Au > 0V' (1 - 77H) . Suppose, in order to obtain a contradiction that there exists a PBE with
m~ = 0. Then, from Kuhn-Tucker's conditions of the maximization of (1.4),
a (0, m* (a)) Au = 0
for some m* (a) that maximizes (1.5) given m* (a) = 0. Because Au > 0, this is satisfied if and only if
a (0, m* (a)) = 0. But a (0, m* (a)) = 0 implies that m = 1 - 7 H. From Kuhn-Tucker's conditions of
the maximization of (1.5), there exists a PBE with m* = 1 - rH if and only if
[1 - a (m (a) , m* (a))] Au > (1 - 77H)
for some m, that maximizes (1.4). Substituting a (m* (a) , m* (a)) = 0, it follows that Au > / (1 -
which contradicts Au > O'H (1 - H) -
Proof of Proposition 5: Existence follows from Proposition 2. For a fixed m*, self 1 solves:
max UL - mLa (m*, 0) Au - 1L (mL).
-- 1<mL<O
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:
a(mT,O) An > -(*(-1) m L=--l,
a(m*, 0) Au < 0 mL = 0, and
0 < a (m*, 0) Au < -0, (-1) - a (m*,O) Au = -~, (mL).
In the PBE, mL = m L . Substituting a (mL, 0) = - )m and using the implicit function theorem, it
follows that the unique PBE has manipulation efforts:
', (-1)
S= -1 if Au > , and
q __' (-1)q A = -', (m) if Au<
q - (1- q) m* q
The first claim follows by inspection. Let the cost of manipulation be OL (mL, K) , where r para-
metrizes the marginal cost of memory manipulation: °2 < 0. Therefore, higher K's lead to a higher
marginal cost of memory manipulation (--mnL > 0). Then, differentiation of the condition (1.8) and an
inspection of the condition for boundary equilibria establishes the second and third claims. *
Proof of Proposition 6: Follows from equations (1.10) and (1.11). M
Proof of Proposition 7: First, consider the forgetfulness model. From Corollary 1,
E [u] - U (Ea) = (1 - qa) L (m*L (a)) > 0.
Then, Proposition 5 implies that the amount of manipulation ImI is increasing in Au. Since, by
Assumption 3, Au (,n, a) is decreasing in n for any a, it follows that E [u] - U (Ea) is decreasing in r,.
Consider the limited memory model. From Corollary 1,
E[u] - U (Ea) = qaH (mH (a)) > 0.
It can be shown that the set of equilibrium manipulations is increasing in the benefit of manipulation
Au (in the sense of strong set order). Then, Assumption 3 and the monotonicity of H (mH) in mH > 0
imply that the set of equilibrium premia {E [u] - U (Ea)} is decreasing in n (in the sense of strong set
order). *
Proof of Proposition 8: The representation follows equations (1.13) and (1.15). Note that q = 0
implies that, in any PBE, m = 0. Thus, w (0) = 0. Similarly, in any PBE, q = 1 implies m* = 0 and,
therefore, w (1) = 1. M
Proof of Proposition 9: This is a special case of Proposition 14. M
Proof of Lemma 1: Note that in this case recollections are i.i.d. Then, in order to apply Doob's
consistency theorem, we need to check that there exists a set A E {0, L, H} such that 01 # 02
Pro, (A) # Pr02 (A). In each period, the probability of each recollection & (which are i.i.d.) is
Pr( = H10) = Pr(a = H0) x 7H,
Pr (& = LJO) = [1 - Pr (a = HIO)qlrL,
Pr(&= 01) = Pr(a= HO)(1 -H)+[1 -Pr(a= H)](1 - L).
Since Pr (a = H|0) is strictly increasing in 0, it follows that 01 > 02 implies Pro, (6 = H) > Pro2 (6 = H)
and Pro, (& = L) < Pr02 (6 = L), which verifies the condition. *
Proof of Lemma 2: To simplify the notation, consider the distribution of q instead of the distribution
of 0. This is without loss of generality since q = Pr (a = H10) is strictly increasing in 0. With some abuse
of notation, I will write F (q hn) for the c.d.f. of q given history h".
Note that actions b, E B are functions of the sequence of recollections {&l, ... , &}. Therefore, to
simplify notation and with no loss of generality, I omit the actions {bl, b 2 , ... , bn} from histories. Thus,
with some abuse of notation, I will refer to a history as a sequence of recollections hn = {&, .. , & a in
all the proofs in the appendix.
Denote by hn\k the history {&1, ... , ok-1, 6k+l, ---, n} . I will use the following result:
Claim A2. For any history hn , we have:
F (qlhn\k,k = H) F (qlhn\k,6k = L)
This claim states that, for any history, a high signal is good news about q and a low signal is bad
news about q in terms of first-order stochastic dominance.
Note that the p.d.f. conditional on h' is
11 [q (1 - 'H - m*,t) + (1 -q) (1 - - m*L,t)]
t:ot =0
x I q(qH + m ,t) x JJ (1-q)(rL+m*L,t) x f(q)
f (qh) = t:at=H t:at=L
f t:at=0 dq
x 
q (7H +  H,t)X (1 - q)(L + m*L,t)x f (q)
t:at=H t:at=L
Let #H denote the number of times that a signal & = H was recollected: # {t : 6t = H}. Similarly,
define #L as # {t : 6t = L} .62 Then, after some algebraic manipulations, we can write:
r [q (1 - H -,t)+ ) ( L -m*L,t)] x q#H x (1 - q)#L x f(q)
f (qlh" ) = t:,=f f [q (1-H m*,t) (1- q)(1- 7L m- M*L,t)] x q#H x (1- q)#Lx f(q)dq
t:rt=O
Note that f (qh"n) is not a function of mH,t and mL,t for any history hn such that at -0. This follows
from the signals at being i.i.d. and the fact that &t = at when &t 0 . Integrating the equation above,
we obtain
fo' fj [q(1-71H -m*, t) +( -  q )(1  - rL - m * ,t)] x q#H x (1-q)#L X f(q) dq
F(xjh,) = t:t =0
fl r [q (1- H -m*H,t) -(1- q)1- rL -m*,t)] x q#HX (1- q)#Lx f (q) dq"
t:at=O
We are now ready to prove the Claim:
62 Obviously, #H and #L are functions of histories. We omit this dependence for notational clarity.
Proof of Claim A2.We have to show that
f' f [q(1 q, -m*H, t ) ( - q )(  - r L - m * , t ) ] xq#H X (Iq)#L Xf(q)dq
t.at =0 <
fl 1 [q(1- qH -mH,t ) + (- q) L - m,t)] x q#Hx ( q)#Lx f(q) dq
t:Ot=0
fo 1j [q(1 -IH-mH, t)(1-q)( 1- L -- m *L ,t) xq#H- 1 X(1 q)#L+1x f(q)dq
t:t =0
fol [q (1 - mHH ,t) + (-q)-1- L -- ,t)] xq#H-1 X (1 q)#L+1 Xf(q)dq
tao =0
When x = 0, both sides become 0 and, when x = 1, both sides are equal to 1.
The derivative of the LHS with respect to x is
[ x(1 - qH - mH,t) (1- X) (1-- OL - mL,t)] X X# H X (1 X) # L X f (X)
t'at=O
1 [q 71 - - m*Ht) + q L ,t)] x q#H (1--q)#Lx f(q) dq'
t:at=0
and the derivative of the RHS with respect to x is
S[x (1 - 'H - H,t) (1-x)(1-L -mL,t)] X #H - 1 X (1 x)#L + x f ()
t:at=0
f1 [q (1-H - Mt) + (--q) -L - ,t)] xq#H-1 x (1- q)#L+ x f(q) dq
t:at=0
Note that dRHS > dLHS if and only ifdq dq
S[x (1- qH H- mt,t) +L - m*,t) ] x # H  (--) # L X f(X)
t: t=O
2 [q (1- qH - MH,t) + (1-q) (- L m,t)] x q#H x (1 q)#L x f(q)dq
t:ot =0
x (1 - H - mH,t) + ( X) -L r,t)] xz # H - 1 X (1 z) # L + x f (x)
t:rt=O
Rearranging, we obtain:
o q 1 + m*,)t L - ,t x #H X q)#L x f(q dq
t: t=0
f1 H [q(1- lH - ,t) (1-q)(1- L -m ,t)] x q#H-x (1 #L+1 x f(q) dq
t:ut =0
t:a1 =0
Thus,dRHS >dLHS if and only if
fo' 11 [q(1- H - mt) -) 11-rL-m * ,)] xq#H x (1 q)#L x f (q) dq
> t:ta=0
fo [q (1 - H - ,t) +L q)(-L-M,t)] X q#H-1 ( )#L+ f()d
t:ta,=0
where p (x) = -. Since p (O) = 0, p (1) = +oo, p (x) is strictly increasing in x, and the term on the
right is a positive constant, there exists a unique x such that
fo [q (1 - H -- m*H, t ) + ( 1 q ) ( 1 - L - m * ,t ) ] xq#H X (1-q)#L x f (q)dq
p(x) > (<) fo [ q 71- H - mHt) + q(1  1- L -m,t) x qq#H-1 - # xL+1 X(q)dq'
t:at=0
if x < (>) .
Therefore, we have that dRS > dLHS if x < 2 and dRHS <dLHS if x > t. Thus, the inequality is
satisfied for all q (it is satisfied with strict inequality whenever q E (0, 1) and with equality at q E {0, 1}.
Now, we are ready to prove the lemma:
Proof of Lemma 2. As shown previously, F (xlh") is not a function of m, k and m k for k such that
&k 5 0. Therefore, we only need to establish the results for k such that &k = 0.
Consider an arbitrary k such that &k = 0. Then, F (xlh") is equal to
1-qH -mbH,k q# H + 1(1 q)#L [q(1-rH -mH,t) + (1 -q)(1 L m, t ) ] f(q)dq
t:Ak:at=O
+( - L-m *Lk) f q# x (1-q)#L+1 1 [q )( -qH - Ht) ( q  (1 - 1L -m*Lt) f (q) dq
t k:at=0
(l-vH-mI) #H#+l(1--q)# L  II [q(1l-mHt) +(1--q) (1--L -mL,t ) ] f (q ) d q
t-k:a t =O
+ (l--Lg-1.k).[q#(1 --q)#L+1 rI [q(1fH* t)+(l--)( 1V-m.)]f(q) dq
t54k: t=O
With some algebraic manipulations, it follows that dF (xlh,) > 0 if and only if
fox q# H X ( 1 - q ) # L + 1 (1_ -rlH -mH,t) + (1-q)(1-L -- m*, t ) ] f (q ) d q
t/kat, =0
lo#HX (l-q)#L+1 [ (1-rH m,t+ (1 q)(1 L - rn*,t)]f (q)dq
t7k:at=o
foxq#H+lx(1 - q)#L fJ [q(1-rH -m*,t) + ( 1 - q) (1 - L - m * ,t ) f (q)dq
thk:al =0
f 1 q#H+lx (1- q)#L 11 [q (-H m t) + (1 -q) (1- iL -m,t)] f (q)dq
tAk:ot =O
Note that the left-hand side is equal to F (xlh, &rn+l = L), whereas the right-hand side is equal to
F (xlhn, n+l = H). From the previous claim, it follows that F (xlh, &,~+l = L) > F (xIh, &n+l = H),
which proves that the condition above is satisfied. Therefore, we have shown that dF (xlh ) > 0.
The argument for dF (xlh n ) < 0 is analogous.
Lk
Proof of Proposition 10: The result is immediate from inequality 1.19, Lemma 1, and the fact that
the sets of histories with zero measure are the same for all relevant manipulation efforts. *
Proof of Proposition 11: In period N, conditions 1 and 2 from the definition of a PBE state that
mi,N (L, h N - )  argmax (L + mL) u (0) d F (OIL h N - 1 )
+ (1- ,L - mL) Ju () dF (010, hN ) L (mL ),
and
N-1 (H + mH) [ fu (0) dF (O9H, hN-1)]
mL,N (H, hN) arg max +(
m + (lH - mH) [fu (0) dF (0, h H (mH)
From Proposition 10. it follows that f u (0) dF (OlhN) converges to u (0) for almost all histories. But,
when fu (0) dF (19hN) = u(0) , it follows that mL (L,h N - 1) maximizes
(L + mL) u (0) + (1 - J7L - mL) u () - V)L (mL) = U(9) - V/L (mL),
which has a global maximum at mL = 0. Hence, by continuity, it follows that mL (L, h N - l) -* 0
(a.s.). Similarly, when fu(9) dF (9IhN) = u (0), mH (H, hn- 1 ) maximizes u(9) - OH (mH) so that
mH (H, hn - 1 ) --+ 0 (a.s.). M
Proof of Proposition 12: Given c = s, self 1 maximizes
(77, + ms) (O, + irs) + (1-/s , - m) [a*H + (1 -- *) 0 L + 7rs] - O s (ms),
where a* = a (mL, m*) . Simplifying, this expression becomes:
(r, + ms) Os + (1 - r* - ms) [oiOH + (1 - a*) OL] + r, - , (ms).
Therefore, the solution of the maximization program of self 1 is independent of r,. It thus follows the
set of manipulation efforts m* (T) that are part of a PBE is the same for all 7rL and 7rH, s G {H, L}.
The self 1 chooses a = T if
qirH + (1 - q) 7rL > qOH (m* (T)) + (1 - q) OVL (m*L (T)).
The result then follows from the fact that the left-hand side is not a function of 7rH and 7rL
.
Proof of Proposition 13: The expected utility of self 1 if she chooses (I, NE) is q (OH + 7rH) +
(1 - q) (OL + rL) . Her expected utility if she chooses NI is qOH (1 - q) OL. Because qrH +(1 - q) 7rL > 0,
it follows that NI is never chosen.
If self 1 chooses (I, E) , she obtains:
q (OH + 7rH) + (1 - q) OL - qOH (mH) q) - L (m*L)
Therefore, (I, E) is chosen if
q (OH + irH) + (1 - q) OL - q nb (miH) - (1- q) OL (mL) > q (OH + 7rH) + (1 - q) (OL + iL).
Rearranging, we obtain
-(1 - q) 'rL > q/H (mH) + (1 - q) L (mn ). (1.28)
Proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 12, it can be shown that the set of manipulation efforts
m* (I, E) that are part of a PBE is the same for all 7rL and 7rH, s E {H, L} . Then, the result follows
immediately from equation (1.28). *
Proof of Proposition 14: For any PBE, define the expected manipulation cost as MC (E) - qH (m*H (e))±
(1 - q) H (m* (E)). Note that limE-,, X (EH, EL) = 0. Therefore, for small E, equation (1.17) becomes:
f u (0, CE ()) dF (0)= quH (EH) + (1 - q) UL (eL) - MC () . (1.29)
Since MC (0) > 0 and, by the Theorem of the Maximum, MC (E) is continuous, it follows that MC (E) >
0 for small E. Hence, lim,,-o MC (6) > 0. Then, equation (1.29) yields:
lim u (0, CE (6)) dF (0) > quH (0) + (1 - q) UL (0) = u (0, 0) dF (0) ,
where the last equality follows from Bayes' rule. Since u is continuous and increasing in money, this
implies that limE,,o CE (e) > 0. Hence, lime-,,o r (e) /6 = - lim~,,o CE (e) /e < 0. .
Proof of Proposition 15: Since MC (e) = 0 for all e, equation (1.17) becomes
f u (0, CE (0)) dF (0) = qH (H) + (1 - q) UL (eL) + ZX (EH, eL). (1.30)
Substituting X (0, 0) = 0, yields
f u(, CE (0))dF (0) qu (0) + (1 - q)uL (0).
Therefore, Bayes' rule implies that f u (0, CE (0)) dF (0) = f u (0, 0) dF (0) and, because u is strictly
increasing in money, 7r (0) = -CE (0) = 0.
Differentiating equation (1.30), it follows that
CE(0)= qu (0)H + (1 - q) u'L (0) L + z(H - L) [u'H (0) - u'L (0)]
qu'H (CE) + (1 - q) u' (CE)
Substituting qH + (1 - q) L = 0, yields
CE' (0) = K [u' (0) - vu' (0)1,
where K = qu()+(l)u 0) q+ > 0. Thus, applying L'Hospital, we obtain
lim 7r () /6 = -CE' (0) = -K [uH (0) - u' (0)],
--ch concludes the proof.
which concludes the proof. m
D1 Proofs of Remarks and Examples
Proof of the claim in Remark 1: Let fl and p denote the cumulative distribution functions of
0a OE {L, 80 , 0 H and 0, E {OL, H }, respectively. o second-order stochastically dominates 0, if, for
any concave function g : 0 -R,
g() dpi (90a)dip (,) . (1.31)
But
g(Oe)d (O) = qg (OH) + (1 - q) g(OL) , and
Sg () di (o) = q(mH H)9(OH) + [q(1- H -H) (1- q)(1-mL -L)]g (0)
+ (1 - q) (qL + mL)g(OL) .
Substituting in inequality (1.31) and dividing by q (1 - mH - 'H)+(1 - q) (1 - ML qL), we obtain:
g (a (mL, mH) OH + [1- (mL, mH)] L) > (mL, mH)g(OH) + [1- a (mL, mH)9 (L),
which is true because g is concave. *
Example 5: It is helpful to separate the analysis in 2 cases: (i) q 2, and (ii) q < .In case (i), self 2
chooses a high ex-post action, b (0) = bH when she expects self 1 to manipulate her memory, mL= - .
In case (ii), she chooses a low ex-post action, b (0) = bL when she expects mL =
Case (i):
The DM chooses to manipulate her memory if
1 ) [,i (b ) + (L)]
2
+ - {a [VH (bL) + 7 (L)] + (1 - a) [VL (bL) + 7 (L)]}3
- L (_2) > VL (bL) + T (L)
where a denotes the weight implies by Bayes' rule. This inequality is satisfied if and only if a > 3.
Substituting the definition of a, we obtain q > 2,which is satisfied since q > 2.2
The ex-ante expected utility from the signal is thus
q [vH (bH) + 7 (H)] + - (1 - q) [VL (bH) + 7 (L)]
+(l- q) 1- [VL (bL) + (L)] - (1 - q)L (, 2
which is equal to 83q1. If the DM makes an uninformed decision, she obtains an ex-ante utility of
q[vH(bH) + T(H)] + (1 -q)[vL(bH)+7(L)] ifb = bH, and
q[vH(bL) + (H)] + (1 -q)[vL(bL)+7(L)] ifb = bL.
Thus, her utility is 7q if q > , and 5q + 1 if q < -. The surplus from observing the signal is then
83q + 1 1- if q> 1
-max {7q, 5q + 1} = 12
12 23-11 if q<
which is positive if and only if q > 2.
Case (ii): In this case, because b (0) = bL, the signal has no value. Therefore, the DM is always
(weakly) better off by not observing the signal. In particular, since she exerts memory manipulation if
q 2> , the surplus is strictly negative for q > - and it is equal to zero if q < 2.
Example 6: Following the same steps as in Example 5, it is straightforward to show that the surplus
from observing the signal S is equal to
(1 - q) -- ) if q 2 , and(3 ) 1
2q-l+(1-q) 1-n-- ifq < 2
Therefoie, S is always positive when q > 1. Furthermore, for q < -, it is positive if and only if
2q - 1 + (1 - q)1- - - 0,
which simplifies to
3 1 - 2q >
4 1-q -
Noting that fn is distributed according to the c.d.f. 4 concludes the proof.
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Chapter 2
Competition over time-inconsistent
consumers
2.1 Introduction
A significant amount of evidence suggests that, in some markets, consumers are not time-
consistent. When making intertemporal decisions, they tend to give higher relative weights to
an earlier future period as it gets closer. Consumers also often overestimate their degree of
time-consistency.
DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006), for example, analyze health clubs that offer both
monthly contracts and 10-visit passes. Most consumers take the monthly contracts even though
they would spend less if they bought a 10-visit pass. Shui and Ausubel (2005) consider a ran-
domized experiment in the credit card industry. Consumers are offered a contract with a lower
interest rate and a shorter duration and one with a higher interest rate but a longer duration.
Although most consumers take the contract with a shorter duration, they would pay less if they
chose the longer duration one because they continue to borrow on the credit card.1
How do firms respond to time-inconsistency among consumers? DellaVigna and Malmendier
OThis chapter was previously publised on the Journal of Public Economic Theory. See Gottlieb (2008).
1Oster and Scott-Morton (2005) consider the relation between newsstand and subscription prices of mag-
azines. They show that magazines associated with future benefits ("investment magazines") have relatively
higher subscription costs than those with immediate benefits ("leisure magazines"), indicating that firms may
be exploiting the consumers' time-inconsistency.
(2004) have shown that firms set prices above marginal cost for goods with immediate rewards
and deferred costs (leisure goods) and below marginal cost for goods with immediate costs and
deferred rewards (investment goods) both in the monopolistic and in the competitive case. This
result follows from the fact that commitment devices are valued by consumers and, therefore,
firms are able to benefit from providing them. Furthermore, as long as consumers are aware of
being time-inconsistent, the equilibrium is efficient.
Although DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004) show that their model is consistent with ev-
idence from investment goods such as the health club industry and the vacation time-sharing
industry as well as evidence from leisure goods such as the credit card and the mobile phone
industries, it is not consistent with observations from the tobacco, alcohol, and unhealthy food
industries (which are probably among the most compelling examples of markets with time-
inconsistent consumers). Since these are leisure goods, the model implies that consumers would
receive a lump-sum transfer and pay a marginal price higher than the marginal cost. However,
we do not observe such lump-sum transfers to consumers in these three examples.
In this essay, I argue that an important component missing from the DellaVigna and Mal-
mendier model is the fact that firms are typically unable to offer exclusive contracts. In some
markets (such as the cigarettes, alcohol, and unhealthy foods markets), the cost for the firm
of enrolling a potential user or for the consumer to switch between different firms is usually
very low and, therefore, contracts are non-exclusive. Then, if a firm offers a positive lump-sum
transfer to consumers and charges high marginal prices (as happens in the case of leisure goods
with exclusivity), another firm may benefit from selling the good at a lower price after the
contract has been signed. Hence, the impossibility to prevent a consumer from buying from
another firm after the contract has been signed is an important restriction for leisure goods.
In equilibrium, there is a stark asymmetry between leisure and investment goods. While the
equilibrium in the investment goods case is the same as in DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004)
and there is no role for taxation when consumers are aware of their time-inconsistency, in the
leisure goods case prices are equal to marginal cost and the equilibrium is always inefficient.
The key idea is that time-inconsistent consumers face an ex-post incentive to circumvent the
prearranged commitment devices. In the case of leisure goods, firms are able to profit ex-post
by offering these contracts, which breaks down the equilibrium.2 In the case of investment
goods, they are not able to profit and the equilibrium with commitment devices is maintained.
This prediction seems to be consistent with evidence that markets for leisure goods with small
costs of enrolling new users and small switching costs do not feature lump-sum transferences
to consumers. 3
An implication of the model is that, in the case of leisure goods, increased competition may
decrease total surplus. If a monopolist could commit not to renegotiate the contract but firms
could not prevent consumers from signing contracts with other firms, total surplus in leisure
goods markets would be higher under monopoly than under competition. 4
The efficient allocation in the case of leisure goods can be obtained by a sales tax that
corrects for the "internalities" of consuming the good. It does not depend on the degree of
naivet6 and requires a relatively small amount of information from a regulator. On the other
hand, the optimal tax in the case of investment goods depends on the consumers' naivete (the
tax is zero if they are sophisticated) and requires much more information. Therefore, my model
suggests that there is a much larger role for government intervention in leisure goods markets
than in investment goods markets.
This paper is related to a growing literature on behavioral industrial organization." Gabaix
and Laibson (2006) analyze information shrouding by firms serving both rational and myopic
consumers. They show that, under some conditions, informational shrouding persists even in
competitive environments. Spiegler (2006) assumes that consumers use a sampling procedure
because they have a limited ability to evaluate complex objects. Then, increased competition
leads to more obfuscation instead of the convergence of prices to marginal costs.6
2 In that sense, my model is similar to the models of commitment as renegotiation-proofness of Hart and Tirole
(1988) and Dewatripont (1988). However, the issue here is not the incentive to renegotiate the contract but to
accept another contract from a different firm.
3In an independent work, Kbszegi (2005) has recently provided a similar suggestion for why we do not observe
lump-sum transfers in some markets for leisure goods He does not, however, explicitly model competition. He
also does not study the welfare properties of the resulting equilibrium. Nevertheless, as in the model presented
in this paper, he also obtains an asymmetry between markets for leisure and investment goods.
4 This result relies on the assumption that consumers' preferences are homogeneous and, therefore, there is
no deadweight loss from monopoly. If consumers were heterogeneous, the result would depend on whether the
deadweight loss from monopoly would overweight the gain from providing commitment.
5Ellison (2006) provides a survey of this literature.
6Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) consider a model where a monopolist faces consumers with limited ability to predict
changes in their future tastes. Heidhues and Kbszegi (2005) study the optimal contract offered by a monopolist
facing loss-averse consumers.
The chapter is also related to the literature on the optimal regulation of goods consumed
by time-inconsistent agents. Gruber and Kszegi (2001) extended the Becker and Murphy's
(1988) rational-addiction model to the case of quasi-hyperbolic consumers. O'Donoghue and
Rabin (2003) studied the optimal taxation of unhealthy goods based on Ramsey's commodity
taxation model. The main conclusion of these papers is that it is optimal to tax leisure goods
and to subsidize investment goods.7 The main reason for taxing leisure goods is the provision
of "internalities": Taxes provide incentives for consumers to act according to their long-run
preferences. In other words, taxing immediate-rewards goods provides a commitment device
that avoids consumers from felling tempted to behave differently from how their long-run selves
would act.
In both papers, however, it is assumed that prices are set equal to the marginal cost in
the absence of regulation. However, as shown by DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004), in the
presence of time-inconsistent consumers, firms do not set prices equal to marginal cost. In this
essay, I consider the optimal taxes when prices are endogenously set by competitive firms when
contracts are nonexclusive.
2.2 The model
The model is a competitive version of DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004). There are three
periods. In the first period, consumers make a take-it-or-leave-it offer of a contract to firms.
Because the good is indivisible, there is no loss of generality in assuming that a first-period
contract consists of a two-part tariff (L, p) , where L denotes a lump-sum price and p is a usage
price. Both L and p are paid in period 2.
Consumption occurs in period 2. The good provides an immediate payoff (in period 2) of
-c and a delayed payoff (in period 3) of b. If -c < 0 < b, the good generates an initial cost
and a delayed benefit. These goods are called investment goods. If b < 0 < -c, then the good
generates an immediate benefit and a delayed cost. These are called leisure goods.
Consumers and firms have a common prior about F, the distribution of c. F is assumed to
7Gruber and K6szegi have estimated the optimal cigarete taxes based on their model. They found that the
provision of "internalities" due to hyperbolic discounting leads to an optimal tax of at least $1 per pack more
than the traditional model.
be a twice continuously differentiable distribution function with strictly positive density f on
O C R. We take 0 = R+ for the case of investment goods (-c < 0< b) and O = R_ for the
case of leisure goods (b < 0 < -c).
In period 2, the realization of the immediate cost c is observed. Consumers make a take-
it-or-leave-it offer of a contract to firms. A second-period contract is a price P contingent on
consuming the good. s Then, they decide whether to consume the good.
If consumption occurred in period 2, consumers get a payoff with expected value b in pe-
riod 3. Since there are no choices in this period, it is irrelevant whether b is deterministic or
stochastic.9
Therefore, the timing of the game is as follows:
1. Consumers offer a two-part tariff (L,p) to firms, where L denotes a lump-sum price and
p is a usage price (both paid in period 2).
2. The immediate cost c is drawn from the distribution F. Consumers offer a price P con-
tingent on consuming the good. Then, they decide whether to consume the good.
3. If the good was consumed in period 2, the consumer gets a payoff with expected value b.
Consumers have quasi-hyperbolic preferences:
Ut = ut + E 6 s-tus.
s>t
They are exponential (or time-consistent) when their time-consistency parameter / is equal to
1. If / is less than 1, they are hyperbolic (or time-inconsistent). A partially naive hyperbolic
agent has true time-consistency parameter /, but believes that in the future she will behave
like a hyperbolic agent with parameter p E [P/, 1]. When 3 = /, the agent is sophisticated.
Each firm faces a cost of providing the good equal to a > 0, incurred in period 2 (which is
when production occurs). 10 We assume that the firm has access to a credit market and faces a
8There is no loss of generality on assuming that the price if the good is not consumed is zero.
9Notice that delayed benefits b do not depend on the realization of c.
10 We assume that there are no costs of signing a contract. Therefore, the firm faces no cost if a consumer
signs a contract but does not consume the good. Our results still hold if these costs are small. On the other
hand, assuming the presence of costs of signing a contract is equivalent to ruling out non-exclusive contracts if
the costs are high enough.
discount factor of 6.
Note that the offer of the two-part tariff is made under symmetric information. Therefore,
a time-consistent consumer would choose marginal cost pricing and would extract all profits
through the fixed fee (which, in this case, leads to L = 0, p = a). The equilibrium in the general
case is obtained by backward induction.
If a consumer has not accepted a contract in the first period, her second period program
(conditional on consuming the good) consists on choosing the price P that maximizes her utility
subject to leaving non-negative profits to the firms:
max /Sb - P - c
s.t. i3 > a.
The unique solution to this program is j3 = a. If she has accepted a first period contract (L, p) ,
her program (conditional on consuming the good) is
max 6b - min {J, p} - c
s.t. > a.
The solution of this program is p = a if p > a and 3 > a otherwise, and the consumer prefers
the second period contract if p > a.
If a consumer accepts a first-period contract and consumes the good in the second period,
she expects to obtain a benefit of 36b and faces a cost of c + p in the second period. Hence,
she expects to consume the good with probability F (Sb - p) and gets an expected utility of
,36 [r(p) - L], where 7r(p) := j b p (6b - p - c) dF(c) is the net expected value of consumption.
The fact that the consumer prefers the second period contract if p > a places an important
restriction on the set of contracts that can be demanded in the first period. Since the she will
not consume using a contract (L, p) with p > a, the firm gets negative profits when L < 0.
Therefore, we cannot have contracts with p > a and L < 0.
Clearly, a consumer would never offer a first period contract with L > 0 and p > a since it
would leave strictly positive profits to the firm (she could improve by offering L' = 0 and the
same usage price). Hence, the possibility of offering contracts in the second period implies that
first-period contracts must satisfy p < a.
Conversely, the consumer prefers to use a first-period contract whenever p < a. Hence, when
p < a, the zero-profit condition for the firm becomes
L + F (06b - p) (p - a) 2 0.
Thus, any contract such that p _ a and L + F (i3b - p) (p - a) > 0 is accepted by the firms.
Hence, conditional on accepting a first period contract, the consumer's first period program
is1 1
maxs36 [ir(p) - L]
p,L
s.t. p<a
L + F (36b - p) (p - a) > 0.
For the moment, ignore the p < a constraint. Then, the first-order condition yields:
P-a= 6(I-) f (0Sb - p) F( b - p) - F (Pdb - p) (2.1)
f (ASb - p) f (06b - p)
which is the same expression as in DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004). The per-unit price p
differs from the marginal cost a for two reasons. First, time-inconsistent consumers use prices
as commitment devices as long as they are not fully naive (i.e. / < 1). This is reflected by the
term -6b (1 -) -( Second, by underestimating the probability of consuming the good,
the consumer does not take into account the full cost of higher marginal tariffs (captured by
the second term).
In the case of investment goods, the term on the right of equation (2.1) is negative. There-
fore, the p < a constraint does not bind and the equilibrium is exactly the same as the one in
11I assume that aggregate surplus is strictly concave for p < a. A sufficient condition is that ()b - a - c) <
1 for all c > f6b - a. Since the consumer can choose L = 0, p = a, there is no loss of generality in assuming that
the first period contract is accepted.
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DellaVigna and Malmendier. The lump-sum price is then given by the zero-profit condition:
L = -F (/b - p) (p - a)
F (6b - p) 6b (1 - f(pb - p) F(35b - p) - F ( 6b - p)
[If ( sb - p) f (p3b - p)
In the case of leisure goods, the term is positive. Hence, the constraint binds and the solution
is p = a. The zero-profit condition implies that the lump-sum price is L = 0. Therefore, the
equilibrium in the case of leisure goods involves marginal cost pricing.
Notice that, because leisure goods are priced at marginal cost, the model implies that
prices are uninformative about the consumers' degree of time-inconsistency when contracts are
nonexclusive.
The model appears to be compatible with evidence from several markets. As DellaVigna
and Malmendier (2004) argue, there is evidence of below marginal cost pricing in investment
goods markets such as health clubs, vacation time-sharing. On the other hand, leisure goods
such as tobacco, alcohol, and unhealthy food do not feature ex-ante lump-sum transfers to
consumers and higher unit prices.
An important assumption of the model is that consumers are able to buy from other firms
in the period that consumption occurs. If contracts could only be signed in a period before
consumption occurs, nonexclusivity would not lead to marginal cost pricing. In the credit card
industry, for example, there is a time lag between obtaining a credit card and being able to use
it. Therefore, even though credit cards are clearly nonexclusive, usage prices are higher than
marginal costs.
2.3 Welfare Analysis
This Section characterizes the optimal taxes for leisure and investment goods. I will follow
most of the literature in treating the agent's long-run time preferences as the relevant for social
welfare. 12 Moreover, since partially naive consumers have a mistaken perception about their
12This view is defended by O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999) and Bernheim and Rangel (2005). An alternative
approach is to apply a Pareto criterion [see, e.g., Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman (1998) or Diamond and
Kbszegi (2003)]. A problem with the Pareto optimality approach is that it leads to an incomplete ranking.
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true time-consistency parameter, I will attribute the correct parameter /3 for the preferences
used in welfare comparisons.
Proposition 18 Suppose consumers are sophistcated. Then the equilibrium is Pareto efficient
in the case of investment goods (b > 0) and Pareto inefficient in the case of leisure goods (b < 0).
Proof. The first part follows from the fact that, in the case of investment goods, the
equilibrium maximizes the consumer's (long-run) utility subject to firms not getting negative
profits. The second part follows from the fact that, by the strict concavity of total surplus, the
unique maximum is given by equation (2). Since profits are equal to zero and the consumer is
worse off under marginal-cost pricing, it follows that the equilibrium is Pareto inefficient. 0
The inefficiency in the case of leisure goods stems from the fact that, with marginal-cost
pricing, consumers do not internalize the full effects of consuming the good. Since the consumers
internalize only a fraction 0 of future costs -Sb, they do not account for the remaining part:
-Sb (1 - ) . Therefore, an optimal tax should increase the price of the good by -Sb (1 - 3)
so that the perceived costs equal perceived benefits. Since this tax raises the consumers' long-
run utility and does not change the firms' profit (which remains equal to zero), the resulting
allocation Pareto dominates the equilibrium without taxes.
For investment goods, the equilibrium is Pareto inefficient when consumers are partially
naive because they do not take into account the true parameter /.13 In order to obtain the
optimal sales tax in the case of investment goods, define the after-tax marginal cost as & - a+r.
Then, the optimal tax should be such that after-tax prices are equal to the optimal price
a - 5b (1 -/) . Hence,
f( (bb - p) F(,36b - p) - F (Sb - p)
f (pbb - p) f (/3b - p)
Expressing in terms of 7, we obtain
Sf (b - p)6b (1 1- )] _ F(P b - p) - F (Pb - p)( )f (Sb - p) f (/35b - p)
13 More precisely, for generic distributions F, the equilibrium in the case of investment goods is Pareto
inefficient.
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I formally state the results above in the following proposition:
Proposition 19 Suppose consumers are partially naive. Then, the equzlibrium is Pareto inef-
ficient. A Pareto efficient allocation can be obtained by zmposing a sales tax of:
(i) T = -6b (1 - /) > 0 in the case of case of leisure goods; and
(ii[() T 6b b-p) -(1 F()] b-p)-F(3bb-p) in the case of investment goods.
The allocation implemented by the sales tax maximizes the consumer surplus subject to the
firms obtaining nonnegative profits.
Notice that the optimal sales tax for leisure goods is always positive. It is a function of the
long-run discount factor 6, the time-inconsistency parameter /, and the expected delayed costs
b of consuming the good and does not depend on the distribution of the immediate benefits c
from consuming. 14
The optimal sales tax for investment goods may be either positive or negative. Furthermore,
it requires not only knowledge of the long-run discount factor 6, the expected delayed costs b
of consuming the good, and the time-inconsistency parameter /, but also the distribution of c
and the perceived parameter of time-inconsistency p. Hence, determining the optimal tax for
these goods requires knowledge of several parameters which are hard to be estimated.
2.4 Conclusion
Although the DellaVigna and Malmendier model appears to be successful in explaining evidence
for the health club, vacation time-sharing, and credit cards industries, it is not compatible with
evidence from some of the most compelling examples of markets featuring time-inconsistent
consumers: tobacco, alcohol, and unhealthy food. According to their model, firms should be
offering ex-ante lump-sum transfers to consumers and higher unit prices so that consumers
purchase exclusively from them.
1
"Gruber and Kbszegi (2001) provide estimates of all the parameters required in order to calculate the optimal
tax in our model for the case of cigarettes.
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I have shown that the evidence can be explained if one drops the exclusivity assumption,
which seems to be unreasonable in these markets. While in the exclusive-contracts case the
difference between leisure and investment goods is only a sign change in prices, there is an
important asymmetry between them when contracts are non-exclusive.
The marginal-cost-pricing result for the case of leisure goods suggests that taxes should
focus on leisure goods such as cigarettes, alcohol, and unhealthy food and not on investment
goods, where the market may provide commitment devices efficiently (at least if consumers are
sophisticated; otherwise, the optimal tax may be positive or negative and depends on parameters
that are hard to estimate).
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Chapter 3
A Model of Mixed Signals with
Applications to Countersignaling
3.1 Introduction
In the initial papers in the signaling literature, the informational asymmetry consists of a
unidimensional parameter, which is known to only one side of the market [e.g. Spence, 1973].
Then, under the natural condition that individuals can be ordered according to their marginal
utility of signaling (single-crossing property), there exists a family of separating equilibria in
which signals reveal information monotonically. In the job market models, for example, higher
education discloses information about higher productivity. These equilibria are ranked by
the Pareto optimality criterion; moreover, only the Pareto dominant equilibrium is robust to
competition among firms [Riley, 1979].
More recently, scholars have identified conditions under which the main results from unidi-
mensional models extend to multi-dimensional ones. These conditions typically involve some
form of separability between dimensions. However, in many situations, a single instrument
conveys information about multiple characteristics. In such cases, good and bad characteristics
may be revealed by the same instrument. We refer to a multidimensional model with a single
oThis chapter is based on joint work with Aloisio Araujo and Humberto Moreira. It was previously publised
on the RAND Journal of Economzcs. See Araujo, Gottlieb, and Moreira (2007).
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signaling instrument as a "mixed signals" model.' Another strand of literature has focused on
unidimensional models featuring non-monotonic signals. These models generate "countersig-
naling", wherein individuals with high types choose to engage in a lower amount of signaling
than medium-type individuals [Feltovich, Harbaugh, and To, 2002].
In this article, we present a two-dimensional characteristics signaling model satisfying the
single-crossing property (SCP) in each dimension. Workers' characteristics are represented by
a vector of cognitive and non-cognitive ability parameters. Firms can observe a combination of
these characteristics through an interview but cannot precisely determine if the result of this
interview was due to high cognitive or non-cognitive ability. The results of the interview process
can be used to reduce the two-dimensional model to a one-dimensional model where the SCP
fails to hold. Workers are able to signal their characteristics through the number of years of
education they acquire. A theoretical contribution of the essay is to provide a characterization
of the equilibrium in a signaling model where the SCP fails, thereby extending Araujo and
Moreira's [2001] analysis of a screening model.
It is shown that countersignaling occurs whenever the schooling technology differs from
the technology of firms. The model has a very intuitive testable implication: the amount of
countersignaling is strictly increasing in the difference between the schooling technology and
the firms' technology. Hence, countersignaling is expected to be more important in occupations
that require a different combination of skills from those required in the schooling process.
This model is also employed in order to understand evidence on the General Educational
Development (GED) exam. The signaling equilibrium has some interesting properties consistent
with available empirical evidence on the GED: individuals with different abilities obtain the
same amount of education and passing the exam signals higher cognitive skills but does not
increase one's earnings. These results follow from the fact that the GED is a mixed signal: if
a worker with low overall ability has passed the exam, it means that her non-cognitive ability
is low. Hence, as both types of ability are used in the production process, passing the exam is
not necessarily a signal of high productivity. The model suggests that the ineffectiveness of the
GED exam stems from its focus on cognitive ability. A test that places a stronger emphasis on
non-cognitive ability would be a more effective signal. Moreover, a simple change in the passing
1We have borrowed the term "mixed signal" from Cavallo, Heckman, and Hsee [1998].
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standards of the GED would not affect its neutrality on wages.
3.1.1 Related Literature on Countersignaling and Mixed Signals
There are several documented examples of what appears to be countersignaling behavior. Hvide
[2003] argues that intermediate individuals appear to pursue more education than bright individ-
uals for professions where individuals without a licence are not denied work. Unlike standard
signaling models of advertising predict, Clements [2004] documents that many high-quality
products are sold in low-quality packages. Orzach et al. [2002] argue that, even controlling for
market size, luxury cars (such as Rolls Royce and Ferrari) seem to be advertised very modestly
compared to nonluxury cars.2 In the context of fashion as a signal of status, Pinker [1999]
claims that "trend-setters are members of upper classes who adopt the styles of lower classes
to differentiate themselves from middle classes". According to O'Neil [2002], countersignaling
led intermediately advanced countries to spend more on their military than most advanced
countries after World War II.
Feltovich, Harbaugh, and To [2002] present a countersignaling model applied to the labor
market. Firms access some measure of the worker's ability (which is interpreted as the recom-
mendation of a former boss). This signal consists of the sum of the unidimensional ability of
the worker and a noise term. Workers may also engage in schooling activity. If the exogenous
signal were sufficiently informative about the individual productivity of workers, then it would
not be profitable for them to use schooling to signal productivity. On the other hand, if the
exogenous signal were completely uninformative about the workers' productivities, we would
have a standard signaling model where higher types signal more. Their model can be seen as an
intermediate case where the exogenous signal is sufficiently informative to separate high from
medium types but not sufficient to separate medium from low types.
Our model differs from that of Feltovich, Harbaugh, and To in that uncertainty about
productivity comes from the divergence between the schooling technology and the firms' tech-
nology instead of a noise term. The misalignment between these two technologies generates an
incentive for some higher-productivity workers to obtain less education.
2 Caves and Greene [1996] find no significant systematic positive correlation between quality and the amount
of advertising.
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Orzach, Overgaard, and Tauman [2002] present a model where firms signal product quality
through prices and advertising expenditures. Product quality is represented by a parameter
that may take two values. Their main conclusion is that modest advertising can be used as a
signal of high quality. However, as their model features only two types of firms, they are unable
to consider the emergence of non-monotone signals.
One example of mixed signals is the GED exam, which is taken by high school dropouts
to certify that they have equivalent knowledge to high school graduates. The GED reveals, at
the same time, high cognitive skills and low non-cognitive skills [Cameron and Heckman, 1993;
Cavallo, Heckman and Hsee, 1998; and Heckman and Rubinstein, 2001]. Moreover, wages
received by high school dropouts are not influenced by this certificate. Another example is the
so-called "Ph.D. curse".3 This curse refers to the difficulty of some recent Ph.D. graduates to
find jobs outside of academia because firms perceive them as being too theoretically oriented
and lacking enough practical abilities. 4 A third example of mixed signals is presented by Drazen
and Hubrich [2003], who argue that higher interest rates show that the government is committed
to maintaining a fixed exchange rate, but also signal weak fundamentals. Benabou and Tirole
[2006] argue that donations signal altruism, but may also signal a desire to be perceived as
altruistic.
In the labor market model, for example, an assumption of unidimensional information asym-
metry implies that all relevant characteristics of an employee can be captured by a single ability-
type, usually thought of as cognitive ability. However, significant empirical evidence supports
the importance of non-cognitive skills as well as cognitive skills in the labor market [Heck-
man, Stixrud, and Urzua, 2005]. Generalization of the original results to the multidimensional
case turns out not to be straightforward; in Kholleppel's [1983] example of a two-dimensional
extension of Spence's model, no separating equilibrium exists.
Quinzii and Rochet [1985] and Engers [1987] provided sufficient conditions for the existence
of a separating equilibrium in the multidimensional model. In Quinzii and Rochet, ability was
represented by a k-dimensional vector and they assumed the existence of k (non-exclusive)
different types of education. Moreover, they assumed that the signaling costs were linear and
3We thank Mathias Dewatripont for this example.
4 See "Academic Careers: A Comparative Perspective," Jeroen Huisman and Jeroen Bartelse (eds),
http://www. awt. nl/uploads/files/academic.pdf.
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separable in the signals (up to a change of variables). Hence, it was as if each school required
only one type of ability. Then, an individual would be able to attend a school whose system
required only a type of skill (cognitive skills, for example) and another school that required only
another type of skill (non-cognitive skills). Under this separability assumption (which implies
that the single-crossing property holds in each dimension), Quinzii and Rochet obtain results
similar to the unidimensional model: separating equilibria exist and wages are monotonic in
the worker's types.
Needless to say, the educational systems assumed by Quinzii and Rochet are not realis-
tic since all known educational systems require both cognitive and non-cognitive abilities (al-
though in different proportions). Engers relaxed this assumption through a generalization of
the unidimensional assumption that individuals' marginal utility of signaling could be ordered
(single-crossing property). However, in the multidimensional case, this assumption is much less
compelling since, as the number of signals rise, it becomes more likely that the single-crossing
property (SCP) will not hold when one controls for one signal (i.e., the introduction of other
signals may break the SCP in the multidimensional case).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The basic framework is presented in Section
3.2. Section 3.3 characterizes the equilibrium. Section 3.4 studies how countersignaling may
emerge and Section 3.5 employs this framework to analyze the GED exam. Section 3.6 briefly
discusses examples of other environments where the model can be applied. Then, Section 3.7
concludes.
3.2 The Basic Framework
The economy consists of a continuum of informed workers who sell their labor to uninformed
firms. Each worker is characterized by a two-dimensional vector of characteristics (t, r), where L
and r7 represent cognitive and non-cognitive ability, respectively. For concreteness, we will refer
to t as intelligence and r7 as perseverance while bearing in mind that non-cognitive skills embody
several other characteristics such as motivation, self-control, and other personality traits. The
set of all possible characteristics is the compact set O - [to, 1t] x [iro, ,r1] C R2 + and the types
are distributed according to a continuous density p : 0 --+ R++, which is assumed to be a C 2
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function.
Workers are able to engage in a schooling activity y E R+ which firms can observe. By
engaging in such an activity, the type-(t, 7r) worker incurs a cost c (t, 7r, y). This worker's pro-
ductivity depends on the vector of innate characteristics, which is not (directly) observable.
Firms have identical technologies with constant returns to scale f (t, 7r) and act competi-
tively.5 Moreover, other than schooling, firms observe the result of an interview g (L, 77) which
does not fully reveal the worker's productivity. Thus, even though firms have some idea of the
overall ability of a worker, they are unable to unambiguously determine her productivity by
observing the result of the interview. 6 In a more general model, we could imagine that individ-
uals might exert effort in order to distort the market's assessment of their productivity [e.g.,
Holmstrom, 1999 and Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole, 1999]. We have studied this possibility
in a previous version of the paper, where we assumed that schooling influences the worker's
performance in the interview. Most of the results presented here are unaffected.7
After observing schooling y and the result of the interview g, each firm offers a wage w (y, g).
Thus, each worker will choose the amount of schooling y in order to maximize w (y, g)-c (t, rl, y) .
The timing of the signaling game is as follows. First, nature determines each worker's type
according to the density function p. Then, workers choose their educational level contingent on
their type. Subsequently, firms offer a wage w (y, g) conditional on observing (y, g) .
Since firms are homogeneous, we will study symmetric equilibria where the offered wage
schedule is the same for every firm. As usual, we adopt the perfect Bayesian equilibrium
concept:
Definition 4 A perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) for the signaling game is a profile of strate-
gies {y (t, g) . w (y. g)} and beliefs fi (. I y, g) such that
5In this paper, we consider only the pure signaling case. In a previous version of the paper, we have shown
that all the results also hold when schooling affects productivity [see Araujo, Gottlieb, and Moreira, 2007].
6 The hypothesis that firms can access an additional signal that consists of a measure of the worker's ability
is also present at Feltovich, Harbaugh, and To [2002].
7 See Araujo, Gottlieb and Moreira [2007]. In this case, it can be shown that, locally, the ability to distort the
result of the interview raises the amount of education in equilibrium for all individuals as in standard 'signal-
jamming' models
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1. The worker's strategy is optimal given the equilibrium wage schedule:
Y (t, 71) E arg max w (y, g (L, 7)) - c (L, 71, y) ,
2. Firms earn zero profits: w (y (L, 7) , g (L, 7)) = E [f (t, ) I g, y] .
3. Beliefs are consistent: i (t, 7 I y, g) is derived from the worker's strategy using Bayes' rule
where possible.
Next, we will specify the analytical forms of the functions presented.8 The signaling tech-
nology is characterized by the following cost of signaling function:
c (t, l, y) = . (3.1)1L7
The function above implies that the cost of education is decreasing in intelligence and
perseverance. Moreover, intelligence and perseverance are imperfect substitutes in the schooling
process. 9
We assume that the interview function is given by
g (t, 71) = at + 7, (3.2)
where a > 0 is the rate of substitution between perseverance and intelligence. Notice that,
conditional on the interview g, the workers' types lie on the hyperplane represented by equation
(3.2). Hence, by conditioning on g, the type space becomes one-dimensional. Thus, we will
refer to a type-(t, 77) worker as type-(t; g), since t captures all private information after taking
g into account.
Substituting (3.2) into (3.1), we are able to rewrite the cost of signaling as a function of the
intelligence and the interview result:
Y
c (t, , y) = t(g -at,
8The robustness of the model to the functional forms is studied in the Appendix A.
9They are "cost substitutes" in the sense that c (t, r, y) has increasing differences.
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where we denote this function by c with some abuse of notation.
In general, the single-crossing property (SCP) may not be satisfied since
cy, (L, g, y) = [- g - aL)2 }O0 } > .[t (g - < I<)I 2
The SCP states that the marginal utility of effort is monotonic in the worker's type. In this
specific case, it means that, conditional on the interview g, more intelligence would either always
decrease or always increase the cost of schooling. In particular, even for individuals with very
low intelligence and very high perseverance levels, raising a unit of intelligence and decreasing
a units of perseverance would decrease the marginal cost of schooling (or the opposite when
the sign of cy, is reversed). Hence, the SCP is equivalent to assuming that the range of abilities
is such that intelligence is always better than perseverance for schooling (or vice-versa).
The intelligence level t = g divides the parameter space in two intervals (CS+ and CS_)
according to the sign of cy, (negative and positive, respectively). For workers with intelligence
below (above) -L, intelligence decreases (increases) the cost of signaling given the interview
result g. When the SCP is satisfied, [to, L1] is contained in one of these intervals. Figure 3-1
depicts a situation where [to, j1] overlaps these intervals.
CS Cs.
2u
Figure 3-1: CS+ and CS_ regions
Therefore, the two-dimensional model reduces to a one-dimensional model where the SCP
may fail to hold after conditioning on g.
We assume that the worker's productivity is given by the Cobb-Douglas function
f (t, 7) = Lb l 1-
b
where b E (0, 1). If b > we say that the firm's technology is intensive in cognitive skills.
Otherwise, we say that it is intensive in non-cognitive skills.
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Single-crossing property holds Single-crossing propert does not hold
CS h1 _ 0  CS 8 CS t2 cr 2c-
Figure 3-2: Continuous versus Discrete Pooling
It is useful to rewrite the production function conditional on the interview g as
s (t, g) = Lb (g - Ce) 1- b . (3.3)
3.3 The Signaling Equilibria
In this section, the signaling equilibrium is characterized. First, we divide the interval of
parameters in three different sets according to the degree of separation. Necessary conditions for
an equilibrium are presented for each set separately. Then, we present the refinement criterion
that will be employed in order to select a unique equilibrium. It consists of a generalization of
Riley's [1979] criterion. Subsequently, sufficient conditions for an equilibrium are obtained.
Given an equilibrium profile of education y (t, g), we refer to the set of types whose signal is
(y, g) as the pooling set E (y, g). A type (t; g) is separated if, in equilibrium, her characteristics
are revealed from her signals y (t, g) and g. If more than one type choose the same amount of
education, we say that they are pooled.
In signaling models where the SCP is satisfied, incentive compatibility requires education
to be increasing if cy, < 0 for all t (CS+) and decreasing if Cy, > 0 for all t (CS_). Then, if two
workers are pooled, monotonicity implies that all intermediate types must also pool with them
(see graph on the left in Figure 3-2). We call these types continuously pooled.
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When the single crossing property does not hold, incentive compatibility requires y to be
increasing in the CS+ interval and decreasing in the CS_ interval so that the equilibrium may
feature non-monotone signaling. As a result, a disconnected set of workers may acquire the
same level of education (see graph on the right in Figure 3-2). We say that these workers are
discretely pooled.10
The precise definitions are stated below:
Definition 5 Given an equilibrium profile of education {y (t, g) : t E [to, t], g E [at + rlo, at + r71 }:
1. A type- (t; g) worker is separated if E (y (t, g) , g) = {(t, g)}. A separating set is a set of
types where every element is separated.
2. A type- (t; g) worker is continuously pooled if E (y (t, g) , g) is not discrete. A continuous
pooling set is a set of types where every element is continuously pooled.
3. A type- (t; g) worker is discretely pooled if O (y (t, g) , g) {(t, g)} is discrete. A discrete
pooling set is a set of types where every element is discretely pooled.
In any signaling equilibrium, each type must belong to one of these three sets. The selection
criterion (to be discussed later) will rule out continuous pooling. Hence, the equilibrium will
take a form similar to the profile on the right of Figure 3-2: There will be an interval of separated
types and an interval of discretely pooled types.
In the following subsections, we study the properties of separating sets, continuously pooling
sets and discrete pooling sets, respectively. As is standard in the signaling literature, the
equilibrium will be represented by differential equations that follow from the worker's first-
order condition. Hence, we characterize piecewise C2 equilibria.1 1
'1Analyzing a model of competition in many markets, Green and Laffont [1990] have also obtained an equilib-
rium where discrete pooling may occur. When the incumbent is able to commit to her decisions, the incentive-
compatibility constraints are relaxed so that the equilibrium may feature discrete pooling. In contrast, in our
paper discrete pooling occurs under the standard incentive-compatibility constraints.
11A piecewise Ck function is a function whose domain can be partitioned in a finite number of intervals such
that the function is k times continuously differentiable in each interval. Therefore, we allow for a finite number
of jumps and kinks. Our results can be generalized to piecewise C' functions. However, as most of the literature,
we focus on the piecewise C 2 case in order to simplify the proofs.
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3.3.1 Separating set
When a worker belongs to a separating set, Bayes' rule implies that belief p (L I y, g) must be
a singleton measure concentrated at t. Then, the zero-profits condition (second condition of
Definition 4) is
w (y (L, g) , g) = f (t, g - a)t). (3.4)
The worker's incentive-compatibility constraint is
t E arg m_ax f (, g - a) - c (t, g, y (Z, g)). (3.5)
L
Notice that each realization of g (t, rl) = x defines a set of possible characteristics
9-1 (x) - {(t, 7) e [to, L1] x [ •o0,1] : x = at + 7}.
As the worker's production function is a strictly concave, continuous function of L, there
exists a unique intelligence level such that the worker's productivity is maximal given the
interview result g. This educational level is defined as
(* (g), q* (g)) = arg max b 1-b s.t. g = at + 7. (3.6)
It follows from the first-order (necessary and sufficient) conditions of the problem above
that t* (g) = b. Hence, productivity is increasing for i < L* (g) and decreasing for t > L* (g).
The interpretation of this result is straightforward. Given the result of the interview g, firms
prefer moderate intelligence levels since a worker whose intelligence is too high must have a low
level of perseverance.
But, as a worker must be earning her expected productivity in any separating set, it follows
that wages are non-monotone in intelligence (controlling for the interview g). As shown in the
previous signaling literature, when the SCP is satisfied, education is increasing in the worker's
type. Suppose this is also the case when the SCP is not valid (i.e., suppose that education
is increasing in intelligence). Then, firms would offer a higher salary for individuals with
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intermediate schooling (as those are the most productive workers). 12 But such an allocation
cannot be an equilibrium since the workers' strategies are not optimal: if they reduce the
amount of schooling, their wages rise (and, of course, they obtain a higher utility). Hence, a
necessary condition for incentive-compatibility is that education must be increasing in t until
L* (g) and decreasing after t* (g).
Notice that this necessary condition for an interior solution follows from the equalization
between the marginal benefit from deviating and its marginal cost. Since the marginal benefit
consists of the wage differential s, and the marginal cost consists of the marginal cost of signaling
times the signaling differential cyyL, by computing s, and Cy, we obtain
yt (t, g) = s (t, g) (bg - at), (3.7)
which implies that y must be increasing if t < L* (g) and decreasing if L > t* (g).
From the local second-order condition, we obtain the usual necessary condition that educa-
tion must be increasing in the CS+ region and decreasing in CS_. Hence, from the first- and
second-order conditions of the program in equation (3.5) we obtain the following lemma, whose
proof is presented in the Appendix:
Lemma 3 In any separating set, if an education and wage profile is incentive-compatible it
must satisfy
yt (t, g) (g - 2at) > 0 (3.8)
and equation (3.7). Moreover, in a separating set, the workers with the highest level of schooling
are the most productive (not the brightest or the most perseverant) and the level of schooling is
strictly increasing in productivty.
Remark 9 Notice that equation (3.8) implies that
y, (t, g) > 0 4= L < -  (3.9)2a
Generally, equations (3.8) and (3.9) cannot hold for all t except when b = . In this case,
12More precisely, the wage schedule would be increasing in schooling until y (t* (g), g) and decreasing from
that point on.
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the firms' technology is identzcal to the signaling technology. If so, we can treat Lr as a single
parameter and we obtain Spence's [1973] model. Moreover, education must be monotone in this
(redefined) parameter.
Remark 10 When b 4 , there exists some misalignment between the firm and the worker
since the relative intensity of intelligence in the schooling technology is different from that in
the firm's technology. Then, if either - E [to, tl] or - E [to, 1], there must exist some pooling
in equilibrium (since the separating set conditions cannot hold for all the interval of parameters).
3.3.2 Continuous pooling set
Let p(t I g) denote the density function of t conditional on the result of the interview g and
suppose there exists a non-degenerate closed set I which is a continuous pooling set such that
no closed set X D I is a continuous pooling set. Then, y (t, g) = y (g) for all L E I.
The zero-profit condition is
w ( (g), g) = W (I, g), (3.10)
where W (I, g) - f1 f (x, g - ax) p(x g)dx is the expected productivity of a type-t worker.
Conditions 2 and 3 from Definition 4 are trivially satisfied in that given set.
3.3.3 Discrete pooling set
A distinct feature of models where the SCP does not hold is the emergence of discrete pooling,
where individuals with non-adjacent types receive the same contract. This feature is a direct
consequence of the possibility of non-monotone signals.
As was shown by Araujo and Moreira [2001], a necessary condition for incentive-compatibility
in a discrete pooling set is the so-called marginal utility identity, according to which, if two
individuals are (discretely) pooling in a contract, they should have the same marginal utility.
We formally state that result as a lemma:
Lemma 4 Suppose that {y (t, g) : t E [to, 1] , g E [at + p0o, at + rq] } is an incentive-compatible
profile of education. If two regular workers with the same interview result choose the same level
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of education, then their marginal cost of education must be the same:
y (t, g) = y (, g)
8c (t, g, y) _ oc(, g,y)
y, (L, g) # 0 y - Oy
y1 (Z, g) # 0
The economic interpretation of Lemma 4 is that if two non-adjacent workers with different
marginal costs of education choose the same contract, one of them could benefit from deviating
by choosing a different amount of schooling.
From the equality of the marginal costs of signaling, it follows that if a type-(t; g) worker is
in a discrete pooling set, the other worker pooling with her is (Z; g) defined as:
Z= --- 7 (L, g ) .  (3.11)
The following lemma will be important for the extension of the model to the GED exam. It
links the productivity of two discretely pooled workers with the relative intensity of cognitive
skills in the firms' production function.
Lemma 5 If two workers are discretely pooled, then the less intelligent worker is more produc-
tive if the firms' technology is intensive in perseverance (b < 1) and the more intelligent worker
is more productive if the firms' technology is intensive in intelligence (b > 2).
Let P (t, g) denote the density of a type-(t; g) individual conditional on t belonging to the
pooling-set 0 (y (t, g) , g) . Then, if t belongs to a discrete-pooling set, it follows that
p( I g)
P(t, g) _ )p( I g) + p(7 () I g)
Furthermore, P(t, g) + P (-y (t, g) , g) = 1 for all (t; g) in a discrete-pooling set.
Analogously to Lemma 3, the local first- and second-order conditions from the workers'
incentive-compatibility constraint yield the following:
Lemma 6 If (t; g) belongs to a discrete pooling set, then if an education and wage profile is
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incentive-compatible, they satisfy:
y, (t, g) = s (t, g) [P (t, g) (bg - at) + P (t, g) t (g - at)] (3.12)
+ s - t, g {[1- P(t,g)] [(1 - b)g -at] + P, (t, g) (g- )} ,
YL (t, g) (g - 2at) > 0. (3.13)
Equation (3.12) displays how discrete pooling distorts an incentive-compatible profile of
education. As in the separated case, equation (3.12) equates the marginal cost with the marginal
benefit of education. However, due to the fact that in the discrete pooling case wages are a
weighted average of individual worker productivity, the marginal benefit of education in a
discrete pooling set is a weighted average of marginal productivities. 13
In the next subsection, we present some comparative statics results as well as the equilibrium
selection criterion.
3.3.4 Equilibrium selection and comparative statics
The proposition below presents some comparative statics results. Since education is costly, a
worker would only choose to obtain an additional amount of education if it increases wages.
Thus, incentive-compatibility requires wages to be strictly monotonic.
Proposition 20 In any PBE, wages are strictly increasing and concave in the amount of
schooling controlling for the interview.
Notice that, for fixed t, the productivity is increasing in the result of the interview g. Then,
in a separating set, wages must be increasing in g. However, this may not be true in a pooling
set: since wages are a weighed average of the productivity of pooled types (where weights are
given by the conditional probability of each type), a change in g would also affect the weights
attributed to each type. In a discrete pooling set, for example, it follows that 14
Ow OP (L, 9)Ow= P (, g) fA (t, I) + [1 - P (t, g)] fA (Z, ) + [s (, g) - s ( g)] .
Og 1g
13Notice that the separating set is a special case of the discrete pooling set where firms are able to infer the
workers ability in a pooling set (P(, g) = 1).
14 The same argument also holds for continuous pooling sets.
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The first and second terms are positive and represent the direct effect: More productive indi-
viduals obtain a higher result in the interview. The last term may be either positive or negative
and reflects the indirect effect. If the proportion of more productive individuals is decreasing in
g, then this term is negative. 15 If t I g is uniformly distributed, for example, then this last term
vanishes (since the conditional distribution of t is constant) implying that wages are increasing
in the interview.
The difference between the monotonicity of wages in education (Proposition 20) and the
non-monotonicity of wages in the interview stems from the fact that education is an endogenous
signal while the interview is an exogenous signal. When a costly signal is endogenous, an agent
will not purchase an additional amount of it unless she obtains higher wages by doing so. In
contrast, when a signal is exogenous, the agent is unable to distort it. Hence, wages may be
non-monotonic in this signal.
As the concept of PBE leads to multiple equilibria, we will apply a selection criterion in
order to pick an equilibrium. Riley [1979] suggested the concept of a reactive equilibrium that
chooses only the separating equilibrium in the continuous-type framework. This concept has
been widely applied in the signaling literature.
As a fully separating equilibrium does not exist when the single-crossing property does not
hold, one must employ a weaker refinement criterion. We propose the quasi-separability crite-
rion, which consists of a slight modification to the concept of reactive equilibrium (both concepts
are equivalent when the SCP holds). Like the reactive equilibrium, the quasi-separability cri-
terion selects the most efficient equilibrium in the class of equilibria with the highest degree of
separation.
Definition 6 A quasi-separable equilibrium is a PBE that satisfies the following conditions:
1. If two workers belong to a pooling set, then their marginal cost of schooling must be the
same;
2. There is no other PBE satisfying condition 1 such that every type obtains less schooling
(with strictly less for at least one type).
1
"Let s (t, g) > s (,g) . Then, < 0 if and only if a )< - (L,,))+ -P(,g)
' g a9 s(ig)-(Zg)
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The first condition identifies the highest possible degree of separability by ruling out con-
tinuous pooling. The second condition gives the boundary condition that uniquely determines
the equilibrium. It consists of a Pareto improvement criterion for selection.
The following proposition can be seen as evidence that the SCP does not hold. It states
that two individuals with different abilities obtaining the same amount of schooling are not
consistent with the SCP. Hence, the fact that the empirical evidence documents that workers
with different abilities receive the same wages suggests that the SCP is violated.
Proposition 21 If there exists pooling in a quasi-separable equzlibrium, then the SCP does not
hold.
3.3.5 Characterization of the equilibrium
In this subsection, we characterize the equilibrium of the model. As the results are more
technical than the rest of the paper, readers more interested in the applications of the model
can skip this subsection.
As in equation (3.11), we denote by y (t, g) the type with the same marginal cost of signaling
as (t; g) . We will focus on the case where y (to, g) < 1t and b < 1/2 (the other cases can be
studied in a similar fashion). Clearly, as -y (to, g) < 1t, it follows that (y (to, g) , i], must be a
separating set in any quasi-separable equilibrium (as no other type can have the same marginal
cost of schooling as L E (y (to, g) , ti]). In this subsection, we show that the quasi-separable
equilibrium is such that all types outside of this interval are discretely pooled (where a pool
consists of two non-adjacent types). The characterization is carried out through a series of
lemmata.
Define the indirect utility U (i, t, g) as the utility received by a type-(t; g) worker who gets
the contract designed for type (Z; g):
U (Z, t, g) w (y (, g) , g) - c (t, g, y (Z, g)).
The first lemma establishes another necessary condition for incentive-compatibility.
Lemma 7 U (t, -, g) is continuous for all t E [to, Li] .
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The basic intuition behind this result is that, as the cost of signaling is continuous, if the
indirect utility were discontinuous, those individuals in a vicinity of the point of discontinuity
could benefit from another type's contract. Hence, it would not be incentive-compatible.
The continuity of U enables us to determine the boundary condition for the amount of edu-
cation when switching from discrete pooling sets to separating sets. Notice that when a worker
becomes pooled with another type, his expected productivity changes discontinuously (as it
becomes the average of their productivities). Thus, the wage function has a discontinuity when
switching from separating sets to discrete pooling sets. Hence, the education must be discon-
tinuous in order to preserve the continuity of the indirect utility. This is formally established
in the following corollary: 16
Corollary 4 Let t be such that [t - e, t] is a discrete pooling set and (t, t + e] is a separating
set, for some e > 0. If y(-, g) is right continuous at t, the following condition is necessary for
incentive-compatibility:
y (t, g) = t (g - at) [1 - P (t, g)] [s (t, g) - s (Q (t, g) , g)] + lim y (x, g) . (3.14)
From now on we assume that the education profile is right continuous. The second lemma
determines the maximal discrete pooling set.
Lemma 8 [to, y (to, g)] is the discrete pooling set.
As the set ('y (LO, g) , Li] must be separated, it follows from Lemma 8 that the set of types can
be partitioned in two intervals: a discrete pooling interval [to, y (to, g)] and a separated interval
The next lemma determines the boundary condition which gives the equilibrium amount
of education. It ensures that the individual with the lowest productivity chooses to get no
education.
Lemma 9 In any quasi-separable equilibrium, y (1, g) = 0.
16We obtain the same result if (t, t + E] is a discrete pooling set and [L - e, t] is a separating set for some E > 0.
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The proof basically shows that as (Lt;g) is separated and is the least productive type,
reducing the amount of schooling would never reduce its wages (as no firm would ever expect
some type to be less productive than L1). But this would also reduce the cost of schooling.
Thus, in equilibrium, t1 must choose the lowest amount of schooling possible.
The next proposition establishes that the conditions from Lemmata 3, 6, and 9 and Corollary
4 are also sufficient for the quasi-separable equilibrium.
Proposition 22 A profile of education is a quasi-separable equilibrium if and only if it satisfies
the differential equations from Lemma 3 and Lemma 6 and the boundary conditions from Lemma
7 and Lemma 9. Furthermore, the quasi-separable equilibrium exists and is unique
Proposition 22 is useful as it reduces the problem of obtaining an equilibrium profile of
education to that of solving two ordinary differential equations with given boundary conditions.
The amount of education for separated types is determined from condition (1) of Proposition
22 and boundary condition (2). Then, using conditions (3) and (4) (a differential equation with
a boundary condition), one can calculate the equilibrium amount of education for discrete
pooling types.
Notice that item 4 from Proposition 22 implies that education must jump downward at
y (to, g) since s (to, g) - s (y (to, g) , g) > 0 (see Lemma 5 and b < 1/2). This follows from the
fact that wages are discontinuous: individuals with L E [2, (o, g)] earn wages higher than
their productivity since they are pooled with more productive workers but those with types
higher than y (tL, g) earn their productivity since they are separated. Hence, if education were
continuous, indirect utility would be discontinuous. But, as shown in Lemma 7, a discontinuous
indirect utility is not incentive-compatible. Thus, the amount of education must jump downward
in order to preserve the continuity of the indirect utility function.
The main form of the equilibrium can be captured by the following symmetric example.
Suppose a = 1 and O = [1, 10]2 . Then, g E [2, 20] and
CyL (, g, y) 0 ' t 2-
Consider different values of the interview result g. For the lowest possible value, g = 2, the
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worker's type is uniquely revealed (t = 1 = ). Hence, there are no incentives for signaling so
that y (t, g) = 0 for t = 1, g = 2. Analogously, if g = 20, the worker's type is uniquely revealed
to be t = r/ = 10 and there are no incentives for signaling.
For g E (2, 20), the CS+ and CS_ intervals are [1, 2] and [1, 10], respectively. Education
is increasing in t for L < 2 and decreasing for t > 9. Due to the symmetry of the example, pairs
equidistant from I are discretely pooled and extreme types are separated. When g E (2, 11), the
discrete pooling interval is [1, g - 1], the separating interval is (g - 1, 10] and y is discontinuous
at L = g - 1. When g E (11, 20), the discrete pooling interval is [g - 10, 10], the separating
interval is [1, g - 10), and y is discontinuous at L = g - 10.
Figure 3-3 presents the equilibrium amount of education and wages conditional on g = 10
for the case where b = 0.4, c = 1, to = 1, t1 = 10, and t I g , U [to, t1] .17 Figure 3-4 presents
the equilibrium amount of utility and the profile of wages as a function of education conditional
on g = 10. Notice that both education and wages are discontinuous but the utility is continuous
in t. As Proposition 20 shows, wages are strictly increasing and concave in education.
17 In a previous version of the paper, we have presented the equilibrium profiles of education, wages, and utility
for other parameters. See Araujo, Gottlieb, and Moreira [2007].
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3.4 Countersignaling
In this section, we show how the basic model presented allows us to understand the existence
of countersignaling. First, we present a precise definition.
Definition 7 A type-(t; g) worker is countersignaling if
sgny, (t, g)} :# sgn{s, (t, g)}.
The definition above states that countersignaling occurs if more productive individuals
choose less education than intermediate individuals. With no loss of generality, we can re-
strict our analysis to the case where b < (since we can always relabel t and rI).
As shown in Section 3.3.5, education is strictly increasing for t < 9 and strictly decreasing
for L > - .Moreover, as argued in Subsection 3.3.1, the productivity of a worker with interview
result g is strictly increasing for t < b and strictly decreasing for t > 2. Thus, the coun-
tersignaling interval is g, . Hence, countersignaling occurs if, and only if, the schooling
technology is different than the firms' technology, i.e., b 1.
Define the distance between the Cobb-Douglas functions f (t, rj) = b -b and f (L, r7)
Lbl-b as b - b . Then, the distance from the schooling technology to the firms' technology is
given by - b. Notice that increasing the distance between the two technologies (i.e., reducing
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b) strictly increases the countersignaling interval. Thus, we have proved the following:
Proposition 23 Countersignaling occurs if and only if the schooling and the firms' technologies
are different (i.e., the SCP does not hold), and the countersignaling interval strictly increases
in the distance from the schooling technology to the firms' technology.
This proposition provides an intuitive testable implication. Countersignaling is expected
to occur more often in occupations that require a different combination of skills than those
required at school. Hence, productive individuals with low levels of education should be more
common among sportsmen and artists than among teachers.
The analysis above was made conditional on the interview g. It turns out that education and
wages may also be non-monotone in the abilities unconditionally. More specifically, consider
the original (two-dimensional) type space. Define the education obtained by type-(L, 7) as
Y (t,) - Y (t, g (, )) •
Suppose that O = [o, 01]2 . Then, the worker's type is uniquely revealed when L = r = 00 so
that she has no incentive to signal. Analogously, her type is uniquely revealed when t = r = 01.
Hence, y (0o, Oo) = 9 (01, 01) = 0 so that y (t, r) cannot be monotone (as long as 9 (t, r) > 0 for
some t and rq).18
The reason for this unconditional non-monotonicity arises from the worker's incentive to
signal. When t and 7r are extreme, there is not much uncertainty regarding the individual's
type. Thus, she faces low incentives to signal. However, when the worker has moderate types,
there are many different types with the same interview g. Hence, she has high incentives to
signal. '19
A key message of the model is that, when types are multidimensional, signals that reveal a
high type in one dimension may indicate a low type in other dimensions. This result captures the
idea that an employer may be suspicious that a potential employee who looks "too perfect" on
one dimension may have problems in other unobserved dimensions. One intuitive case is when
'
8 When education is productive, (00, 0o) and (01, 01) will generally not be zero.
19Therefore, as in Feltovich, Harbaugh, and To [2002], the presence of an additional signal makes intermediate
types the ones with the highest incentives to signal.
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the (two-dimensional) types are perfectly negatively correlated. Then, one could reparametrize
the model into a one-dimensional type model where the SCP does not hold. In the model above,
types are perfectly negatively correlated conditional on the interview g. This leads to the SCP
not being satisfied and to the emergence of countersignaling.
3.5 The GED exam
3.5.1 Empirical evidence
Signaling models [e.g., Spence, 1973] generally assume that an individual's personal abilities are
represented by a scalar of cognitive skills. However a vast body of empirical evidence consistently
contradicts this assumption. Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua [2005], for example, found that for
several dimensions of behavior and for a variety of labor market outcomes, non-cognitive skills
are better predictors of behavior than cognitive skills.20
In the psychology field, the five-factor model of personality (referred to as the "Big Five")
identifies five dimensions of non-cognitive characteristics: extroversion, conscientiousness, emo-
tional stability, agreeableness, and openness to experience. Personality measures based on this
model are good predictors of job performance for a wide range of professions [Barrick and
Mount, 1991].
An interesting set of evidence on the impact of non-cognitive skills on education and wages
comes from the General Educational Development (GED). The GED is an exam taken by
American high school dropouts to certify that they have equivalent knowledge to high school
graduates. It started in 1942 as a way to allow veterans without a high school diploma to obtain
a secondary school credential. Today, about half of the students who drop out of high school
and a fifth of those classified as "high school graduates" by the U.S. Census Bureau are GED
recipients.
2 0 Cawley et al. [1996] showed that cognitive ability is only a minor predictor of social performance and that
many non-cognitive factors are important determinants of blue collar wages. Bowles and Gintis [2001] provided
survey evidence that employers consider measures of non-cognitive skills to be significantly more important than
measures of cognitive skills in the hiring of production workers. Klein, Spady and Weiss [1991] showed that lower
quit rates and lower absenteeism account for most of the premium awarded by high school graduates compared
to high school dropouts (not higher productivity). Edwards [1976] showed that dependability and consistency
are more valued by blue collar supervisors than cognitive ability and independent thought.
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The GED consists of five tests covering mathematics, writing, social studies, science, and
literature and arts. Except for the writing section, all the sections consist of multiple choice
questions. The costs of acquiring a GED are relatively small. The pecuniary costs range from
no cost in some states to around $50 in other states and the median study time for the tests is
only about twenty hours.
Even though the U.S. Census classifies dropouts who have acquired a GED as ordinary high
school graduates, the market does not treat them equally. GED recipients earn lower wages,
work less in any year and stay at jobs for shorter periods than high school graduates [Boesel,
Alsalam and Smith, 1998].
GED recipients are smarter than other dropouts (as measured by IQ) but exhibit more
behavior and self discipline problems and are less able to finish tasks. They switch jobs at a
faster rate and are more likely to skip school, fight at school and work, use marijuana, and
participate in robberies. Hence, the GED conveys two pieces of information in one signal.
The student who acquires it is bright, but lacks perseverance and self discipline [Cameron and
Heckman, 1993; Cavallo, Heckman and Hsee, 1998; and Heckman and Rubinstein, 2001].
Cavallo, Heckman and Hsee [1998] and Heckman and Rubinstein [2001] have shown that
when one controls for both cognitive and non-cognitive abilities, there is no difference in earnings
between a GED recipient and a dropout who has not acquired the certificate. Tyler, Murnane,
and Willett [2000] obtained similar results except for young white dropouts who were in the
margin of passing the exam. As for females, the evidence is the same as that of males, except
for those who dropped out because of pregnancy [Carneiro and Heckman, 2003].
Because high school dropouts who have taken the GED are treated in the labor market just
like those who have not taken it, any theory that tries to explain this exam must exhibit pooling
in equilibrium. Moreover, since GED recipients do not earn higher wages than dropouts without
the GED, the signal-earnings relation is not strictly monotone as in the traditional signaling
models. As Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua [2005] point out,
Our evidence that multiple abilities determine schooling challenges the conven-
tional single skill signalling model due to Arrow (1973) and Spence (1973). A special
challenge is the GED program where the credential (the GED test) conveys multiple
conflicting signals. GED recipients are smarter than other high school dropouts but
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they have lower noncognitive skills.
3.5.2 The Model
In this subsection, we extend the basic framework to study the effect of the introduction of a
pass-or-fail test like the GED. We model the GED as a certifiable statement that only individuals
with a sufficiently high combination of characteristics are able to reveal. Hence, we will add a
disclosure dimension to the signaling model presented previously.21
We model the GED as an additional signal h (t, r) that only individuals with a sufficiently
high combination of characteristics are able to receive. More specifically, denoting by h (L, r) = 1
if an individual passes the exam and h (t, 7r) = 0 if she fails, we specify the test as
S 1, ifr; +rl >
0, if otherwise
where E R++ is the parameter that represents the minimum combination of skills required
to pass the test (passing standards) and r, is the rate of substitution between intelligence and
perseverance. 22
We assume that there is a nonnegative expected net benefit in passing the test. The pos-
itive expected net benefit may be due to three characteristics of the GED. First, the costs of
taking the exam are rather low. The median time studying for the GED is 20 hours and the
monetary costs range from $0 to $50. Second, the GED provides recipients with the option of
postsecondary schooling and joining the U.S. Military. Third, there could be some nonmonetary
benefits for being legally considered a high-school graduate.
After obtaining the GED, the worker may choose whether or not to disclose this information
to the employer. Hence, firms cannot distinguish between workers who have acquired a GED
but chose not to disclose it from those who were unable to obtain the GED. We denote by h the
information disclosed by the worker. More specifically, h = 1 if h = 1 and the worker chooses
2 1See, for example, Grossman (1981) and Okuno-Fujiwara, Postlewaite, and Suzumura (1990) for standard
disclosure games.
22 The assumption that schooling does not affect the possibility of passing the GED is unimportant for our
results. As would probably be clear, all results still hold if education entered linearly in the minimum combination
of skills.
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to disclose this information. Otherwise, h = 0. Firms observe h but not h. Therefore, employers
now observe the amount of education y, the interview result g, and the GED h.
Controlling for the interview result g, h can be rewritten as
1, if ( - a) > - g
0, otherwise.
Since the GED exam is intensive in cognitive skills, we shall assume that the exam h emphasizes
intelligence more than the interview g does:
Assumption 1 r > a.
Then, each worker with t > 9-g would be able to pass the test. The graphs in Figure 5
separate the interval [to, L1] in three regions. The first graph depicts the case where - > -,
while the second graph represents the case where < -g
CS CS. CS CS_
to g g-g 1 t0 g-g g ti
2cr K -c. K -a 2u.
Eh= 1
Figure 3-5: CS+ and CS_ regions
In the left region, workers have low intelligence so that education must be increasing in
intelligence (CS+ region) and the worker is unable to pass the test. On the right side, workers
have high intelligence. Thus, education must be decreasing in intelligence (CS- region) and the
worker is able to pass the test.
The region in the middle depends on the sign of g - If 9-9 > - (first graph), some
workers with types in the CS_ region are unable to receive h = 1. If g < - (second graph),
some workers with types in the CS+ region are able to pass the test.
The game consists of adding a last stage to the game presented in Section 3.2. Hence, the
timing of the game is as follows. First, nature determines each worker's type according to density
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p. Second, workers choose their education y9 (L, g) contingent on their types.23 Subsequently,
firms offer a wage w9 (y, g, h) conditional on observing (y, g) and on whether the worker will
(h = 1) or will not disclose the GED (h = 0). Then, workers choose whether or not to acquire
the GED and, if they do, whether or not to disclose this information. 2 4
Consider the case where the firms' technology is intensive in non-cognitive skills. Then, for
any pool of workers, the one with higher perseverance/lower intelligence is the most productive.
If firms could identify the most intelligent individuals in a pool of workers, they would offer
them lower wages. But, of course, a worker would never take the GED if this reduced her
earnings. Hence, in the case where the firms' technology is intensive in non-cognitive skills,
allowing workers to take the GED does not affect education and wages (compared with the
equilibrium obtained in Section 3.3). Thus, we say that, in this case, the GED is a neutral
signal. 25 This conclusion, which is the main result of this section, is formally stated in the
following proposition.
Proposition 24 Suppose that the firms' technology is intensive in non-cognitive skills. Let
{y (t, g), w (y (t, g), g)} denote the quasi-separable equilibrium of the model where the GED is
not available. There exists a quasi-separable equilibrium of the game where the GED is available
such that acquiring the GED does not affect education and wages:
y (t, g, h* (, g)) = y (, g), (3.15)
wg (y (t, g) , g,h* (, g)) = w (y (, g) ,g),
h* (t, g) = 0 Vt E [to,7 (to)] ,
2 We add the superscript g to differentiate the model where the GED is available from the one examined in
the previously.
24 In standard disclosure models, individuals first choose which information to reveal A second stage consisting
of a signaling game is easily introduced by assuming that the payoffs from the disclosure game are obtained by
backward induction from the second stage. In the model presented above, however, the signaling game occurs in
the first stage and the disclosure game occurs in the second stage. This is the natural assumption in our model
since the choice of whether or not to take the GED is usually made after the worker has decided how much
education to acquire.
2
"When L and y (t) are both able to obtain the GED (i.e., they are greater than _), there also exist equilibria
such that h* (, g) = h* (~ (L),g) = 1. Since the GED does not disclose any information in this case, it does not
affect education or wages.
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Proof. The result is trivial for a separating set. Assume two workers with t < g-g <
are pooled in the same contract (otherwise, the signal is not informational). Since acquiring
the GED has positive net benefits and a worker can always choose not to disclose that she has
obtained the GED, Z will have h = 1 and t will have h = 0. Suppose that type-Z chooses to
disclose this information - i.e. h (i, g) = 1. Then, from Lemma 5, the firm would offer a lower
salary for the type-i worker and a higher salary for t. But this cannot be an equilibrium since
the type-Z worker's strategy is not optimal (condition 1 from Definition 4). Thus, all types who
were discretely pooled in the quasi-separable equilibrium of the game where the GED was not
available choose h = 0. Then, it follows that the separating and discrete pooling intervals as
well as the conditions for the PBE obtained in Proposition 22 are the same in both games,
which concludes the proof. m
Notice that, consistent with Heckman and Rubinstein [2001] and Cavallo, Heckman and
Hsee [1998], workers who have a GED have higher cognitive skills and lower non-cognitive
skills but receive the same wages as those who do not have it. However, as the result above
holds for all E R++, it follows that, unlike Cavallo, Heckman and Hsee [1998] suggested,
an increase in the GED standards, g, would not affect the equilibrium education and wage
schedules. 26 Furthermore, since the introduction of the GED does not affect the equilibrium
profile of education, our model does not support the claim that, when the GED is neutral, it
may discourage education [e.g., Cavallo, Heckman and Hsee, 1998].
A key assumption for the neutrality of the GED is that the firms' technology is intensive
in non-cognitive abilities.27 Consider now the case where the firms' technology is intensive in
cognitive skills. Then, for any pool of workers, the one who is able to acquire the GED is the
most productive. Hence, by disclosing that one has a GED, a worker is able to obtain higher
wages at no cost so that the GED is no longer neutral. The next proposition formally proves
this result.
Proposition 25 Suppose that the firms' technology is intensive in cognitive skills and - E
2 6 This implication of the model could be tested as passing standards vary by states and have changed over
time. Thus, one could test if the neutrality of the GED is robust to different states and different periods of time.
27The neutrality of the GED does not rely on the assumption that education does not affect the ability to pass
the GED exam. For example, suppose that an individual would be able to pass on the GED if nL + rl + Oy > g.
Then, the shaded area in Figure 8 would depend on y but if two workers were discretely pooled in a contract,
the one who could pass the test would still be the least productive worker.
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[to, - (to)]. Then, there exists an equilibrium where the GED is non-neutral: for any t < _ <
wg (Y (t, 9) , g, h* (t, g) < W (y (t, g) , g) < w y ( (t) , g) , g, (t) , g))
h* (t, g) = 0, h* ( () , g) = 1,
h* (t, g)=1 >= L
Proof. In this case, condition 2 of Definition 4 implies that wg (y (~ (b) , g) , g, 1) = s (7 (L)) >
s (t) = w9 (y (t, g) , g, 0) , where the inequality follows from Lemma 5. Then, type ~ (t) prefers
to disclose h = 1 and type t cannot pool with her since she cannot acquire the GED. The
existence part follows the same steps as Section 3.3, except that now there will be separability
in the two extremes. m
Corollary 5 Suppose that the firms' technology is intensive in non-cognitive skills. There exists
an equilibrium such that an exam h that places more weight to non-cognitive skills (r < a) is
non-neutral.
A way to make the GED exam a non-neutral signal would be to put more emphasis on non-
cognitive skills as it would separate two pooled workers with different signs, h. Even though it
must be significantly harder to design a signal that emphasizes non-cognitive skills, psychologists
have developed tests that measure such skills, and they have been used by companies to screen
workers [e.g., Sternberg, 1985].
When the GED is non-neutral (b > ), it separates two previously pooled workers. Then,
the wage received by the more (less) productive worker increases (decreases). As incentive-
compatibility requires that the indirect utility must be continuous, it follows that, in this case,
the introduction of the GED increases (decreases) the education obtained by the more (less)
productive workers. Hence, another testable implication of the model is that the variance of
education (conditional on g) should increase when the GED is non-neutral and should remain
constant when it is neutral.
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3.6 Other Applications
In the previous sections, we have shown that a two-dimensional signaling game featuring an
additional exogenous signal can be reduced to a one-dimensional signaling game where the SCP
is violated. Moreover, we have characterized the equilibrium of this one-dimensional signaling
game.
Although the paper is presented in a job market environment, it can be employed in a wide
variety of environments. In this section, we briefly discuss some examples.
First, consider a corporate finance context, where firms may use dividends in order to
signal future earnings. Reinterpret t as current earnings, 'q as future earnings, y as the amount
of dividends paid, and g as representing a specialist's classification of the profitability of the
firm. Then, if the firm's and the specialist's time preferences were not aligned, the SCP would
not hold in general (see Appendix A). This misalignment might be due to credit constraints.
It could also be a consequence of an (unmodeled) CEO remuneration contract that induces
greater short-term orientation.28 Consistently with Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler [1997], our
model would then predict a non-monotonic relation between dividends and future earnings.
Furthermore, higher dividends would be a mixed signal. Depending on the time preference of
the firm and investors, it could signal both high present earnings and low future earnings or
low present earnings and high future earnings.
In an international finance context, we could reinterpret t as the government's commitment
to maintaining a fixed exchange rate, r as the quality of the fundamentals of the country, and
y as the interest rate. The signal g could denote the country's risk classification or some other
indicator of its fundamentals. As long as the risk classification is not perfectly aligned with the
government's preferences in the sense that their marginal rates of substitution between L and 7
cannot be ordered, the SCP would not hold. In that case, consistently with the evidence from
Drazen and Hubrich [2003], our model would predict that interest rates are mixed signals as
they indicate that the government is committed to maintaining a fixed exchange rate, but may
also signal weak fundamentals. Furthermore, countersignaling implies that it could be optimal
for a country to choose lower interest rates in order to signal strong fundamentals.
2
"Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong [2005] have shown that when the equilibrium stock prices may differ from
the fundamental value, the optimal contract may induce greater short-term orientation.
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Another application is a model where firms choose the amount of advertising expenditures
in order to signal product quality, captured by a two-dimensional type (t, r7). Reinterpreting
y as advertising expenditures, g as additional information obtained from other sources (e.g.,
word-of-mouth advertising, magazine reviews, etc.), one can easily apply the model presented
above. In that model, advertising may be a mixed signal. Furthermore, consistent with the
evidence from Caves and Greene [1996], Clements [2004], and Orzach et al. [2002], there would
not be an increasing relationship between advertising and product quality.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented a model of mixed signals. We demonstrated that when firms
have access to an interview technology, the two-dimensional model can be reduced to a one-
dimensional model where the single-crossing property may not hold. When this is the case, the
equilibrium features countersignaling in the sense that signals are non-monotone in the worker's
productivity.
It was shown that countersignaling occurs if, and only if, the schooling technology differs
from the firm's technology. Moreover, the countersignaling interval is strictly increasing in
the distance between the schooling and the firm's technologies. Hence, this phenomenon is
expected to be more important in occupations that require a more diverse combination of skills
from those required in the schooling process.
We have extended the basic model in order to analyze the GED exam. It was shown that,
consistently with the empirical evidence, a GED recipient has above average cognitive skills and
below average non-cognitive skills. When cognitive skills are more valued in the labor market,
this new information affects equilibrium wages. However, when non-cognitive skills are more
valued in the labor market than cognitive skills (as suggested by significant empirical evidence),
it does not affect the wage schedule.
The main problem with the GED is its focus on cognitive skills. As the firm's main concern
is usually about the worker's non-cognitive skills, a non-neutral signal should assign more weight
to this kind of skills. Thus, changing its focus to non-cognitive skills would turn the GED into
a non-neutral signal. Moreover, increasing the passing standards with no change of the relative
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intensity of each skill in the test would not change the equilibrium wages.
Our results provide evidence of the importance of the failure of the single-crossing property
in explaining observed phenomena. As the absence of this property is necessary for the existence
of discrete pooling in equilibrium, the fact that an individual with high cognitive ability and
low non-cognitive ability receives the same wages as another with low cognitive ability and high
non-cognitive ability while an individual with intermediate abilities does not is evidence of lack
of the single-crossing property.
This essay also has a technical contribution as it characterizes the equilibrium of a signaling
model where the single-crossing condition does not hold. This framework can be employed in a
wide variety of environments such as advertising, corporate finance, and international finance.
Appendix A Robustness of the Single-Crossing Property
This section characterizes the set of functions c and g that satisfy for the single-crossing property
(SCP). We will show that the SCP does not hold as long as the interview technology and the schooling
technology cannot be ordered according to their technical rates of substitution.
Let the cost of signaling be represented by the twice continuously differentiable function
Y
=
which is assumed to be strictly decreasing in t and q and strictly increasing in y.
The interview technology is represented by the twice continuously differentiable function g (L,, )
which is assumed to be strictly increasing. From the implicit function theorem, there exists p (L, g) such
that
if and only if g(t, 7r) = . Moreover,
gL
IPL g7
Substituting into the cost function, it follows that the cost of signaling function can be written as
c Y r( Hence,
Thus tPh (L ta ))2 f
Thus, the SCP holds if, and only if, - t has a constant sign for all L, 77. Therefore, a necessaryr., 9r)
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and sufficient condition for the SCP to hold is that the technical rates of substitution of the schooling
technology and the interview technology can be ordered.
Suppose, for example, that w and g are both CES functions: 29
r = [alLP + a27 P]
g = b[1/ + 02 P
Then, the SCP holds if, and only if, L - ( I - has a constant sign for all t, q.
When the SCP does not hold and the CS+ and CS_ regions are not independent of y, the necessary
conditions may no longer be sufficient and we cannot guarantee that an equilibrium exists. If it exists,
however, some results presented in this paper still hold. As in Remark 9, it can be shown that we cannot
in general have a fully separating equilibrium when the SCP is violated. The equilibrium must be such
that y is increasing in the CS+ region and decreasing in the CS_ region so that, as long as it does not
feature complete pooling, y will not be monotone.
In a previous version of the paper, we have analyzed the case where education affects the interview
result so that the CS+ and CS_ regions are no longer independent of y. We have shown that if a
quasi-separable equilibrium exists, then our results on countersignaling and the GED still hold.3 0
Appendix B Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3:
Since the first claim of this lemma is a particular case of Lemma 6, we will only prove Lemma 6.
The second claim follows from equation (3.7), since
bg
y1 (t, g) > 0 - c < = * (g). (3.16)
Proof of Lemma 4:
29The functions considered in the model are special cases of the CES when 'y = 1, /1 = a, /32 = 1, p -- 0, and
o = a2 = 1.
3oSee Araujo, Gottlieb, and Moreira [2007].
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If { w (y (t, g)) , y (t, g)} is an incentive-compatible profile of education and wages, it must satisfy
t E arg max w (y (Z, g) ,g)
L
c(, g, y (Z, g)).
The first-order condition of the program above yields
(3.17)
Suppose that y (L, g) = y (Z, g) for some regular types t and L. Substituting in equation (3.17) yields
cy (t, g, y (t, g)) = Cy (, g, y (, g)). .
Proof of Lemma 5:
Let t > Z be two discretely pooled workers and notice that ac = 7 and at = fj. Substituting in the
firm's technology yields,
Proof of Lemma 6:
Define U (Z, L) as the expected utility received by a type-(t, g) individual who gets a contract designed
for type (Z, g):
U (Z, ) = P(Z,g)s(Z, g) + P - Z,g) s
The incentive-compatibility constraint is
tE arg max U(Z, ),
The local first-order condition is
UZ (z, L)I!=, = 0,
- ,g) - c(t,g,y (,g)).
Wy (y (t, g) , g) = c (t, g, Y (L, g))
Vt E [to, t1] -
Vt C [tL, L1] (3.18)
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f (L, g) > f (Z, g) 4-=> b 1- b > bL1-b ~ 2b > 1
Calculating the derivative above yields
c, (t, g, y (t, g)) y, (t, g) P, (, g) s (L, g) + P (t, g) s, (t, g)
-P, ( - s ( - tcg) - P
Since s (x, g) = bg- s (x, g) and (, g, y (t, g)) = 1 , the expression becomesS(, g) -s (, g) [P (, g) (g - a) + P ( g) (b-at)
yt, (L, g) = s (t, g) [Pt (L, g) t (g - at) + P (L, g) (bg - at)]
+s ( - L,g) [P (g - L, g) [g (1-b) - at] - P, ( g( a L a a-J-L\~-,g) L(g-at)]
Using the fact that P (a - t,g) = 1 - P (t, g) for all L, we obtain equation (3.12).
Differentiating equation (3.18) with respect to t, we obtain
Un (, L) + UZ, (, ) = 0. (3.19)
The necessary second-order condition is
(3.20)
Substituting (3.19) in (3.20), it follows that
U (t, ) = -cy (L, g, y (t, g)) Y (t, g) > 0.
Substituting cy, (t, g,y) = - 2 in the inequality above establishes (3.13).(gn( g[ _
Proof of Proposition 20:
Suppose that wages are not strictly increasing in education. Then, there exist types t and i such
that
y(t,g) > y(Z,g) and w (y (t,g),g) < w (y (, g),g).
But this is not incentive-compatible since
y (t,g) y (i,g)
w (Y (, g) , g) - < w (y (, g) , g) -
concluding the first part of the proof.
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- L19 , - 19a
UzZ (1, L) < 0.
In order to establish the concavity of w, consider the incentive-compatibility constraint:
y (t, g) E arg max w (y, g) -
Y t (g- at)"
The second-order condition (necessary) is31
wyy (y (, g) , g) < 0.
Proof of Proposttion 21:
Suppose that type L belongs to a pooling set. Then, there exists a type Z = - L L that pools in
a contract with t. Hence, t + z = 9 , implying that L and Z cannot both belong to CS+ or CS_. .
Proof of Lemma 7:
Suppose that t is an interior point of either a separating set or a discrete pooling set. Then, as y is
continuous in t (since it solves a differential equation) it follows that:
lim U (L,)= lim U (, ) = U (, t) .
X -"+L_ X--'L+
Suppose that [L - E, L) is a discrete pooling set and [t, L + e] is a separating set, for some e > 0.
Clearly, a necessary condition for incentive-compatibility is
lim U(x,x) > lim U(L, ),
X--+ ---*L_
which means that the first individuals in the separating set would not want to get the contract of the
last individual in the discrete pooling set. Then,
y (, g)lim U(x,x) = s(L, g)-
X-4L+ L (g - at)
lim U(, x)= P (L, g)s(L, g) + [1 -P(L, g)] s( 7 (L, g), g) - ( )
since y(', g) is right continuous at L.
31Another way of establishing the monotonicity of w consists of calculating the first-order condition of the
indirect mechanism, which yields: wy (y (t, g) , g) = (t) > 0.
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Thus, the inequality can be written as
y(t, g) lim y (x, g) + L (g - at) [1 - P (t, g)] [s (t, g) - s (Y (L, g) , g)] .
Another necessary condition for incentive-compatibility is
lim U(x, x) lim U(, L) ,
X--_ X ---+L+
which states that the last individuals in the discrete pooling set would not want to get the contract of
the first individuals in the separating set.
Using the definition of the indirect utility, we get
lim,,,_ y (x, g)
lim U(x,x)=P(t, g)s(t, g)+[1-P(t, g)ls ( ((L, g) ,g)- ( )
x-L_ L (g - at)
y (L, g)
lim U (x, L) = s (t, g) - ,
X L+ L(g - at)'
implying that
y(L, g) > lim y (x, g) + L (g - at) [1 - P (t, g)] [s (t, g) - s y(, g) ,g)].
Combining these two necessary conditions, we obtain:
t (g - at) [s (I, g) - s (Y (, g) , g)]y (L, g) = +-- s((,g),g) lim y(x,g). (3.21)
Substituting in the indirect utility function, it follows that U (t, t) = limx,, U (x, ) . •
Proof of Lemma 8:
From Remark 10, it follows that some types between b and - must be discretely pooled (since
there is no continuous pooling in a quasi-separable equilibrium). Assume that some type in [to, - (Lo)] is
separated. Then, there must be a t E [I0 , -2-] such that [t, -] is a discrete pooling set and [t - E, t) is
a separated set for some e > 0. From equation 7, it follows that y (t, g) < limx,,o_ y (x, g) (i.e., y jumps
upward when the types become separated). But this is not incentive-compatible because the marginal
cost of education is lower for L + e than for L - e for E sufficiently small (thus, a type-(t + e) individual
would always prefer to get the type-(L - e) individual's contract). *
Proof of Lemma 9:
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As y (tj, g) < LO, L1 is separated. Suppose a type L1 worker chooses some strictly positive education
) > 0. Then, according to equation (3.4), this worker's wage must be s (t1, g) in any separating equilib-
rium (which is the lowest wage since L1 is the least productive type). However, she would receive a wage
of at least s (t 1 , g) if she chose y = 0. As y = 0 implies in a lower signaling cost and does not reduce her
utility, she would be strictly better off by doing so. *
Proof of Proposition 22:
Let where y (L, g) be given by the solution to the differential equations from Lemma 3 and Lemma
6 with the boundary conditions from Lemma 7 and Lemma 9. Define w (y, g) as in condition 2 from
Definition 4. Let p be a Dirac measure concentrated at L in the interval [y(Lo, g), L1] and P(L, g) in the
interval [tL, 7(Lo, g)) for y in the range of signals. 32
By construction, in order to show that {y (L, g) , w (y, g)} and 1 (.ly, g) is a PBE, it suffices to establish
that
y(t, g) C arg maxw(y, g) - c(t, g, y)
for all L E [to, L1].
First, observe that the first-order condition of the program above is equivalent to equation (3.7) for
L E [Y(Lo, g), L1] and equation (3.12) for t E [to, y(Lo, g)) and, therefore, are satisfied by y (t, g). Moreover,
the (global) second-order condition is equivalent to
Wyy(y, g) - cyy(, g,Y) < 0
for y in the range of signals.
From equation (3.1), cyy(L, g, y) = 0. Then, since wy(y, g) = cy(L, g, y) for y = y(L,g) by the first-
order condition,
Wyy(y, g)yL = cyY(L, g, y)yt + cyt(L, g, y)
for y = y(t, g). Thus, whenever y, # 0.
cy(, g, Y)
wy (y, g) = < 0
for y = y(t, g), by equations (8) and (14). Therefore, the (global) second-order condition holds.
To complete the first part of the proof we have to show that this PBE is the quasi-separable equi-
librium. But this is clear by inspection of Definition 3 and Lemma 7. Existence and uniqueness of the
32For y outside the range of signals, let p be a Dirac measure concentrated at L1 (which is the least productive
type by Lemma 3).
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quasi-separable equilibrium follow from the fact that both differential equations are Lipschitz. *
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Chapter 4
Multidimensional
Incentive-Compatibility: The
Multiplicatively Separable Case
4.1 Introduction
In many markets, some participants have information that is relevant to other participants.
Frequently, information can be inferred from actions taken by the informed parties. The unin-
formed may move first and induce the informed to take such actions (screening) or the informed
may move first and take actions in order to signal their information (signaling).
An important result in models with asymmetric information is the Revelation Principle,
which states that any allocation process can be replicated by a mechanism in which partici-
pants are asked to reveal their private information. The Revelation Principle reduces a possibly
complicated problem to an easy-to-state mathematical-programing problem, where each agent
prefers to reveal his private information honestly (incentive-compatibility). However, the gen-
eral analysis of such mathematical-programing problem is not straightforward.
Most of the literature assumes that an individual's private information consists of a one-
dimensional type parameter and that the marginal utility of taking the action can be ordered
oThis chapter is based on joint work with Aloisio Araujo and Humberto Moreira.
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(single-crossing condition, SCC). Under this assumption, Mirrlees (1971), Spence (1974), and
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) show that the solution of the programing problem is determined
by a first-order and a monotonicity condition and the characterization of the set of incentive-
compatible allocations becomes straightforward. McAfee and McMillan (1988) characterize
incentive-compatible allocations in a multidimensional model under a single-crossing condition
and Quinzii and Rochet (1985) characterize the separating equilibria of a multidimensional
signaling model under a single-crossing condition.
This essay has two main purposes. First, it studies incentive-compatible allocations under
a condition that is weaker than the SCC. This allows us to characterize the solution of multidi-
mensional screening models as well as the equilibria of multidimensional signaling models where
the SCC does not hold. Second, we determines the implications of multidimensional signaling
and screening models when the SCC does not hold.
The characterization of optimal allocations in multidimensional screening models is comple-
mentary to Rochet (1987), McAfee and McMillan (1988), and Armstrong (1996). Our condition
(discussed in Section 4.2) has three main advantages. First, it is easy to verify and is com-
patible with most specifications used in applied work (e.g. utility functions multiplicatively
separable between the decision variable and types).1 Second, it does not require assumptions
to be made on endogenous variables and on the distribution of types. And third, it allows for
utility functions that do not satisfy the SCC. The characterization of equilibria in multidimen-
sional signaling models also provides necessary and sufficient conditions for signals to reveal all
unobservable information (full-separability). 2
Recently, the SCC has been criticized both on theoretical and empirical grounds. The
first type of criticisms stress that, even though this property may be natural and intuitive
in one-dimensional models, it cannot be extended in a sensible manner to multidimensional
1Armstrong (1996) assumes homogeneity of the utility function with respect to the type parameter, separa-
bility of the agent's indirect utility, and separability of the density function. McAfee and McMillan (1988) on
the other hand assume a generalized single-crossing condition that requires the shadow-price indifference curves
to be hyperplanes.
Matthews and Moore (1987) analyze a two-dimensional screening model where utility functions cross twice.
2 Since Kholleppel's (1983) example of a model where no separating equilibrium existed, the existence of a fully-
separating equilibrium became an important issue. Engers and Fernandez (1987) show that the SCC is sufficient
for full-separability. The present article extends previous results on conditions required for full-separability by
obtaining necessary and sufficient conditions.
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settings. Models with discrete multidimensional types can be transformed into one-dimensional
type models but the SCC is usually broken (see Rochet and Stole, 2003). Furthermore, utility
functions that satisfy the analog of the SCC in multidimensional settings may fail to satisfy
this condition in the presence of other signals (Araujo et al., 2007) or when there is correlation
between the characteristics (Araujo and Moreira, 2003). Also, the presence of a moral hazard
dimension may cause the SCC to be violated (Acemoglu, 1998).
In some applications, it is widely recognized that the assumption of one-dimensional types
may be implausible. In the context of education, for example, Heckman (2005) argues that
"abilities are multiple in nature", and that one-dimensional models cannot capture important
phenomena (see Araujo et al., 2007, or Heckman et al., 2005).
Criticisms made on empirical grounds stress that several examples of interesting and intu-
itive phenomena have been proved to arise only when one drops this assumption. Bagwell and
Bernheim (1996) investigate conditions under which consumers may be willing to pay higher
prices for functionally equivalent goods as away to signal wealth ('Veblen effects'). Their main
finding is that Veblen effects do not arise when the SCC holds but may arise when it fails.
Bernheim (1991) proves that firms may choose to distribute dividends even when they are
taxed more highly than stock repurchases ('dividend puzzle') when the SCC fails. Bernheim
and Severinov (2003) provide an explanation for the equal division of bequests based on a model
where the SCC fails. Rotemberg (1988) shows that a tax on a signal may be Pareto-improving
if the SCC fails to hold. Similarly, Bernheim and Redding (2001) show that taxing signals
can be Pareto-improving in a model where the SCC does not hold. Bernheim (1994) studies a
model of conformity in social interactions where the single-crossing condition fails.
The previous chapter of this thesis presented a model where high types choose to engage
in a lower amount of signaling than intermediate types (see also Example 9). Araujo et al.
(2004) show that the relation between dividend payments and earnings may be non-monotone
when the SCC is not satisfied, and Smart (2000) and Araujo and Moreira (2003) show that the
relation between risk and insurance coverage may not be monotonic.
Thus, one may question what the empirical content of the signaling and screening models is
once the SCC is not assumed. In other words, which implications of these models are not a result
of the particular specification of the cost of the activity. Similarly, it is important to understand
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which results from the standard models generalize to multidimensional environments.3
We show that the only robust prediction of signaling is the monotonicity of transfers in
costly actions. However, this prediction is shared by most alternative (symmetric information)
models. Therefore, even when one employs a selection criterion, signaling can almost never
be rejected. Another negative result concerns the identifiably of signaling models. It is shown
that, for each signaling model, there exists a large class of signaling models with the same
observable implications. Hence, it is impossible to determine which is correct among a large
class of models.
The characterization of solutions of multidimensional screening allows us to identify a new
necessary and sufficient condition. Under homogeneity of the distribution of types or when types
are one-dimensional, this condition implies that the principal's profit must grow with respect
to types at a higher rate under asymmetric information than under symmetric information.
Overall, our results imply that special attention must be devoted to the specific characteris-
tics of the market being studied. Only with precise knowledge about the cost of engaging in the
activity, the relevant number of dimensions, and the technology, one is able to obtain testable
predictions of the model.
This chapter is also related to the literature on monotone comparative statics, which studies
necessary and sufficient conditions for solutions to maximization programs to be monotone. One
important result in this literature is that the SCC is sufficient for the solution to be monotone
(c.f., Milgrom and Shannon, 1994). Furthermore, if the choice set is sufficiently rich, this
condition is also necessary. In the present paper, we show that the cross-partial derivative of
the cost function determines not only whether the set of incentive-compatible allocations is
increasing or decreasing but the whole shape of the solution.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 characterizes the set of incentive-
compatible allocations and studies the restrictions imposed by incentive-compatibility. Section
4.3 presents the screening model and characterizes the optimal solution. Then, we study the
additional implications imposed by the screening model. Section 4.4 considers the signaling
3In a model of insurance under asymmetric information, Chiappori et al. (2006) argue that coverage and
risk are positively correlated even when the SCC is not imposed or when types are multidimensional. However,
although we also obtain a monotonicity condition, our results are not directly applicable to insurance since we
follow the standard mechanism design model and assume quasi-linear utilities.
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model. Then, Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Characterization of Incentive Compatibility
The economy consists of informed agents and an uninformed principal. Each agent is char-
acterized by a multidimensional parameter ('type') 0 E 0, where 0 C R' is a compact and
convex set with non-empty interior. Types are distributed according to a continuous density
p : O -> R++. Agents may engage in a costly activity y E R+. Principals have a continuously
differentiable valuation function f : O x R+ - IR+.
The cost of the activity y is given by a C 3 function c : O x R+ -- R+, where
Assumption 0 cy (0, y) > 0 and ce (O, y) < 0, for all 0 E 0, y E R+, and i = 1,..., n.
The first inequality states that y is costly while the second states that higher types have a
lower cost of engaging in the activity y.
The standard single-crossing condition (SCC) requires cOy not to change signs so that having
a higher type has a monotonic effect on the marginal cost of engaging in y. The following
assumption generalizes the SCC in the sense that it allows coy to change sign.
Assumption 1 There exist functions : R -+ R, : O -4 R, and p : O -- R such that
c(0, y) = (y) + y x (0) + O (0) .
Assumption 1 implies that coyy (0, y) = 0, for all i = 1, ..., n. It is satisfied, for example,
when costs are quadratic in y :
a (0, y) = j X Y2 Y x y  () + (0),
where J is a real number. This representation includes the standard case of costs that are linear
in y (J = p (0) = 0 for all 0).
The SCC holds in each dimension if either coy (0, y) > 0 or cody (0, y) < 0 for all y, Oi,
and i. Assumption 1 states that coy (0, y) is not a function of y. Hence, if we fix the n - 1
other dimensions and consider a graph of 0. and y, coy is constant along any vertical line. In
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Figure 4-1: Cost function that satisfies SCC in each dimension.
particular, the intervals where coey > 0 and where co,, < 0 are separated by vertical lines (see
Figures 4-1 and 4-2).
In a context of education as signal, for example, the agents are workers, the principals are
employers, the activity y is the amount of schooling, and the price w is the wage paid to workers.
In an industrial organization context, the agents are firms, principals are potential buyers, and
the activity may be the amount spent on advertisement or the duration of warranties. The
following example considers the model from Chapter 3.
Example 9 Consider a labor market model. Risk neutral workers engage in a costly schooling
activity y E R+ and obtain wages w E R +. Their ability is captured by a two-dimensional vector
0- (01, 02) E R2 and the cost of schooling is4
c (, y) =
Employers do not observe ability but observe the amount of schooling y. They can also
interview workers, which gives them an additional measure of each worker's skills. The interview
401 and 02 can be znterpreted as cognitzve and non-cognitzve skzlls, for example.
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Figure 4-2: Cost function that satisfies Assumption 1.
technology is represented by the following function:
g (0, y) = aO1 + 02 + /y.
A type-0 worker produces a good that is worth f (y, 0), where fe, > 0, fy, 0, fyy < 0, and
fyo, > 0. For a fixed g (0, y) = 9, we can write the cost of schooling as
Y
(01, (g -0 al - y)"
Note that the single-crossing condition does not hold since ely,{>}0 - 01 > 8 - -
The szngle-crossing condition means that exchanging one unit of ability 81 for a units of 02
would always be either desirable or undesirable in terms of reducing the cost of schooling. In
the specificathon above. because the abilities are imperfect substitutes, this exchange is desirable
for high levels of 01 and undesirable for low levels of 01. Therefore, the substitutability between
skills breaks down the single-crossing condition. Furthermore, Assumption 1 is satisfied when
3= 0.
The next example describes a model of warranties:
Example 10 Consider a model of warranties and uncertain product quality. Product quality is
determined by a two-dimensional vector of characteristics 0 - (01,02) E R 2 . For concreteness,
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interpret 01 as the reliability and 02 as the complexity of the good. Consumers observe a measure
of product quality given by the function g (0) = a0 1 + 02.
Producers may offer a warranty that repairs any defect that may occur until time y. Let
w (y, g) denote the price charged conditional on g (0) = g when warranty y is provided.
Denote by f (O1, 02, y) the expected value of the good to consumers given warranty y and
c (01,02, y) denote the expected cost of producing the good and providing warranty y. We assume
that reliability reduces the cost of providing warranty whereas complexity increases the cost of
providing warranty:
co1y < 0, c0 2y > 0.
As in Example 9, we can rewrite the expected cost of producing the good conditional on g as
8 (01, y, g) c (01, a0 1 - g, y) . Note that C01 = co1 y + aco2y may switch signs because the first
term is negative while the second term is positive. Therefore, the fact that reliability decreases
the cost of providing warranty whereas complexity increases this cost implies that single-crossing
condition may not hold. In particular, if we assume linear costs,
c (01, 02, y) = A x 01 x (K - 02 ) X y,
where A and K are positive real numbers, it follows that 01y{}0 01 {<}JK+ and
Assumption 1 is satisfied.
The following example presents a multidimensional generalization of the standard nonlinear
pricing model:
Example 11 A monopolist sells a good in different sizes (or qualities) Q > 0. Consumers have
private information about their tastes, captured by a vector of types 0 E O. The consumer's
gross surplus from the good is V (0, Q) , where v> 0 and > 0. A purchase of size Q is sold
at price P (Q) . Therefore, the consumer's utility from purchasing the good is V (0, Q) - P (Q) .
The cost of production is FC + MC x Q, where FC > 0 and MC > 0 denote the firm's
fixed and marginal costs. The firm's profit from selling the good is P (Q) - MC x Q - FC.
Let y = Q - Q for Q large enough, let w (y) = -P (Q - y) , and define the function
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c: E x IR+ -- R+ by
c(0, y) = -V (0, Q - y) .
The consumer's utility can be written as w (y)- c(O, y). Furthermore, c(0, y) satisfies Assumptzon
0.
Let f (y) = -MC x (Q - y) - FC. The firm's profit can be written as f (y) - w (y) . Hence,
this model is a special case of the basic framework. Moreover, Assumption 1 is satisfied if and
only if there exist functions ( : RI - R, V : E - R, and p : 0 -+ IR such that
V (0, Q) = (Q) + Q x ' (0) + p (0) .
The next example describes of the random participation model of Rochet and Stole (2002):
Example 12 Consider the same setting as in Example 11. Take 0 = (01, 02) and take ( (Q) =
0, P (0) = 01, P (0) = -02. The parameter 01 denotes the consumer's taste for quality Q, and
02 indexes the consumer's opportunity cost.
A mechanism (y (0), w (y)) is incentive-compatible if it satisfies the following incentive-
compatibility constraint:
y(O) E arg maxw(W) - c(O, F) (IC)
for all 0 E O. Equivalently, we say that w(y) implements y(.). We say that a profile of activities
y(-) is implementable if there exists a function w (y) that implements it.
Before proceeding, we need to introduce some notation. We say that a type 0 is regular for
y(-) if the differential Dy(O) has full rank; otherwise 0 is critical. Finally, y is a critical value
of y if there exists a critical type 0 such that y(O) = 7, otherwise y is called a regular value of
y. We refer to a C 1 function with measure zero of critical values as a regular function. In what
follows we will only consider mechanisms (y (0), w (y)) such that y and w are regular.5' 6
5 Apart from the differentiability assumption, the only restrictions that this condition imposes to the incentive
compatible profile is that there are no discontinuities in y(-) and its derivative. The results could be generalized
with an adaptation in the proof of Theorem 1: the price profile would have kinks (which would correspond to the
discontinuities of the derivative of y) and disconnected domain (which would correspond to the discontinuities
in y).
6By Sard's theorem, this condition is automatically satisfied if y E C", n > 1.
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Which mechanisms (y (0), w (y)) satisfy incentive-compatibility? In the remainder of this
section, we first analyze necessity and then sufficiency. The following lemma gives the usual
first- and second-order conditions of the incentive compatibility constraint.
Lemma 10 Let (y(.), w(.)) be an incentive-compatible mechanism. Then,
w'(y(0)) = c (0, y(0)), (4.1)
coy (0, y (0)) YO" (0) _ 0, (4.2)
for all i = 1,...,n and 0 E O.
Proof. To simplify the proof, let us assume that y(.) is C2. If (y(.), w()) is incentive-
compatible, it must satisfy:
0 e arg maxw y -c ,y) ,
whose local first- and second-order conditions are
w' (Y (0)) o (0) - c (0, (0))y0 (0) = 0,
W" (y (0)) [Yo, (0)]2 + w' (y (0)) yo2"O (0) - cy, (0, y (0)) [yo" (0)12 - C (0, y (0)) Yo,0, (0) < 0.
Equation (4.1) follows from the first-order condition. Differentiating the first-order condition
(which must hold for every 0) yields
w" (y (0)) [yoi (0)12 + w' (y (0)) YO, 0, (0) - c~ (0, y (0)) [yo, (o)]2 - C (0, y (0)) yo, , (0)
co, (0, Y (0)) Yo (0).
Substituting in the second order condition, we obtain coy (0, y (0)) YO. (0) <0.
When the SCC holds, equation (4.2) reduces to a monotonicity condition. When it does
not hold, equation (4.2) implies that incentive-compatible mechanisms may not be monotonic:
y has to be increasing in the region where cony < 0 and decreasing in the region where coy > 0.
In one-dimensional models where mechanisms are monotone, if two types pool in the activity
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y, all intermediate types must also be pooled with them. As a consequence, pooling sets must
be intervals. However, when mechanisms are not monotone, a disconnected set of types may
be pooled. Araujo and Moreira (2004) have shown that a necessary condition for incentive-
compatibility in this case is the so-called marginal utility identity. This condition implies that
if two disconnected types are pooling in an activity y, they should have the same marginal cost.
The following lemma establishes this result in our context:
Lemma 11 If two individuals with regular types 0 and 0 choose the same signal, then their
marginal cost must be the same:
y (0)() =y cy (0, y (0)) = c, , y (0) . (4.3)
Proof. Suppose that (w(y(O)),y(0)) is incentive-compatible. Then, (4.1) must hold.
Therefore, if 0 and 0 are regular types such that y (0) = y (), equation (4.1) implies that
Cy (0, y (0))= Cy (B'y M
We have shown that the local conditions (4.1), (4.2) and the global condition (4.3) are
necessary for incentive-compatibility even when Assumption 1 does not hold. The following
example shows that they may not be sufficient when Assumption 1 does not hold.
Example 13 Suppose that the cost of activity y is
S1 [y_(0_1)212 50 [y _(0_1)2 
]3
e(0,y)- 0 1 
+
so that Assumption 1 is not satisfied. Conszder the following mechanism:
y(0) = (0-1)2,
where E = [1.1, 2].
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Note that conditzons (4.1), (4.2), and (4.3) are satisfied. Under the proposed mechanism,
type 0 = chooses y ( ) = and obtains utility w ( ) - c (, .) = However, by choosing
y =1, he obtains w (1) - c (, 1) = > 1, which is a profitable deviation. Therefore, (4.1),
(4.2), and (4.3) may not prevent non-local deviations when Assumption 1 does not hold.
The proposition below establishes that, under Assumption 1, the necessary conditions are
sufficient as well.
Proposition 26 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. A mechanism (y(.), w(.)) is incentive-compatible
if and only if the first- and second-order conditions (4.1) and (4.2), and the pooling condition
(4.3) are satisfied.
Proof. (=) Follows from Lemmata 10 and 11.
(.=) Let us define the wage schedule w E C'. By (4.3) we can define the derivative of w
by w'(y) = cy(0, y) for y = y(0) and all regular types 0 E O. Since the set of critical values
has zero measure, we can extend continuously the definition of w'(y) for critical values. Then,
define the following wage schedule for y E y(): 7
y
w(y) = w'(x)dx + Wmin
ymin
where wmin > maxoeO c (0,0) (which ensures that all types will participate) and ymin
miny(E).OEE
Let 0 be first a regular type (for critical 0 the argument is made by continuity). The first-
order condition of the previous problem is w'(y(0)) = Cy(0, y(O)), which holds by the definition
of w(-).
Given a regular " = y(0), there exists i £ {1,..., n} such that yo (0) z 0. By the implicit
function theorem there exists a function p such that, locally, i = p(, -i), where 0-i is the
vector n - 1 dimensional 0 but coordinate i. Taking the derivative with respect to " in the
equality w'( ) = cy((0 , 0-i), _ ), we get
), we extend the wage function linearly such that the derivative is continuous.
7 For y y(E), we extend the wage function linearly such that the derivative is continuous.
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Therefore, the second derivative of the agent's utility at y is
However, Assumption 1 implies that cyy,(, ) - Cyy(, ) = 0 because c yy = 0 for all i. Then,
the sign of the second derivative is given by (4.2), i.e., it is negative. Again, for critical j we
can use continuity. This implies that y(O) is the maximum on y(E). This concludes the proof.
Next, we use the characterization from Proposition 26 to study implications of incentive-
compatibility when the SCC is not imposed. Our assumption that the activity y is costly implies
that transfers must be strictly increasing in y. Therefore, w' (y) > 0 is a necessary condition
for incentive-compatibility. The theorem below states that it is also a sufficient condition.
More specifically, given any mechanism (y (0) , w (y)) we can find a cost function satisfying
Assumptions 0 and 1 for which such schedule is incentive-compatible.
Theorem 1 Let y (-) be a regular function and let w (.) be a positive C2 function. There exists
a C 1 cost function satisfying Assumption 1 for which (y(-), w(.)) is incentive-compatible if and
only if w (.) is strictly increasing. Moreover, if w (-) is concave, such cost function can be chosen
such that Assumption 0 is also satisfied.
Proof. (=>) Follows from revealed preference.
(=) Let us define the following C 1 function:
K
c(0, y) = A(0) + w'(y(0))y + - y(0))2
where K > 0 is a constant such that w"(y(O)) < K and A(O) is such that c (, y) > 0 and
co, (0, y) < 0. Such function A (0) exists.
The function c is C 1 because y(E) is a compact set and w(.) is C2. Moreover, the marginal
cost cy(O, y) = w'(y(O)) + K(y - y(O)) is always positive along y = y(O). A sufficient condition
for the existence of a K such that the marginal cost is positive for all y > 0 and w"(y(0)) < K
is w" (y (0)) < for all 0. This condition is obviously satisfied when the wage function is
concave since w' > 0 and O is compact.
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Note that c satisfies Assumption 1. We claim that the pair (y(-), w(-)) is incentive-compatible.
First, (4.1) is trivial and (4.2) holds because
co,y(0, y(O))y, (0) = [w"(y(O)) - K] [ye,(0)]2 < 0.
Furthermore, if 0 and 0 are regular values of y(.), then
c (0, Y) = c~(O, y) = w'(y(O)) - Ky(0) = w'(y(0)) - Ky()
4= y = y(o) = y(),
since w'(y)-Ky is decreasing on y (by the assumption on K), i.e., (4.3) holds. Using Proposition
26, we conclude the proof. m
The theorem above implies that, apart from the monotonicity of the transfer function,
incentive-compatibility by itself does not lead to any additional restrictions on the space of
incentive-compatible mechanisms. In the next sections, we characterize the solutions of screen-
ing and signaling models and analyze which additional restrictions arise.
4.3 The Screening Model
In this section, we embed the structure of the previous section into a screening model. There
is one uninformed principal who makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to an informed agent. The
agent's private information is characterized by the parameter 0, which is distributed according
to the density p.
The revelation principle allows us to restrict the space of contracts to direct mechanisms that
satisfy the incentive-compatibility constraint (IC). Each type has an outside option that gives
a constant reservation utility normalized to zero.8 Therefore, the principal faces the following
participation constraint:
w(y(O)) - c(0, y(0)) > 0 VO E 9. (IR)
The following definition states the principal's problem:
"One could also allow for type-dependent reservation utilities. For the purposes of our results on the additional
restrictions imposed by screening, we can always ajust the cost function to avoid countervailing incentives.
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Definition 8 The princzpal's program zs
max E[f(O, y(O)) - w(y(O))] (4.4)(y(O),w(y))
s.t. (IC) and (IR).
Proposition 26 states that, under Assumption 1, the space of incentive-compatible mech-
anisms is characterized by conditions (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3). Define the agent's informational
rent given an incentive-compatible mechanism (y(O), w (y)) as
r(O) w(y(O)) - c(O, y(o)). (4.5)
Applying the Envelope Theorem (see Milgrom and Segal, 2002), we obtain the following con-
dition:
Vr(O) = -Voc(O, y(9)), (4.6)
where V is the gradient operator. Note that condition (4.6) is equivalent to (4.1).
In order to solve the principal's program, we follow the standard approach of considering
first a relaxed program which ignores some of the constraints. Then, we state conditions that
ensure that the ignored constraints do not bind so that the solution of the relaxed program is
the same as the solution of the principal's program.
The relaxed program is defined as the maximization of the principal's profit subject to the
agent's first-order condition and the participation constraint:
max E[f(O, y(O)) - w(y(O))]
(y(O),w(y))
s.t. (4.1) and (IR).
Note that the program above does not take into account the local second-order conditions (4.2)
and the global conditions (4.3). For clarity, it is convenient to analyze the one-dimensional and
the multidimensional cases separately.
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4.3.1 The one-dimensional case
This subsection characterizes the solutions of screening models when the parameter of private
information 0 is one-dimensional and considers their empirical implications. We obtain a new
necessary and sufficient condition for a mechanism to be a solution to a screening model.
The new condition, which does not depend on the SCC, states that the principal's profit must
increase in the agent's type at a higher rate under asymmetric information than in the symmetric
information case. Equivalently, the condition identifies the regions where the principal's profit
is increasing and decreasing in the activity y chosen by the agent.
From our assumption about the type space, it can be written as EO [8, ] C R. Note that
Assumption 0 implies that the informational rent is increasing in the agent's type. Therefore,
the participation constraint (IR) is satisfied if and only if r (8) > 0. Furthermore, in the solution
to Program (4.4) it must be the case that r(O) = 0.
Integrating (4.6), the agent's informational rent becomes
0r(O) = r() - CO 0, Y A) d.
Applying integration by parts, we obtain
E[w(y(O))] = r() + E [c(O, y(O)) 1 - P(O) P))
for every incentive-compatible mechanism (y(O), w(y)).
Substituting into the objective function, the relaxed program becomes:
max E [f(9, y(0)) - c (0,y(0))+ co(,y( (0)) .((O),w(y))[ p(O)
The pointwise first-order condition of the relaxed program is equivalent to
1- P(0)fy (0, y (0)) - Cy (, y ()) - P(coy (0, y (0)) = 0. (4.7)
This condition depicts the usual trade-off between rent extraction and distortion that the prin-
cipal faces. Instead of equating the marginal valuation to the marginal cost, the principal sets
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it equal to the marginal cost plus the marginal cost of information rents.
For simplicity, suppose that w is C 2 . Taking the total derivative of equation (4.1) with
respect to 0 gives:
w"(y())y' (0) = coye(, y(0)) + cyy(0, y(0))y' ().
Thus, (4.7) can be written as
1 - P(9)
fy (0, y (0)) - w'(y(0)) + [w"(y(0)) - cy(9, y(0))y'(0) = 0. (4.8)p(O)
Note that the (necessary) local second-order condition of Program (IC) is w"(y(0))-cyy (0, y (0)) <
0. Substituting from equation (4.8), it follows that
[f (0, y (0)) - w'(y(O))]y'(0) > 0, for all 0 E 0, (4.9)
since the hazard rate is always positive.
Condition (4.9) has a natural interpretation in terms of the principal's profit: 7r ()
f (9, y (0)) - w (y (0)). Under symmetric information, we would have r' (0) = fo (0, y (0)). Dif-
ferentiating the profit function, we obtain:
7r' (0) = fo (,y( ())+ [fy (0,y( ())- w' (y ())] y' (0) fo (0,y( ()),
where the inequality uses equation (4.9). Therefore, under asymmetric information, the princi-
pal's profit increases at a greater rate than the increase in productivity. Note that this result is
quite general in that it does not depend on any assumptions on the cost function except for it
being increasing in y and decreasing in 0 and the assumption that types are one-dimensional.
The next subsection shows that this result can be somewhat generalized to multidimensional
types.
Condition (4.9) can also be interpreted as determining the effect of activity y on the prin-
cipal's profit. From condition (4.2), it can be written as:
fy (0,y(0)) } '(y(0)) co, (,y( (9)) . (4.10)
< >
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Thus, the profit must be increasing in y in the region where the type decreases the marginal
cost of the activity (controlling for the type 0). 9 Conversely, the profit must be decreasing
when types increase the marginal cost of the activity y. In the standard case where coy < 0 (the
single-crossing condition is satisfied), it implies that the principal's profit is increasing in the
activity y controlling for the agent's type.
The previous argument shows the necessity of condition (4.9). It turns out that this condi-
tion is also sufficient to rationalize any incentive-compatible mechanism as the solution of the
principal's program when Assumption 1 is satisfied:
Theorem 2 Suppose E C IR. Let y (-) be a regular function and let w (.) be a positive C 2
function. There exists a C 1 cost function satisfying Assumption 1 and a distribution of types
p for which (y(-), w(-)) is the optimal mechanism if and only if w (.) is strictly increasing and
condition (4.9) is satisfied.
Proof. (==>) Follows from the preceding argument and Theorem 1.
(:=) Let (y(O), w(y)) be a mechanism satisfying the conditions of the theorem. Take the
cost function of the proof of Theorem 1. Then, the mechanism satisfies incentive-compatibility
and equation (4.7) becomes:
fy (0, y (0)) - w'(y(0)) 1 - P(O) 0. (4.11)
[w"(y(0)) - K]y'(0) p(0)
Hence, by (4.9) we can then define the following function:
[ K - w"(y(t))
P(0) = 1 - A x exp [f o j_- y(t) dt
f() = xexp f fy (t, Y (t)) - w'(y())
where A is chosen such that P(2) = 0. It is easy to see that P(-) is a cumulative distribution
function which satisfies (4.11). Note that for such economy the second-order condition of the
relaxed functional holds if and only if
fyy (0, y (0)) - K < 0.
9 By 'controlling for the type', we mean the effect on the profit if an agent chose a different amount of activity
y. Of course, in equilibrium we only observe one action for each type: y = y (0).
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Therefore, choosing K with this property we conclude that (y(O), w(y)) is the solution of the
principal's program. 10 0
4.3.2 The multidimensional case
As in McAfee and McMillan (1988) and Rochet (1987), this subsection obtains necessary and
sufficient conditions for implementability and optimality in a multidimensional screening model.
The implementability result follows straight from Proposition 26, which characterizes the set
of incentive-compatible mechanisms under Assumption 1. In this subsection, we use this result
to characterize the optimal mechanism.
In general, the first difficulty in multidimensional screening is to deal with the integration of
equation (4.6). In order to deal with this, we will follow the approach proposed by Armstrong
(1996).
Assume that there exists a 0 E E such that 0 < 0 for all 0 E O. With no loss of generality,
take 0 = 0.11 Under Assumption 0, the informational rent (4.5) is increasing in the agent's type.
Thus, the participation constraint is satisfied if and only if r(0) > 0 so that, in the solution to
Program (4.4), we must have r(O) = 0.
Consider the expected value of the agent's informational rent (4.5):
R = fr(0)p(O)dO.
Define the function v : [0, 1] - R by v(t) = f r(tO)p(O)dO. Then, it follows that v'(t) =
f 0 - Vr(tO)p(O)dO, where - denotes the inner product. Because r(0) = 0, we have
e
v(0) = 0 and v(1) = R.
Since v(1) - v(O) = f v'(t)dt, it follows that
O
R = f (f 0. Vr(tO)p(0)d0) dt. (4.12)
1
oWe can choose a cost function such that the marginal cost is always positive whenever fyy, (0,y (0)) < -v))
A sufficient condition is that w is more concave than f (0, -) for all 0, i.e., fy, (0, y) < w" (y) for all y > 0 (see
the proof of Theorem 1).
11 This can be obtained by redefining the types as 0 = 0 - 0.
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The envelope condition (4.6) implies that R = -fo (e 9 -Voc(tO, y(tO))p(O)dO) dt. For
each t > 0, we apply the change of variables / = tO, which takes E into itself. Under this
transformation, the term O,col (tO, y(tO)) becomes
1
t
Then, the integral with respect to 0 in equation (4.12) can be transformed according to
f 0 -Voc(tO, y(tO))p(O)dO = t-n- 1 1 -Voc(I, y(7))p () dy,
so that the expected informational rent becomes
R =- fe. . Voc(q, y(71)) fo t-- 1 p (1) dt) d.
Finally, letting r = 1/t and defining q(rq) = f Trn- 1 p(Tr)d, we obtain
R = - f r -Voc(q, y(?r))q(q)d.
Substituting R back into the principal's objective function, we obtain the following relaxed
maximization problem
maxE f (, y(O)) - c(O, y(O)) + 0 Voc (0, y (0)) ) (4.13)
y(-) P(O)
where the expectation operator is taken with respect to the probability measure defined by the
density p(O).
The procedure used to derive the expression above is known as integration along rays. It
only takes into account the constraints (4.1) along rays. 12 The term inside the expectation is
12Note that the gradient of the rent function,
Vr(0) = Voc(0,y(O)),
is a conservative vector field since, under assumption Al,
, °(O,y (O)) Y = (,y())ae,~ 0y8, 5y
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the virtual surplus. It consists of the first-best social surplus f(O, y(O)) - c(O, y(O)) plus the
distortion needed to prevent deviations along rays 0 Voc(O, y(O))() (which is negative because
ce, (y), ) < 0).
Remark 11 Armstrong (1996) characterizes the optimal "cost-based" tariff assuming homo-
geneity of the utility function wzth respect to the type parameter and separability of the agent's
"cost-based" indirect utilzty. Wzth an additional separability condition on the density function
which depends directly on the endogenous separability of the indirect utility, he also shows that
this tariff is optimal. McAfee and McMillan (1988) generalize the single-crossing condition
for the multidimensional case. However, their condition are so restrictive that imply that the
shadow price indifference curves have to be hyperplanes.
Although we are restricted to utility functions that satisfy Assumption 1, we do not need any
homogeneity and separabzlity assumptions. Moreover, the marginal cost indifference curves may
not be hyperplanes and, therefore, we do not assume the generalized single-crossing condition.
Thus, our setup is not contained neither in Armstrong (1996) nor in McAfee and McMzllan
(1988).
The following lemma will be useful to characterize the solution of Program (4.13).
Lemma 12 Suppose the cost function is convex. Let y : 0 -- R be a profile of activities and
define -y(0) _ c (y(O), 6) as the marginal cost associated with it. Let : y(O) - -> R be a function.
Then:
i. if y = oy and y is decreasing, then y(.) is implementable;
ii. if y (.) is implementable, then there exists a non-increasing y such that y = o y7.
Proof. First, note that Proposition 26 implies that y (.) is implementable if and only if it
satisfies conditions (4.2) and (4.3).
(i) Let us verify conditions (4.2) and (4.3). We have
cOy(O,y(O))y (O) = cO,(O,y(O))y'(Y(O))Y0 o(O)
S cony(, y()) '(rs(0))[cY (, y(O))ye, (0) + coey(O, y(b))1,
for all i, j = 1,..., n. Therefore, the integration along rays is unimportant to define procedure above.
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which implies that
[1 - cyy(0, y(0))y'( (0))]coy(0, y(o))yo, (0) = [coy(8, y(8))]2 /(0)).
Since c(0, y) is convex and y(-) is decreasing, it follows that (4.2) holds.
Let 0,0 c O be such that y(0) = y(0). Since y(.) is decreasing, y(8) = y(0). Therefore,
cy(0, y(0)) = cy(0, y(0)) or, equivalently,
Cy (0, y(0)) = cy(0, y(0)).
Hence, (4.3) holds.
(ii) Now, suppose that conditions (4.2) and (4.3) hold. From condition (4.3), it follows that
y(0) = y(0) = 'y(0) = -(),
for all 0, 0 E E. This means that the indifference curve of y(.) are contained in the indifference
curves of -y(-). Using condition (4.2), we have, through radial directions, that
y(8) > Y( A =. Y() <_ y A,
for all 0, 0 in a given radius from 0. Again using (4.3), the last inequality holds in all E. Applying
the representation theorem for preferences, there must exist a non-increasing y : y(O) -- R such
that y(O) = o y(O), for all 8 E O. .
Lemma 12 and Proposition 1 imply that y(O) is implementable by w(y) if (4.1) holds and
there exists a non-increasing function (7-) such that y(O) = f(,y(0)), where y(0) = c(0, y(O)).
Therefore, there is no loss of generality in considering the indirect mechanism where the message
space corresponds to the set of possible marginal costs of taking the action y. Each type reveals
its marginal cost -y(O) of taking the prescribed action, takes the action y(~(8)), and receives a
transfer of w ( (-(8))) .
Taking the conditional expectation of Program (4.13) and applying the law of iterated
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expectations, we obtain the following first-order condition:
E [f=(, y( (0)))|y (0) Y] - E 0.ocy (0, y()) pq( _ (0) =7 =0. (4.14)
Suppose that there exists an implicit decreasing and non-negative solution of equation (4.14),
~(~y).13 Then, the following theorem establishes that y* (0) = *(y(0)) is the solution of
Program (4.13):
Theorem 3 Suppose the valuation function f concave in y and the cost function c is convex in
y and satisfies Assumption 1. If equation (4.14) defines a decreasing function * : 7 (0) -+ R+
which is integrable,14 then y* (0) = *( (0)) is an optimal profile of activities.
Equation (4.14) has an intuitive interpretation in terms of projections. The unrestricted
optimum of Program (4.13) is the pointwise maximization of the virtual surplus. However, this
solution may not satisfy conditions (4.2) and (4.3). From Lemma 12, any profile of actions
that satisfies these conditions can be written as an indirect profile that is a function of 0 only
through the marginal cost of taking the action y (0). Then, condition (4.15) states that the
solution of the principal's program is determined by the first-order condition of the projection
of the virtual surplus on the space of marginal costs y (0).
Recall that, from Assumption 1, the cost function is c (0, y) = ( (y) + y x 4' (0) + <p (0) .
In order to prove Theorem 3, it is useful to consider indirect mechanisms where the message
space consists of 4 (O) . Although the space of marginal costs - (6) is more intuitive than the
space b (0), it is harder to work with since the marginal cost y (0) is a function of the profile of
actions y (.) , which is endogenous. However, when costs are convex, working with both message
spaces is equivalent:
Lemma 13 Consider a convex cost function satisfying Assumption 1, let y : 0 -*+ R be a profile
of activities, and define y(O) =_ y(0, y(O)) as the marginal cost associated with it. There exists
a strictly increasing function : ~y (0) -* 4 (0) such that / (y (0)) = 4 (0) for all 0 E O.
13If this relaxed solution does not satisfy the monotonicity condition one has to perform the usual "ironing
principle" (see Mussa and Rosen, 1978). Notice that since y(-y) is one-dimensional function, this is straightforward
exercise.
14 Integrability is ensured if, for example, limy-,, f (0, y)- c (0, y) = -oo for all 8. This implies that the implzczt
solution of (4.14) is bounded. Because () s compact, t follows that it is rntegrable.
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Proof. Since y(O) = ('(y(O)) + 4(0), it follows that
-Y- 'W-Y)) = 0-
The left hand side is an increasing function of -y because ' is a non-decreasing function (re-
member that (" = Cy > 0). Thus, y is an increasing transformation of V,, which concludes the
proof. m
Therefore, there is no loss of generality in considering indirect mechanisms where each type
sends message 4 (0), takes an action ( (0)) and obtains a transfer w ( (y())). Proceeding
as in equation (4.14), we obtain:
E[fy(9, y(V (O)))|4 (0) = 4] -r ' (y) - (0) + E .V (0)p (0)= = 0. (4.15)
Lemma 14 Suppose the valuation function f concave in y and the cost function c is convex in
y and satisfies Assumption 1. If equation (4.15) defines a decreasing function 0* : 4 (E) -* R
which is integrable, then y* (0) = y*(4 (0)) is an optimal profile of activities.
Proof. Suppose y (40) satisfies (4.15) and let 2 (4) be an arbitrary implementable profile of
activities. By the previous lemma we can suppose that y and z are non-increasing functions.
Let y (0) := (4 (0)) and z (0) := 2 (0 (0)).
Define the following functional
F[z] := E [D(O, z(O))],
where
D(O, z(O)) := f(0, z(O)) - c(O, z(0)) + O.Vc(O, z(O))q(
Note that F[z] consists of the objective function from Program (4.13) evaluated at z (0) .
Since D(O, -) is a concave function for each 0,
D(0, z(O)) - D(0, y(0)) < Dy(, y (0)) [z(0) - y( 0 ) .
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Taking the law of iterated expectations, yields
F[z] - F[y] _ E {E [Dy(O, y(0))I4 (0) = 7P] [(4) - ()]} .
However, (4.15) implies that E[Dy(0, (0))IV (0) = 4] = 0. Thus, F [z] - F[y] < O.
Theorem 3 then follows immediately from Lemmata 13 and 14. Note that, because Voy(O) =
.(0)E V0 , (O) 10(o) E (0) = 4[ ,()
Substituting in equation (4.15), we obtain
{E[fy(( 0), 0) 1(0) = ] - 7y} x E 0 Voy(O) q (O ) = (4.16)
=-(4,) E [ -Vo (0) q (0) )= 2 > 0,
where the inequality uses the fact that, by Lemmata 12 and 13, " is non-increasing. Note
that equation (4.1) implies that -y (0) = w' (y (0)) . Therefore, the inequality above generalizes
condition (4.9) for the multidimensional case.
The following examples illustrate the usefulness of the characterization in Theorem (3):
Example 14 (One-dimensional model with SCC) Take 0 to be an interval in R and let
coy < 0, cyy > 0. Since n = 1, we have
Oq(O) = f Op(70)dT = 1 - P (0) .
Because y(0) is a decreasing function, we can apply a change of variables from y to 0. Then,
equation (4.14) becomes
fy (0, y (0)) - c,(0, y (0)) = -co (0, y (0)) 1 (0)
which is the standard first-order condition of the unidimensional relaxed problem.
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Example 15 (One-dimensional Labor Market without SCC) In the model from Exam-
ple 9, let f = 0.15 The cost function becomes c (01, y, ) = 01-a0) , which satisfies Assumption
1. The marginal cost of schooling is 3y( 0 1) = p (01) = e01 (el) Suppose that 01 conditzonal on
- is uniformly distributed on [0,0]. In the appendix, we show that conditzon (4.14) becomes:
(4a ( g2 - 4
fy 2 (4)) g ,( )  = +  2 ) 2~2 . (4.17)2c 2a a
This equation characterizes the solution of the signaling model presented by Araujo, Gottlieb,
and Moreira (2007) in a screening environment. If f is type-independent (so that it can be
written as f (y)), the solution is + () = fy 1 (  (  i) ,2 4)
Example 16 (Two-dimensional Labor Market) Let 0 = (01, 02) be uniformly distributed
on [0, 1]2 and suppose the valuation function is type-independent (so that it can be written as
f (y)). As in Example 9, take c (0, y) = y  The marginal cost function is given by -y (0) =
'(0) 1= s- Then, condition (4.14) becomes
f '(y()) = 1+ E ()=q(O ) = ]
In the appendix, we show that E q (0) =- 1 ( . Thus the solution is
ILI 2y - 2 2 Thus, the solution is
characterized by' 6
I(Y)) = 2 2 + y - --n(y)
2-y
or, in terms of the agent's type,
1 1 0102
f' (y (01, 02)) 0102 - 2 [1 -ln(0 1 02)].
0102 2 2
Example 17 (Nonlinear Pricing) Consider the model of Example 11. Since fy = MC and
15 See Araujo and Morezra (2004) for the case P3 5 0. The analysis of this case is more complex since zmple-
mentabzlzty is not necessary by the local and global conditions presented in thzs paper.
16 It is strazghtforward to show that the implzczt solution (-y) is decreasing in -y.
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- (0)= cy(O, y (0)) = VQ (O,Q - y (0)) , equation (4.14) becomes
VQ (O,Q (0)) = MC + E .VoVQ(, Q(O))pqO) 17( ) = .
When types are one-dimensional and the SCC is satisfied, this equation reduces to the standard
nonlinear pricing rule:
1- F(0)
VQ (0, Q (0)) = MC + VOQ (0, Q (0))
The example below relates condition (4.16) to its one-dimensional counterpart (4.9):
Example 18 (Multidimensional Screening) Take n > 2 and suppose that the distribution
function is homogeneous of degree a < 2 - n. By homogeneity, q > 0 can be factored out of
the conditional expectation in condition (4.16). Thus, we obtain
{E[fy(Oy(O))4(0O) = V)] - w' (y (0))} E [0 Voy(0)I) (0) -= ] > 0,
which is the multidimensional equivalent of condition (4.9).
Suppose that the valuation function is type-independent (i.e., it can be written as f (y)) and
the cost cost function is homogenous of degree / < 0 on 0.17 Then, the first-order condition
(4.14) yields
f (%(-y)) - - + aP-y = 0,
where a = f rt+n-ld'r < 0o sznce a < 2 - n. From (1), this condition, after multiplying by
'(i), becomes
[f'(y (Y)) - w'(y (-))] y4'(y) = a/Py' (7) _ 0.
Thus, in this case, condition (4.9) holds when we identify each type by its marginal cost of the
activity -y (as was shown in the proof of Lemma 12, y is decreasing).
Reciprocally, for each mechanism (y(-), w(y)) we are able to find an economy such that the
mechanism is the solution of the principal's program. This is formally stated in the following
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17Armstrong (1996) assumes 0 = -1.
theorem:
Theorem 4 Suppose 0 = IR'. Let y : 0 --* R+ be a regular function and w (y) be a positive C 2
function. There exist a valuation functzon linear in y, a C 1 cost function satisfying Assumptions
0 and 1, and a distribution of types p for which (y(O), w(y)) is the optimal mechanism if and
only if w (y) is strictly increasing and condition (4.16) is satisfied.
Proof. (=>) Follows from an adaptation of Theorem 1.
(-=) Let (y(O), w(y)) be a mechanism satisfying the conditions of the Theorem. Applying
Theorem 1, we can find a cost function satisfying Assumptions AO and Al such that this
mechanism is incentive compatible. Notice that -y(O) = w'(y(O)). Take a density p over O that
is homogeneous of degree a < 2 - n. Hence, maximizing (4.13) pointwise is equivalent to setting
f(0, y) = (y)y, where
p (') = - aE [0.Voc (0, y(O))1y() = -y]
satisfies equation (4.15), which is necessary and sufficient for optimality, and a is defined in the
previous example. m
The participation constraint (IR) implies that all types participate in the mechanism. When
9 (0) + (0) = 0 for all 0 (as in Examples 14, 15, 16) there is no loss of generality in assuming
so. In general, however, it may be optimal to exclude some types. In that case, it is useful to
distinguish between two types of models:
1. Certain Participation: p (0) = cp for all 0 E O,
2. Random Participation: p (0) is non-constant in 0 E O.
Next, we study the exclusion of types in models with certain and random participation
separately.
Certain Participation
Without loss of generality, we can normalize co = 0. It is straightforward to show that the
exclusion region is defined by O0 = {0 E O; y(O) > yo}, where yo is such that y (Yo) = 0.
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Thus, it follows that, if equation (4.14) defines a decreasing function -* : y(0) --+ R which is
integrable, the optimal profile of activities is given by
y* (0) = max {* (' (0)), 0}.
Equivalently, if equation (4.15) defines a decreasing function Y* : (0) -- R, then the optimal
profile of activities is y* (0) = max {y* (4 (0)), 0}.
Random Participation
Recall that, by Lemmata 12 and 13, there is no loss of generality in considering indirect mech-
anisms where the message space is 4 (0). Let ? (0) = w (Y (4')) - ( (Y (0)) - y0 (4) . Given any
fixed mechanism, types which participate are those whose outside options are lower than f, i.e.,
Then, the principal's expected payoff is
E { [f (0,1 (4)) - ( (4')) - 4' (4') - f(V)] 1[ (V)>(O)] },
where 1 denotes the indicator function. If the solution y (0) of this program is a decreasing
function, then y (0) = ) (' (0)) is the solution of the principal's program.
Assume that the valuation function f is type-independent. Hence, as in models of second-
degree price discrimination, the agent's parameter of private information does not enter the
principal's payoff directly. Then, applying the law of iterated expectations, the principal's
payoff is
E {[f (Y (4))- { (p (4')) - 4'( (') - 0()] B 4' (0) = V51 }.
Let G (4, x) = E [1[x>g,(O)] 4'] denote the probability that a type with rent r (0) = x par-
ticipates conditional on 4' (0) = 4'. Denote the social surplus by S (4', y) = f (y) - ( (y) - 4y.
Following the approach of Rochet and Stole (2002), the principal's program can be written as
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the maximization of
E { [S (V, y (V)) - (V)] GP (V, (b)) },
subject to 9 (.) being non-increasing and there existing a w (.) such that w(( )) = F() +
(()) + 4y(v).
By the envelope theorem, this program is equivalent to
max E {I [S (V, y (V)) - (0)] GI (V, + (V))}
subject to ' (4) = -y (4), and
9 (4) non-increasing.
Ignoring the monotonicity condition, the solution is characterized by the second-order differen-
tial (Euler equation):
d 0[G (4, ? (4)) Sy (' (), )] + {[S (4', G ()) - (4')] ~ (', ? ())} = 0,
with boundary conditions 9 (m) = yFB(Om) and 9 (4 M) = yFB(OM), where Cm = min4' (0),
Om = arg minoee 4 (0) , M = max , (0), 0 M = arg max0e E (0), yFB (0) is the first-best
solution (i.e., it satisfies Sy(0, yFB(0)) = 0), and '(4') = -((0).
Simplifying and using the fact that -'(4) = -(4), we obtain:
G(P, P (0)) [(" (9 ( )) - f" (Y ( )))" ( ) - 2] + G ( ,
(4.18)
+G (4, (4')) [(f' ( (4)) - ' ( (4))) ? (4) + f (9 ())- ( (p (4))- F (')] = 0.Or
Assuming that equation (4.18) implicitly defines a non-increasing function y (4) , it characterizes
the solution of the random participation model when valuations are type-independent. If the
solution y (4) is not non-increasing, the solution is obtained by applying an ironing procedure.
The proposition below summarizes this result:
Proposition 27 Suppose the valuation function f is type-independent and concave and suppose
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that the cost function c is convex in y and satisfies Assumptwon 1. If equation (4.18) defines a
decreasing function 0* : () -- IR which is integrable, then y* (0) = y*(b (0)) is an optimal
profile of activities.
Equation (4.18) generalizes the characterization of Rochet and Stole (2002) for arbitrary
distributions of types and arbitrary cost functions satisfying Assumption 1. The following
example shows that their model can be obtained as a special case of our characterization:
Example 19 (Rochet and Stole, 2002) Let 0 C R 2 be an interval and denote types by
2
(t, x) E O. Let 4 (t, x) = -t, p (t, x) = -x, f (y) - ( (y) = -. Assume that types t and x are
independently distributed and denote by f (t) and G (x) the probability distribution of t and the
cumulatzve distribution of x, respectively. Let M(t, u) - G~' (t, u) = f(t)G(u).
Then, equation (4.18) becomes
MU(t, u) (u - u + M(t, u)(2 - u) + Mt(t, u)(t - u) = 0,2)
which is the equation obtained by Rochet and Stole.
Therefore, this section analyzed the solution of screening models under Assumption 1. The-
orem 3 characterized the solution when all types participate. In 4.3.2, it was shown that this
characterization can be easily generalized to the case of certain participation (i.e., sO (0) =
for all 0). In 4.3.2, we characterized the solution with the exclusion of types when participation
is random but valuation functions are type-independent. This characterization generalized the
one presented by Rochet and Stole (2002).
In terms of empirical implications, Theorem 4 established that the screening model imposes
two restrictions on the space of mechanisms (y(O), w(y)) . First, by incentive-compatibility, it
requires w to be monotonic. Second, maximization of the principal's payoff imposes condition
(4.16). When types are one-dimensional or when the distribution function and the cost function
are homogeneous and the valuation function is type-independent, this condition implies that
the principal's profit as a function of types must increase at a greater rate under asymmetric
information than the increase in productivity (which is equal to the rate of growth under
symmetric information).
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4.4 The Signaling Game
In this section, we consider a standard signaling game where preferences are as described in
Section 4.2. There are many identical principals ('receivers') who act competitively. For sim-
plicity, we consider the case where the principal's valuation function does not depend on the
amount of the activity ('signal') exerted by the agent ('sender'):
f(0, y) = f(O).
Therefore, the only way through which the activity affects the transfer is through its infor-
mational content. Of course, our results extend to the case where the activity also affects
the valuation. Our competitive assumption implies that the transfer is equal to the expected
valuation of the sender conditional on the signaling activity.
The timing of the signaling game is as follows. First, nature determines the type of each
sender, 0, according to the density function p. Then, senders choose the amount of signaling y
contingent on their types. Subsequently, the market offers a transfer w (y) conditional on the
observed signal.
Since all receivers are equal, we will study symmetric equilibria where the offered wage
schedule is the same for every receiver. As usual, we adopt the perfect Bayesian equilibrium
concept. In what follows E[.I.] represents the conditional expectation operator with respect to
the measure of beliefs /.
Definition 9 A perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) for the signaling game is a profile of strate-
gies (y (0) ,w (y)) and beliefs p (. y) such that:
1. The sender's strategy zs optzmal given the equilibrzum wage schedule, z.e., (IC) holds.
2. The market is competitive (i.e., receivers earn zero profits):
w (y) = E [f (0) I y(-) = y]. (4.19)
3. Beliefs are consistent: i (0 1 y) is derived from the sender's strategy using Bayes' rule
where possible.
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Substituting the zero-profit condition (4.19) into the first-order condition from incentive-
compatibility (4.1), we obtain:
' E [f(.) y(-) = y(0)]
c, (0, y (0)) (4.20)
Consider a separating equilibrium. Bayes' rule implies that w (y (0)) = E [f (-) y(-) = y(0)]
f (0) for all 0. Therefore, equation (4.20) becomes yo, (0) = eO). Therefore, Assumption 0
implies that we must have yo, (0) > 0 in any separating equilibrium. However, from the second-
order condition from incentive compatibility (4.2), we can only have Ye, (0) > 0 if cO,y (0, y (0)) <
0. Hence, a fully separating equzlibrium exists only if c,y (0, y (0)) < 0 for all 0: The SCC is
satisfied along the equilbrium signal y. 18
Given an equilibrium profile (y(-), w(.)), denote the type with the lowest amount of activity
y, the amount he chooses, and the wage he gets by
min- = arg min y
ymin = y(Omi), and (4.21)
m in  
= W (min).
Let fmin denote the lowest valuation in the economy:
fmin = min f (o) .
In a PBE we need to make sure that agents have no incentive to deviate to actions off
the equilibrium path. In order to obtain a sufficient condition for types not to benefit from
deviating to actions off the equilibrium path, let beliefs off the equilibrium be given by
S( 0 )= lif 0 = argminf ()
0 if 0 argmin f )
for y 0 y (O) . By deviating to any y 0 y (O) , an agent gets transfer f m in, which gives a payoff of
'sThis condition is slightly less demanding than the SCC, which states that co , (0, y) < 0 for all 0, y.
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at most fmin - c (0, 0) . Then, type 0 does not want to deviate to any action off the equilibrium
path y y (0) if this payoff is lower than E [f (-) I ymin] - c (0, ymin) . Therefore, types do not
benefit from deviating to actions off the equilibrium path if y m 'n > 0 satisfies
E [f (0) ymin] _ fmin c (0, ymin) - c (0, ), y V, (4.22)
for all y y (6) .
Notice that the set of actions ym in > 0 such that this inequality is satisfied is non-empty
(since ymin = 0 satisfies this condition). Moreover, when 0 min is separated, the only ymin com-
patible with (4.22) is ymin = 0. Inequality (4.22) gives boundary conditions for the differential
equation (4.1).
Conditions (4.1), (4.2), (4.3), (4.19), and (4.22) are necessary for a PBE. As in Example 13,
they may not be sufficient when Assumption 1 does not hold. However, the following lemma
states that they are sufficient for a PBE when Assumption 1 holds.
Lemma 15 Suppose Assumption 1 holds and let y(-) and w(.) be regular functions. There
exists a set of beliefs [t( y) such that (y(-), w(.), yt (-)) is a PBE if and only if the first- and
second-order conditions (4.1) and (4.2), the pooling condition (4.3), the zero-profit condition
(4.19), and the boundary condition (4.22) are satisfied.
Proof. (=) Straight from Proposition 26.
(=) Define the transfer schedule as in Proposition 26, where wm ' is as defined in (4.21).
Observe that w(yin) = min and, by (4.20), w'(y(O))yo(O) = -E[f(.)y(.) = y(0)] for
every regular type 0 and every i. Therefore, by continuity, w (y) = E [f (0) y(-) = y] for all
y E y(O), i.e., the zero profit condition holds.
Lemma 26 has shown that the agent's strategy is optimal given the equilibrium transfer
schedule. This concludes the proof. n
Inequality (4.22) implies that, when 0 min is not separated, there may exist several boundary
conditions ymi" that satisfy the requirements of a PBE. In order to deal with the multiplicity
of equilibria, we will follow part of the literature by selecting based on an efficiency criterion.
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Thus, we impose as a selection criterion that
y m in = 0. (4.23)
We will refer to a PBE satisfying condition (4.23) as a least costly equilibrium. The proposition
below states necessary and sufficient conditions for a least costly equilibrium.
Proposition 28 Suppose Assumption 1 holds and let y(.) and w(-) be regular functions. There
exists a set of beliefs ip ( i y) such that (y(-), w(-), p (-)) is a least costly equilibrium if and only
if the first- and second-order conditions (4.1) and (4.2), the pooling condition (4.3), and the
boundary condition (4.23) are satisfied.
Proof. Follows straight from Lemma 15. m
Proposition 28 characterizes the least costly equilibria of the signaling model. This charac-
terization allows us to study which restrictions follow from a signaling model when the single-
crossing condition is not imposed.
We know from Section 4.2 that incentive-compatibility implies that the transfer schedule
must be strictly increasing. Furthermore, our selection criterion implies that there must be
some type 0 such that y (0) = 0. The theorem below shows that these are the only implications
of the signaling model.
Theorem 5 Let y (-) be a regular function and let w (-) be a positive C2 function. There exists
a C 1 cost function satisfying Assumption 1 and a distribution of types p for which (y(.), w(-)) is
a least costly equilibrium profile of signals and transfers if and only if w (.) is strictly increasing
and there exists a 0 E E such that y (0) = 0. Furthermore, this equilibrium profile is the same
for all distribution of types p.
Proof. (->) Obvious.
(4) Let us define the following C 1 functions: c(O, y) as in the proof of Theorem 1 and
f(0) = w(y(O)).
Observe that c and f are non-negative C 1 functions. We claim that the pair (y(-), w(-)) are the
profiles of signals and transfers in a least costly equilibrium for the economy {c, f, p}, for any
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density p. First, by Proposition 26 (y(.), w(-)) is incentive compatible which implies Condition
1 of the definition of the PBE. Moreover, y(O) = y(0) = f(O) = f(O), which implies that
E[f(.)y(O) = y] = f(O) and - {E[f(.)Iy(O) = y]} = fo,(O), for all 0 and density p. We then
only need to prove the first-order conditions (4.20) which is equivalent to
fo, (O) w'(y(O))yo (O) yo)
cy(0,Y(()) w'(y(O))
Finally, the boundary condition (4.23) obviously holds. Using Theorem 1, we conclude the
proof. *
Since the equilibrium constructed in Theorem 5 holds for all distributions p and for any
cost function c(O, y) = w'(y(O))y + (y - y()) 2 with kT > K, it follows that the model is not
identified given data on signals and transfers. Indeed, any distribution of types is compatible
with the same equilibrium profile of signals and transfers. Thus, we have the following corollary:
Corollary 6 Signaling models are not identified given data on szgnals and transfers: for every
profile (y(.), w(.)) satisfying the conditions of Theorem 5, there is an znfinite number of signaling
models that have this profile as a least costly equilibrium.
Remark 12 The only robust property that emerges from the equzlibrium is the monotonicity of
the wage schedule. If the cost of signaling function is increasing on the signal then, by revealed
preference, equilibrium wages are increasing.
Therefore, in the context of education as a signal, the only robust implication of the signaling
hypothesis is the monotonicity of wages in education. However, this result is also shared by the
usual human capital (symmetric information) models. Indeed, the revealed preference argument
holds regardless of the link between education and product'ity.
In the context of advertising as a signal, Theorem 5 implies that revenues must be increas-
ing in advertisement. Because this is implied by revealed preference it holds regardless of the
relationship between quality and advertising. It is also shared by Becker and Murphy's (1993)
model of advertisement as a good, for example.
Remark 13 For one-dimensional type models, Theorem 5 says that signaling models are com-
patible with non-monotonic signaling functions. However, from (4.2), this is only possible
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when the SCC zs violated. Recent works show that such non-monotonic equzlbria may emerge
and have important empirical consequences [see Araujo et al. (2007) and Araujo and Moreira
(2003)].
Theorem 5 does not allow one to control for the valuation function. From an applied
perspective, it assumes that the econometrists do not observe the valuation function. Next, we
show that even if one controls for the valuation function, the indeterminacy result still remains.
More precisely, let y(O) be a profile of signals and w (y) be the associated transfer schedule
that satisfy the conditions of Theorem 2. Fix any valuation function f(0). We say that f is
consistent with the given profile of signals and transfers if it satisfies the zero-profit condition:
w(y) = E[f(-) y(0) = y], (4.24)
where the expectation is taken with respect to some distribution of types p. Definition 9
implies that this consistency requirement must be satisfied in any PBE. The following corollary
establishes that any profile of signals and transfers satisfying (4.24) can be rationalized by a
cost of signaling function and a distribution of types as a part of a least costly equilibrium
of this economy (characterized by the fixed valuation function and the distribution of types).
Formally, we have the following:
Corollary 7 Let y (-) be a regular function, let w (-) be a C2 functon, and let f (-) be a valuation
function satisfying (4.24) with respect to a continuous density p. There exists a C' cost function
satisfying Assumption 1 for which (y(-), w(-)) is a least costly equilibrium profile of signals and
transfers if and only if w (-) is strictly increasing and there exists a 0 c 0 such that y (0) = 0.
Proof. (>) Obvious.
(4=) Take the cost of signaling exactly as in the proof of Theorem 1 and the density p. Then,
following the same steps of the proof of Theorem 5 establishes the result. *
Theorem 5 and Corollary 7 show that there are only three implications of signaling models.
First, the zero-profit condition implies that transfers have to be in the convex hull of the
valuation of agents. Second, our selection criterion based on efficiency requires some type
to choose zero amount of the activity (least costly equilibrium). However, this result is not
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robust since there are PBEs that do not satisfy this condition. Third, the fact that signaling is
costly implies that transfers must be strictly increasing in signals. Although this conclusion is
extremely robust, it is also implied by most alternative models. Any profiles of activities y and
transfers w satisfying these three conditions is compatible with a least costly equilibrium of a
signaling model.
Remark 14 (The multidimensional case n x n) By Quinzii and Rochet (1985) another
interesting extension to consider here is economies that have the same dimension of types and
signals. Do the result of our paper remain the same? Under a natural generalization of as-
sumption AO and Al we have the following conclusions: (i) the characterization of incentive
compatibility Secton 2 are naturally generalizable; (ii) the indeterminacy results of this section
(Theorem 5 and Corollary 1) are then straightforward; (iii) however, the characterization of
the screening problem is not trivial. Although one can extend the integration by rays to get an
analogous expression of Program (13), it is not obvious that Lemma 3 will be true in this case
and consequently the projection method to derive an analogous first-order condition (14).
4.5 Conclusion
This paper studied incentive-compatibility when the single-crossing condition is not satisfied.
This allowed us to provide a characterization of the solution of multidimensional screening mod-
els and the equilibria of multidimensional signaling models. Then, using our characterization,
we analyzed the restrictions imposed by incentive-compatibility, screening, and signaling once
the single-crossing condition does not hold.
First, it was shown that the only implication of incentive-compatibility was the monotonicity
of transfers in actions. Then, in the case of screening models, we obtained a new necessary and
sufficient condition. In the one-dimensional models, it implies the principal's profit to grow at a
higher rate under asymmetric information than the it would grow under symmetric information.
In the case of signaling models, the zero-profit condition implies that transfers must be in
the convex hull of valuations in each set of pooled types. We have also imposed a selection
criterion that requires some type to choose a zero amount of the signal. We have shown that any
profile of actions and transfers satisfying these conditions is an equilibrium of some economy.
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Therefore, apart from these mild restrictions, the implications of signaling and screening
models arise from assumptions of the cross-partial derivative of the cost function. In the absence
of more precise knowledge of the cost function, we cannot obtain other testable predictions from
these models.
Appendix A
SCC
One-dimensional Labor Market Model without
First note that b = 1 implies that
-2 4c /2 4a
-= or 81 =2a 2a
In a discrete pooling set these types are equally likely conditional to 4(0) = b under the uniform
distribution. We have that
01q(0 1) 1 - P(01)
p(O) p(O1)
and, since '(01) = -( - 2a01) 2 = + a 1 2,
O1q(O1) ?(O1)
'()
p(91) ( - 0) + a012)
=- + 012 & 2 2
E [0 O1(01) = ]Oz 81
= g and
2
2 1
2a2 ao"
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Therefore,
E q '(O1 ) 0(01) - E 0 (1) = + - a 2E [92 (81) = ]
but
This implies that
qp(01) 0'(01)] /(01) 4] _ 2 + 0_2 02+2 2a
= 2- +~2
2) .
a
Finally, condition (4.14) becomes
2 _ 4a
9 g 1
2a
2 4a
2a
+fyil
(0))
which is the condition (4.17).
Two-dimensional Labor Market Model
Let p = 1 on [0, 1]2 and -7 = 1 . Thus, 0 -Voy = -y, and
(00 in{1/ 0 1 , 1 / 0 2 } +
q(O) f= Tn-lp(O)dT = [rdr]
Lemma: For all - E [1, oo),
Proof: We have to s
q (O)how that
Proof. We have to show that
1
0) = 7]
2 [min{1/01, 1/02 2
=2
- 1]+
1 In(y)
2y2 2-y2
=[pE [qh(7)]
for mensurable function h : [1, oo) --+ R. Let us calculate the right hand side. To do it, we will make the
change of variable from (01, 02) to (01, y):
T: [0, 1]2 t [0, 1] x [1, oo]
(01,02) -(01,1/0102)
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Appendix B
=g+ -4 - 20,
a
E [E [ q()= 7
Then,
T-1 : D -- [0, 1]2
(01,) - (01, 1/701)
where D = T ([0,1]2) = {(O,/) E [0,1] x [1, oo];7 > 1/0 } and
IDT- =
1 0
1 1
y0Y y 21
1
,201
- 0I
Hence,
E [ h(_ ) f q(O)h(7 )dO2 d01
11/ (01 O,7)h(7) x
(4.25)
( -0) dO
11 1, ) h(7 )dOld
1 1/r 7(,~ 241
where the last equality comes from Fubini's theorem and q(O1,7) = q(0 1, 1/'1). Note that
1 1
> = 0 - 01 ~ 1 1/2 '01 - 02 7
1 1
72 = <1 - 81.
701 7
Therefore, we have that
722021
q(01, "Y) = 2 1[
-1 01 <1, 1/2
I-1, 1 -< 0, < 1
Substituting in equation (4.25), yields
E [- h( )] = I h(y)
1 272
{I / 81 2
I/ Y ( 7Y2 01
- dO +
Note that
0= 2 1/Y11 2
dO1 = Y2 12 1/-Y - ln(
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1/I
iy1/2 - de dIy.Y1//2 ((1 01
(21 - 1)
(4.26)
1Sln(7),
2
and
fl (1 1 ) d 1  1 - ln(Ol) 1 / 2
1/y/2 01 202 1/ 1/ 2
+ - I ± ln(7y).
2 222
Therefore, equation (4.26) simplifies to
[q() h()] - h( - 1 - ln(y)) d
for all h, which establishes the result.
References
Acemoglu, Daron, 1998. Credit Market Imperfections and the Separation of Ownership from Control.
Journal of Economic Theory 78, 355-381.
Araujo, A., Moreira, H., 2003. Non-monotone insurance contracts and their empirical consequences.
Discussion Paper #512, Getulio Vargas Foundation.
Araujo, A., Moreira, H., 2004. Adverse Selection Problems without the Spence-Mirrlees Condition.
Discussion Paper #425, Getulio Vargas Foundation.
Araujo A., Gottlieb D., Moreira H., 2007. A Model of Mixed Signals with applications to Countersig-
naling, RAND Journal of Economics 38, 1020-1043.
Araujo, A., Moreira, H., Tsuchida, M., 2004. Do Dividends Signal More Earnings? A theoretical
analysis. Discussion Paper #524, Getulio Vargas Foundation.
Araujo, A., Moreira, H., 2003. Non-monotone insurance contracts and their empirical consequences.
Discussion Paper #512, Getulio Vargas Foundation.
Armstrong, M., 1996. Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing, Econometrica 64, 51-75.
Bagxwell, L. S., Bernheim, B. D., 1996. Veblen Effects in a Theory of Conspicuous Consumption. Amer-
ican Economic Review 86, 394-377.
Becker, G. S., Murphy, K. M., 1993. A Simple Theory of Advertising as a Good or Bad. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 108, 941-964.
Bernheim, B. D., 1991. Tax Policy and the Dividend Puzzle. Rand Journal of Economics 22; 455-476.
Bernheim, B. D., 1994. A Theory of Conformity. Journal of Political Economy 102; 841-877.
Bernheim, B. D., Redding, L. S., 2001. Optimal Money Burning: Theory and Application to Corporate
Dividend Policy, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 10, 463-507.
188
Bernheim, B.D., Severinov, S., 2003. Bequests as Signals: An Explanation for the Equal Division Puzzle,
Journal of Political Economy, 111, 733-764.
Chiappori, P.-A., Jullien, B., Salani6, B., Salani6, F., 2006. Asymmetric Information in Insurance:
General Testable Implications, RAND Journal of Economics, 37, 783-798.
Engers, M., Fernandez, L., 1987. Market Equilibrium with Hidden Knowledge and Self-Selection. Econo-
metrica 55, 425-439.
Heckman, J., 2005. Lessons from the Technology of Skill Formation. NBER Working Paper #11142.
Heckman, J., J. Stixrud, Urzua S., 2005. The Effects of Cognitive and Noncognitive Abilities on Labor
Market Outcomes and Social Behavior. Discussion Paper, University of Chicago.
Kohllepel, L. Multidimensional 'Market Signaling', 1983. Discussion Paper, Universitit Bonn.
Matthews, S., Moore, J. 1987. Monopoly Provision of Quality and Warranties: An Exploration in the
Theory of Multidimensional Screening. Econometrica 55,441-467.
McAfee, R.P., McMillan, J., 1988. Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design.
Journal of Economic Theory 46, 335-354
Milgrom, P. R., Segal, I. R., 2002. Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets, Econometrica 70,
583-601.
Milgrom, P. R., Shannon, C., 1992. Monotone Comparative Statics, Econometrica 62, 157-180.
Mirrlees, J. A., 1971. An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation. Review of Economic
Studies 38, 175-208.
Quinzii, M., Rochet, J.-C., 1985. Multidimensional Signaling. Journal of Mathematical Economics 14,
261-284.
Rochet, J.-C., Stole, L., 2003. The Economics of Multidimensional Screening. In: M. Dewatripont, L. P.
Hansen and S. J. Turnovsky (eds.) Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications
- Eight World Congress, 2003.
Rotemberg. J. J., 1988. Pareto Improving Distortionary Taxes in the Presence of Signaling. Alfred P.
Sloan School of Management Working Paper No. 2039-88.
Rothschild. TM. and Stiglitz, J. E., 1976. Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: An essay on the
economics of imperfect information. Quarterly Journal of Economics 90, 629-650.
Smart, M., 2000. Competitive Insurance Markets with Two Unobservables. International Economic
Review 41, 153-169.
Spence, M., 1974. Market Signalling. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
189
